📅 May 26, 2012

Re: Hello

From: Caroline Lang

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Yes, at your house? Envoyé de mon iPad Le 26 mai 2012 a 19:15, "Jeffrey Epstein" <jeevacation@gmail.com> a ecrit : 1030?

Yes, at your house?

Envoyé de mon iPad

Le 26 mai 2012 a 19:15, "Jeffrey Epstein" <jeevacation@gmail.com> a ecrit :

1030?

📅 May 27, 2012

(no subject)

From: Jeffrey Epstein

To: Caroline Lang

Tomorrow morning is fine. I must leave at 12. We can do tonite or Tom morning. Sorry for typos, sent from my iPhone.

Tomorrow morning is fine. I must leave at 12. We can do tonite or Tom morning. Sorry for typos, sent from my iPhone.

📅 Jun 11, 2012 REDACTED

Re:

From: Richard Kahn

To: Jeffrey

I emailed Munro to figure out exact timing however we were told 16-18 weeks from purchase date of May 23rd PLEASE NOTE EFFECTIVE JUNE 5TH MY CONTACT INFO WILL BE AS FOLLOWS: Richard Kahn HBRK Associates Inc. On Jun 11, 2012, at 1:27 PM, Jeffrey wrote: When does the transformer arrive? Sorry for all the typos. Sent from my iPhone On Jun 11, 2012, at 1:24 PM, Richard Kahn wrote: Attached are available cash balances as Darren informed me that you would like to make a $10,000,000 investment

I emailed Munro to figure out exact timing however we were told 16-18 weeks from purchase date of May 23rd

PLEASE NOTE EFFECTIVE JUNE 5TH MY CONTACT INFO WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

Richard Kahn

HBRK Associates Inc.

On Jun 11, 2012, at 1:27 PM, Jeffrey wrote:

When does the transformer arrive?

Sorry for all the typos. Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 11, 2012, at 1:24 PM, Richard Kahn wrote:

Attached are available cash balances as Darren informed me that you would like to make a $10,000,000 investment via Mort

Please advise on where I should take funds

PLEASE NOTE EFFECTIVE JUNE 5TH MY CONTACT INFO WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

Richard Kahn
HBRK Associates Inc.
████████████████████████

████████████

Begin forwarded message:

From: Harry Beller

Date: June 11, 2012 11:25:25 AM EDT

To: Rich Kahn

Subject: available cash

Available Cash:

Financial Trust Company:

1) JPM (managed by Ted Serure) $3,510,650

2) JPM $3,738,700

3) JPM (Paul Barrett managed, trading (75mm) A/c) $4,726,000

HAZE Trust:

1) JPM (MM account) $1,627,000

JEE:

1) JPM (managed by Ted Serure) $666,000

📅 Apr 12, 2012

(no subject)

From: Jeffrey Epstein

To: Irina

call me

call me

📅 Apr 12, 2012

Re:

From: Irina

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Hi Jeffrey, can I please call in 20 minutes? Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

Hi Jeffrey, can I please call in 20 minutes?

Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

📅 Jul 11, 2012 REDACTED

Re:

From: Unknown

To: Jeffrey Epstein

call me if you in NY. On 7/11/12, Jeffrey Epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote: > no„ should i > > On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 6:12 PM, rote: > » Jeffrey, do you know this girl Aksana Samy (belorussian, One model » management, blonde)? >> > > > > -- > > The information contained in this communication is confidential, may > be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and > is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of > Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use,

call me if you in NY.

On 7/11/12, Jeffrey Epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote:

> no„ should i
>
> On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 6:12 PM, rote:
>
» Jeffrey, do you know this girl Aksana Samy (belorussian, One model
» management, blonde)?
>>
>
>
>
> --
>
> The information contained in this communication is confidential, may
> be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and
> is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of
> Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this
> communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be
> unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please
> notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to
> jeevacation@gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies
> thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

📅 Apr 23, 2012

NYC travel dates

From: Bill Conover

To: Jeff Epstein

Jeff, I will be in NYC from May 1st for a few days. Do you have time to meet? Bill The information contained in this message is privileged, confidential and protected from disclosure. Any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication without prior permission is prohibited.

Jeff,

I will be in NYC from May 1st for a few days. Do you have time to meet?

Bill

The information contained in this message is privileged, confidential and protected from disclosure. Any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication without prior permission is prohibited.

📅 Jul 14, 2012

Re:

From: Brian Boyd

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Hi Jeffrey, Sure. If you're in the EST area, I'm 8 hours behind you, a day ahead. Today or tomorrow both fine. Now or over the next few hours would be fine. B On 15/07/2012, at 1:40 AM, Jeffrey Epstein wrote: lets skype or talk in the next day or two ******* The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorize

Hi Jeffrey,

Sure. If you're in the EST area, I'm 8 hours behind you, a day ahead. Today or tomorrow both fine. Now or over the next few hours would be fine.

B

On 15/07/2012, at 1:40 AM, Jeffrey Epstein wrote:

lets skype or talk in the next day or two

*******

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation@gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

📅 Jul 4, 2012

Welcome! Here's Your Registration Confirmation

From: Match.com <mailer@connectmatch.com>

To: jeevacation@gmail.com

Welcome to the Leading Online Dating Site Congratulations! You've joined the most dynamic group of singles out there. We're responsible for more dates, relationships and marriages than any other site. Period. Please Review Your Account Information: Username: jeeproject Password: Email: jeevacation@gmail.com ZIP Code: 10022 Birthday You are a: Man Seeking: Women To make changes to the above information, go to http://www.match.com/login/login.aspx?TrackingID=526118&BannerID=551328&EmailID=fbc8

Welcome to the Leading Online Dating Site

Congratulations! You've joined the most dynamic group of singles out there. We're responsible for more dates, relationships and marriages than any other site. Period.

Please Review Your Account Information:

Username: jeeproject
Password:
Email: jeevacation@gmail.com
ZIP Code: 10022
Birthday
You are a: Man
Seeking: Women

To make changes to the above information, go to
http://www.match.com/login/login.aspx?TrackingID=526118&BannerID=551328&EmailID=fbc8d1d6-6add-45cc-8eff-85f1170c3579&LAND=/accountsettings/changeReg.aspx

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Finding a great date all starts with writing a great profile. Take a minute and let everyone know exactly who you are. http://www.match.com/login/login.aspx?TrackingID=526118&BannerID=551328&EmailID=fbc8d1d6-6add-45cc-8eff-85f1170c3579&LAND-/profile/myprofile.aspx

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MATCH.COM DOES NOT CONDUCT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS ON ITS MEMBERS. PLEASE TAKE PROPER SAFETY PRECAUTIONS.

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📅 Jul 2, 2012 REDACTED

Dr. Mechanick 2:30 TOMORROW!

From: Lesley Groff

To: Jeffrey Epstein CC

Dr. Mechanick's office for BLOOD WORK ONLY at 2:30 tomorrow July 3, Tuesday **Reminder to Car Shop Today** **FTC Closed for Emancipation Day** **Reminder to Call Larry Delso** 9:30 Appt w/Leon Black's Tax Guy, Tom Turrin (Eileen Alexanderson, EAlexanderson@apollo-advisors.com) 10:30 Appt w/ ████ ████ (917 702 0142) 2:30 Appt w/Dr. Mechanick- For Blood Work Only 1192 Park Ave, Corner of 93/94, Ground Floor 212 831 2100 4:00 Appt w/Patrick for haircut at Frederic Fekkai Salon Henri Bend

Dr. Mechanick's office for BLOOD WORK ONLY at 2:30 tomorrow

July 3, Tuesday

**Reminder to Car Shop Today**

**FTC Closed for Emancipation Day**

**Reminder to Call Larry Delso**

9:30 Appt w/Leon Black's Tax Guy, Tom Turrin (Eileen Alexanderson, EAlexanderson@apollo-advisors.com)

10:30 Appt w/ ████ ████ (917 702 0142)

2:30 Appt w/Dr. Mechanick- For Blood Work Only

1192 Park Ave, Corner of 93/94, Ground Floor

212 831 2100

4:00 Appt w/Patrick for haircut at Frederic Fekkai Salon

Henri Bendel

714 5th Ave. (btn 55th & 56th), 4th floor

212-753-9500

📅 Jul 12, 2012 REDACTED

Re:

From: Unknown

To: Jeffrey Epstein

will do On Jul 12, 2012, at 2:43 PM, Jeffrey Epstein wrote: remind me to call ███ on aug 14 ******** The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in er

will do

On Jul 12, 2012, at 2:43 PM, Jeffrey Epstein wrote:

remind me to call ███ on aug 14

********

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation@gmail.com <mailtoleevacation@gmail.com> , and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

📅 Apr 15, 2012 REDACTED

(no subject)

From: Jeffrey Epstein

To: Unknown

I tried thurs fri and sat.. I have yet to see or f=nd you.. I do not like it. you told me you were busy thur=. . i underst000d. I will only be here mon and tues

I tried thurs fri and sat.. I have yet to see or f=nd you.. I do not like it. you told me you were busy thur=. . i underst000d. I will only be here mon and tues

📅 Apr 15, 2012 REDACTED

Re:

From: Unknown

To: Jeffrey Epstein

do you ased me why i couldnt come yeste=day ? i didnt tell you I'm busy friday, yes i were cleaned a=ts but i could come anytime to see you if someone asked me because i t=ought you are busy and i asked to call me back in this night because i want=d to explain everything and ask should i do the procedure , and if yes &nbs=;i needed your help i had yesterday commplicated procedure with anesthesia s= someone had to pick me up because it was in king hway , Brooklyn , i=couldn't walk home by myself

do you ased me why i couldnt come yeste=day ? i didnt tell you I'm busy friday, yes i were cleaned a=ts but i could come anytime to see you if someone asked me because i t=ought you are busy and i asked to call me back in this night because i want=d to explain everything and ask should i do the procedure , and if yes &nbs=;i needed your help i had yesterday commplicated procedure with anesthesia s= someone had to pick me up because it was in king hway , Brooklyn , i=couldn't walk home by myself I told you even before &=bsp;i have a big problem with my pussy that were all over small pumps=with pus and some of them got big sizes that I even hardly w=lked

Sent from my iPad

📅 Jun 11, 2012

Re: RE: RE: RE:

From: Jeffrey

To: Boris Nikolic

Make mark Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone On Jun 11, 2012, at 1:46 PM, Boris Nikolic wrote: > Rodger - will send an email later at night that my schedule changed. > > Pls let me know if you would like that I skip Mark as well. > > Really your call! > > B > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Jeffrey [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com] > > Sent: Monday, June 11, 2012 10:39 AM > > To: Boris Nikolic > > Subject: Re: RE: RE: > >Cancel > > Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone

Make mark

Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 11, 2012, at 1:46 PM, Boris Nikolic wrote:

> Rodger - will send an email later at night that my schedule changed.
>
> Pls let me know if you would like that I skip Mark as well.
>
> Really your call!
>
> B
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
>
> From: Jeffrey [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com]
>
> Sent: Monday, June 11, 2012 10:39 AM
>
> To: Boris Nikolic
>
> Subject: Re: RE: RE:
>
>Cancel
>
> Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Jun 11, 2012, at 1:36 PM, Boris Nikolic
wrote:
>
>> Rodger!
>>
» If you prefer I do not need to meet him this time. I can cancel on him.
» My schedule is already almost full.
>>
» I will make Mark but I can cancel Ian. Totally up to you
>>
>> Boris
>>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Jeffrey [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com]

» Sent: Monday, June 11, 2012 10:33 AM
>> To: Boris Nikolic
>> Subject: Re: RE:
>>
1

EFTA_R1_00079404
EFTA01769059

>> He is a gossipy gay, unlike mark lloyd who is a safe deposit
>>
>> Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On Jun 11, 2012, at 1:30 PM, Boris Nikolic wrote:
>>
>>> OK.
>>> Will do so.
>>> Will be careful.
>>> And was planning - that was only a joke over the email.
>>>
>>> Is there Anything I should be careful to say or not to say.
>>> I can call you later in day to discuss.
>>>

>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Jeffrey [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com]

>>> To: Boris Nikolic

>>> lan is NOT family. go slow

>>> Sorry for all the typos.Sent from my iPhone

<key>date-last-viewed</key>
<integer>0</integer>
<key>date-received</key>
<integer>1339439496</integer>
<key>flags</key>
<integer>8590195713</integer>
<key>gmail-label-ids</key>
<array>
<integer>22</integer>
<integer>23</integer>
</array>
<key>remote-id</key>
<string>228784</string>
</dict>
</plist>

>>> B

>>>
>>>

>>> Sent: Monday, June 11, 2012 10:28 AM

>>> Subject:
>>>
>>>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>

2

EFTA R1_00079405
EFTA01769060

📅 Jun 6, 2012 REDACTED

(no subject)

From: Jeffrey <jeevacation@gmail.com>

From: Jeffrey <jeevacation@gmail.com> Sent: Wednesday, June 6, 2012 12:11 PM To: Attachments: photoJPG; Untitled attachment 00264.txt Organized?

From: Jeffrey <jeevacation@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, June 6, 2012 12:11 PM
To:
Attachments: photoJPG; Untitled attachment 00264.txt
Organized?

📅 Apr 23, 2012

attached is article on scott rothstein selling ft lauderdale home for =5,100,000

From: Richard Kahn

To: Jeffrey Epstein

attached is article on scott rothstein selling ft lauderdale home for =5,100,000 =ttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303513404577352281083193026.=tml?mod=djem Real Estate_h#articl eTabs%3Darticle Richard Kahn HBRK Associates Inc.

attached is article on scott rothstein selling ft lauderdale home for =5,100,000

=ttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303513404577352281083193026.=tml?mod=djem Real Estate_h#articl
eTabs%3Darticle

Richard Kahn

HBRK Associates Inc.

📅 Jul 8, 2012

Re:

From: Mark Lloyd

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Thanks, will be in touch. Either place would be just what I need right now!! On 8 Jul 2012, at 12:53, Jeffrey Epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote: sorry to hear it. island then ranch. you are always welcome On Sun, Jul 8, 2012 at 7:34 AM, Mark Lloyd wrote: All been thrown as my mother had a stroke yesterday and is in intensive care. Not quite sure what the prognosis is going to be, but clearly not very good as she is now paralyzed on her left side and has a serious lung infection. Next day

Thanks, will be in touch. Either place would be just what I need right now!!

On 8 Jul 2012, at 12:53, Jeffrey Epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote:

sorry to hear it. island then ranch. you are always welcome

On Sun, Jul 8, 2012 at 7:34 AM, Mark Lloyd wrote:

All been thrown as my mother had a stroke yesterday and is in intensive care. Not quite sure what the prognosis is going to be, but clearly not very good as she is now paralyzed on her left side and has a serious lung infection. Next day or two will tell. One way or the other it would be very nice indeed to spend some time with you. What are your plans??

On 8 Jul 2012, at 12:29, Jeffrey Epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote:

summer plans?

📅 Jun 5, 2012 REDACTED

June 5 update

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen

Articl=2. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#b> Los Angeles Times <http://www.latimes.com/> Toppling Syria's Assad<=b> Max Boot Articl= 4. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#d> Asia Times An unwelcome turn in the Arab Spri=g? Brian M Downing Ar=icle 1. SPIEGEL Operation Sam=on: Israel's Deployment of Nuclear Missiles on Subs from Germany By Ronen Bergman, E=ich Follath, Einat Keinan, Otfried Nassauer,

Articl=2. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#b>

Los Angeles Times <http://www.latimes.com/>

Toppling Syria's Assad<=b>

Max Boot

Articl= 4. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#d>

Asia Times

An unwelcome turn in the Arab Spri=g? Brian M Downing

Ar=icle 1.

SPIEGEL

Operation Sam=on: Israel's Deployment of Nuclear Missiles on Subs from Germany

By Ronen Bergman, E=ich Follath, Einat Keinan, Otfried Nassauer, JOrg Schmitt, Holger Stark,=Thomas Wiegold And Klaus Wiegrefe

06/04/2012 -- Many =ave wondered for years about the exact capabilities of the submarines Germ=ny exports to Israel. Now, experts in Germany and Israel have confirmed th=t nuclear-tipped missiles have been deployed on the vessels. And the German government has long known about it= By SPIEGEL

The pride of the Is=aeli navy is rocking gently in the swells of the Mediterranean, with the s=lhouette of the Carmel mountain range reflected on the water's surface. To=reach the Tekumah, you have to walk across a wooden jetty at the pier in the port of Haifa, and then climb int= a tunnel shaft leading to the submarine's interior. The navy officer in c=arge

1

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of visitors, a brawny man in his 40s with his eyes hidden behind a pa=r of Ray-Ban sunglasses, bounces down the steps. When he reaches the lower deck, he turns around and says: =quot;Welcome on board the Tekumah. Welcome to my toy."

He pushes back a bo=t and opens the refrigerator, revealing zucchini, a pallet of yoghurt cups=and a two-liter bottle of low-calorie cola. The Tekumah has just returned =rom a secret mission in the early morning hours.

The navy officer, w=ose name the military censorship office wants to keep secret, leads the vi=itors past a pair of bunks and along a steel frame. The air smells stale, =ot unlike the air in the living room of an apartment occupied solely by men. At the middle of the ship, the cor=idor widens and merges into a command center, with work stations grouped a=ound a periscope. The officer stands still and points to a row of monitors= with signs bearing the names of German electronics giant Siemens and Atlas, a Bremen-based electronics com=any, screwed to the wall next to them.

The "Combat In=ormation Center," as the Israelis call the command center, is the hea=t of the submarine, the place where all information comes together and all=the operations are led. The ship is controlled from two leather chairs. It looks as if it could be in the cockpit of a sm=ll aircraft. A display lit up in red shows that the vessel's keel is curre=tly located 7.15 meters (23.45 feet) below sea level.

"This was all =uilt in Germany, according to Israeli specifications," the navy offic=r says, "and so were the weapons systems." The Tekuma, 57 meter= long and 7 meters wide, is a showpiece of precision engineering, painted in blue and made in Germany. To be more precise, it i= a piece of precision engineering made in Germany that is suitable for equ=pping with nuclear weapons.

No Room for Doubt <=span>

Deep in their inter=ors, on decks 2 and 3, the submarines contain a secret that even in Israel=is only known to a few insiders: nuclear warheads, small enough to be moun=ed on a cruise missile, but explosive enough to execute a nuclear strike that would cause devastating results. T=is secret is considered one of the best kept in modern military history. A=yone who speaks openly about it in Israel runs the risk of being sentenced=to a lengthy prison term.

Research SPIEGEL ha= conducted in Germany, Israel and the United States, among current and pas= government ministers, military officials, defense engineers and intellige=ce agents, no longer leaves any room for doubt: With the help of German maritime technology, Israel has managed-to create for itself a floating nuclear weapon arsenal: submarines equippe= with nuclear capability.

Foreign journalists=have never boarded one of the combat vessels before. In an unaccustomed di=play of openness, senior politicians and military officials with the Jew's= state were, however, now willing to talk about the importance of German-Israeli military cooperation and Germa=y's role, albeit usually under the condition of anonymity. "In the en=, it's very simple," says Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. "=ermany is helping to defend Israel's security. The Germans can be proud of the fact that they have secured the existence =f the State of Israel for many years to come."

On the other hand, =ny research that did take place in Israel was subject to censorship. Quote= by Israelis, as well as the photographer's pictures, had to be submitted =o the military. Questions about Israel's nuclear capability, whether on land or on water, were taboo. And decks 2 a=d 3, where the weapons are kept, remained off-limits to the visitors.

In Germany, the gov=rnment's military assistance for Israel's submarine program has been contr=versial for about 25 years, a topic of discussion for the media and the pa=liament. Chancellor Angela Merkel fears the kind of public debate that German Nobel literature laureate Gunter G=ass recently reignited with a poem critical of Israel. Merkel insists on s=crecy and doesn't want to the details of the deal to be made public. To th=s day, the German government is sticking to its position that it does not know anything about an Israeli nuclear we=pons program.

'Purposes of Nuclea= Capability'

2

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But now, former top=German officials have admitted to the nuclear dimension for the first time= "I assumed from the very beginning that the submarines were supposed=to be nuclear-capable," says Hans R0hle, the head of the planning staff at the German Defense Ministry in the late =980s. Lothar ROI, a former state secretary in the Defense Ministry, say= that he never doubted that "Israel stationed nuclear weapons on the =hips." And Wolfgang Ruppelt, the director of arms procurement at the Defense Ministry during the key phase, admits t=at it was immediately clear to him that the Israelis wanted the ships &quo=;as carriers for weapons of the sort that a small country like Israel cann=t station on land." Top German officials speaking under the protection of anonymity were even more forthcoming. &qu=t;From the beginning, the boats were primarily used for the purposes of nu=lear capability," says one ministry official with knowledge of the ma=ter.

Insiders say that t=e Israeli defense technology company Rafael built the missiles for the nuc=ear weapons option. Apparently it involves a further development of cruise=missiles of the Popeye Turbo SLCM type, which are supposed to have a range of around 1,500 kilometers (940 miles) irnd which could reach Iran with a warhead weighing up to 200 kilograms (440=pounds). The nuclear payload comes from the Negev Desert, where Israel has=operated a reactor and an underground plutonium separation plant in Dimona since the 1960s. The question of how =eveloped the Israeli cruise missiles are is a matter of debate. Their deve=opment is a complex project, and the missiles' only public manifestation w=s a single test that the Israelis conducted off the coast of Sri Lanka.

The submarines are =he military response to the threat in a region "where there is no mer=y for the weak," Defense Minister Ehud Barak says. They are an insura=ce policy against the Israelis' fundamental fear that "the Arabs could slaughter us tomorrow," as David Ben-Gurio=, the founder of the State of Israel, once said. "We shall never agai= be led as lambs to the slaughter," was the lesson Ben-Gurion and oth=rs drew from Auschwitz.

Armed with nuclear =eapons, the submarines are a signal to any enemy that the Jewish state its=lf would not be totally defenseless in the event of a nuclear attack, but =ould strike back with the ultimate weapon of retaliation. The non-conventiona= submarines are weapons "a way of and guaranteeing get away scot-free," that=the as enemy Israeli will Admiral not be Avraham tempted Botzer to strike p=ts pre-emptively it. with

Questions of Global Political Responsibility

In this version of =it-for-tat, known as nuclear second-strike capability, hundreds of thousan=s of dead are avenged with an equally large number of casualties. It is a =trategy the United States and Russia practiced during the Cold War by constantly keeping part of its nuclear ar=enal ready on submarines. For Israel, a country about the size of the Germ=n state of Hesse, which could be wiped out with a nuclear strike, safeguar=ing this threat potential is vital to its very existence. At the same time, the nuclear arsenal causes countr=es like Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia to regard Israel's nuclear capacity w=th fear and envy and consider building their own nuclear weapons.</=>

This makes the ques=ion of its global political responsibility all the more relevant for Germa=y. Should Germany, the country of the perpetrators, be allowed to assist l=rael, the land of the victims, in the development of a nuclear weapons arsenal capable of extinguishing hundreds=of thousands of human lives?

Is Berlin recklessl= promoting an arms race in the Middle East? Or should Germany, as its hist=ric obligation stemming from the crimes of the Nazis, assume a responsibil=ty that has become "part of Germany's reason of state," as Chancellor Merkel said in a speech to the Israel= parliament, the Knesset, in March 2008? "It means that for me, as a =erman chancellor, Israel's security is never negotiable," Merkel told=the lawmakers.

The perils of such =nconditional solidarity were addressed by Germany's new president, Joachim=Gauck, during his first official visit to Jerusalem last Tuesday: "I =on't want to imagine every scenario that could get the chancellor in tremendous trouble, when it comes to political=y implementing her statement that Israel's security is part of Germany's r=ason of state."

3

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The German governme=t has always pursued an unwritten rule on its Israel policy, which has alr=ady lasted half a century and survived all changes of administrations, and=that former Chancellor Gerhard Schroder summarized in 2002 when he said: "I want to be very clear: Israel rec=ives what it needs to maintain its security."

Franz-Josef Strauss=and the Beginnings of Illegal Arms Cooperation

Those who subscribe=to this logic are often prepared to violate Germany's arms export laws. Ev=r since the era of Konrad Adenauer, the country's first postwar leader, Ge=man chancellors have pushed through various military deals with Israel without parliamentary approval, kept th= Federal Security Council in the dark or, as then Defense Minister Franz-J=sef Strauss, a member of the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU), di=, personally dropped off explosive equipment. That was what happened in an incident in the early 1960s, when =trauss drove up to the Israeli mission in Cologne in a sedan car and hande= an object wrapped in a coat to a Mossad liaison officer, saying it was &q=ot;for the boys in Tel Aviv." It was a new model of an armor-piercing grenade.

Arms cooperation wa= a delicate issue under every chancellor. During the Cold War, Bonn feared=that it could lose the Arab world to East Germany if it openly aligned its=lf with Israel. Later on, Germany was consumed by fears over Arab oil, the lubricant of the German economic mira=le.

Cooperating with Ge=many also had the potential to be politically explosive for the various Is=aeli administrations. Whether and in what form the Jewish state should acc=pt Germany's help was a matter of controversy for the Israeli public. The later Prime Minister Menachem Begin, for examp=e, who had lost much of his family in the Holocaust, could only see German= as the "land of the murderers." To this day, financial assistance for Israel is in most cases referred to as "reparations."

Cooperation on defe=se matters was all the more problematic. It began during the era of Franz-=osef Strauss, who recognized early on that aid for Israel wasn't just a mo=al imperative, but was also the result of pragmatic political necessity. No one could help the new Germany acquir= international respect more effectively than the survivors of the Holocaus=.

In December 1957, S=rauss met with a small Israeli delegation for a discussion at his home nea= Rosenheim in Bavaria. The most prominent member of the Israeli group was =he man who, in the following decades, would become the key figure in Israel's arms deals with Germany, as well a= the father of the Israeli atomic bomb: Shimon Peres, who would later beco=e Israel's prime minister and is the current Israeli president today, at t=e age of 88.

No Clear Basis

It is now known tha= the arms shipments began by no later than 1958. The German defense minist=r even had arms and equipment secretly removed from Germany military stock=iles and then reported to the police as stolen.

Many of the shipmen=s reached Israel via indirect routes and were declared as "loans.&quo=; The equipment included Sikorsky helicopters, Noratlas transport aircraft= rebuilt M-48 tanks, anti-aircraft guns, howitzers and anti-tank guided missiles.

There was "no =tear legal or budgetary basis" for the shipments," a German offi=ial admitted in an internal document at the time. But Adenauer backed his =efense minister, and in 1967 it became clear how correct he was in making this assessment, when Israel preempted an attack by its n=ighbors and achieved a brilliant victory in the Six-Day War. From then on,=Strauss's friend Peres consistently reminded his fellow Israelis not to fo=get "what helped us achieve that victory."

The fact that the G=rman security guarantee was not a question of partisan politics became evi=ent six years later, when Social Democrat Willy Brandt headed the governme=t in Bonn -- and Israel was on the verge of defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Although Germany was officiall= uninvolved in the war, the chancellor personally approved arms shipments

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=o Israel, as Brandt biographer Peter Merseburger reported. As those involv=d recall today, Brandt's decision was a "violation of the law" that Brandt's speechwriter, Klaus H=rpprecht, sought to justify by attributing the chancellor's actions to a s=-called emergency beyond law. The chancellor apparently saw it as an "=overriding obligation of the head of the German government" to rescue the country created by survivors of the Holocau=t.

DID THE GERMAN GOVE=NMENT FINANCE THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM?

In the 1960s, Israe='s interests had moved past conventional arms. Ben-Gurion had entrusted Pe=es with a highly sensitive project: Operation Samson, named after the Bibl=cal figure who is supposed to have lived at the time when the Israelites were being oppressed by the Philisti=es. Samson was believed to be invincible, but he was also seen as a destru=tive figure. The goal of the operation was to build an atomic bomb. The Is=aelis told their allies that they needed cheap nuclear energy for seawater desalination, and that they plann=d to use the water to make the Negev Desert fertile.

The German governme=t was also left in the dark at first -- with Strauss being the likely exce=tion. The CSU politician was apparently brought into the loop in 1961. Thi= is suggested by a memo dated June 12, 1961, classified as "top secret," which Strauss dictated aft=r a meeting in Paris with Peres and Ben-Gurion, in which he wrote: "B=n-Gurion spoke about the production of nuclear weapons."

One can speculate o= the reasons that Ben-Gurion, a Polish-born Israeli social democrat, chose=to include the Bavarian conservative Strauss in his plans. There are indic=tions that the Israeli government hoped to receive financial assistance for Operation Samson.

Israel was cash-str=pped at the time, with the construction of the bomb consuming enormous sum= of money. This led Ben-Gurion to negotiate in great secrecy with Adenauer=over a loan worth billions. According to the German negotiation records, which the federal government has now re=eased in response to a request by SPIEGEL, Ben-Gurion wanted to use the lo=n for an infrastructure project in the Negev Desert. There was also talk o= a "sea water desalination plant."

No Reason for Conce=n

Plants for a civili=n desalination plant operated with nuclear power did in fact exist, and th= development of the Negev was also one of the largest projects in Israel's=brief history. When Rainer Barzel, the conservatives' parliamentary floor leader, inquired about the project =n Jerusalem, the Israelis explained that obtaining water through desalinat=on was an "epochal task." An official who accompanied Barzel not=d that the Israelis had said that "the necessary nuclear power would be monitored internationally and could not be used for=military purposes, and that we had no reason to be concerned."=/p>

But a desalination =lant operated with nuclear power was never built, and it remains unclear w=at exactly happened with the total of 630 million deutsche marks that Germ=ny gave the Israelis in the period until 1965. The payments were processed by the Frankfurt-based Kreditansta=t fur Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Credit Institute). The head of the or=anization said in internal discussions that the use of the funds was "=never audited." "Everything seems to suggest that the Israeli bomb was financed also with German money," says Avne= Cohen, an Israeli historian at the Monterey Institute of International St=dies in California who studies nuclear weapons.

Finally, in 1967, l=rael had probably built its first nuclear weapon. The Israeli government d=smissed questions about its nuclear arsenal with a standard response that =terns from Peres: "We will not introduce nuclear weapons to the region, and certainly we will not be the first.&quo=; This deliberately vague statement is still the Israeli government's offi=ial position today.

When dealing with t=eir German allies, however, Israeli politicians used language that hardly =oncealed the truth. When the legendary former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan=visited Bonn in the fall of 1977, he told then Chancellor Helmut

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Schmidt about neighboring Egypt's fear "t=at Israel might use nuclear weapons." Dayan said that he understood t=e Egyptians' worries, and pointed out that in his opinion the use of the b=mb against the Aswan dam would have "devastating consequences." He didn't even deny the existence of a nuclear weapon.=/span>

First Submarines Ar= Secretly Assembled in England

A country that has =he bomb is also likely to search for a safe place to store it and a safe l=unching platform -- a submarine, for example.

In the 1970s, Brand= and Schmidt were the first German chancellors to be confronted with the l=raelis' determination to obtain submarines. Three vessels were to be built=in Great Britain, using plans drawn up by the German company Industriekontor Lubeck (IKL).

But an export permi= was needed to send the documents out of the country. To get around this, =KL agreed with the German Defense Ministry that the drawings would be comp=eted on the letterhead of a British shipyard and flown on a British plane to the British town of Barrow-in-Fur=ess, where the submarines were assembled.

Assuring Israel's s=curity was no longer the only objective of the German-Israeli arms coopera=ion, which had since become a lucrative business for West German industry.=ln 1977, the last of the first three submarines arrived in Haifa. At the time, nobody was thinking about nuclear second-strike capability. It was not until the early 1980s, when more and=more Israeli officers were returning from US military academies and raving=about American submarines, that a discussion began about modernizing the Israeli navy -- and about the nuc=ear option.

A power struggle wa= raging in the Israeli military at the time. Two planning teams were devel=ping different strategies for the country's navy. One group advocated new,=larger Sa'ar 4 missile boats, while the other group wanted Israel to buy submarines instead. Israel was "= small island, where 97 percent of all goods arrive via water," said =mi Ayalon, the deputy commander of the navy at the time, who would later b=come head of the Israeli domestic intelligence agency, Shin Bet.

Strategic Depth

Even then it was be=oming apparent, according to Ayalon, "that in the Middle East things =ere heading toward nuclear weapons," especially in Iraq. The fact tha= the Arab states were seriously interested in building the bomb changed Israel's defense doctrine, he says. "A subm=rine can be used as a tactical weapon for various missions, but at the cen=er of our discussions in the 1980s was the question of whether the navy war to receive an additional task known as strategic depth," says Ayalon. "Purchasing the submarines was=the country's most important strategic decision."

Strategic depth. In other words, nuclear second-strike capability.

At the end of the d=bate, the navy specified as its requirement nine corvettes and three subma=ines. It was "a megalomaniacal demand," as Ayalon, who would lat=r rise to become commander-in-chief of the navy, admits today. But the navy's strategists had hopes of a budgetary miracle.=/span>

Alternatively, they=were hoping for a rich beneficiary who would be willing to give Israel a f=w submarines.

KOHL AND RABIN TURN=ISRAEL INTO A MODERN SUBMARINE POWER

The two men who fin=lly catapulted Israel into the circle of modern submarine powers were Helm=t Kohl and Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin's father had fought in World War II as a v=lunteer in the Jewish Legion of the British army, and Rabin himself led the Israeli army to victory, as its ch=ef of staff, in the 1967 Six-Day War. In 1984, having served one term as p=ime minister in the mid-1960s, he moved to the cabinet, becoming the defen=e minister.

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Rabin knew that the=German government in Bonn had introduced new "political principles&qu=t; for arms exports in 1982. According to the new policy, arms shipments c=uld "not contribute to an increase in existing tensions." This malleable wording made possible the delivery of subma=ines to Israel, especially in combination with a famous remark once made b= former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher: "Anything that float= is OK" -- because governments generally do not use boats to oppress demonstrators or opposition forces.

After World War ll,=the Allies had initially forbidden Germany from building large submarines.=As a result, the chief supplier to the German navy, Howaldtswerke-Deutsche=Werft AG (HDW), located in the northern port city of Kiel, had shifted its focus to small, maneuverable boats that=could also operate in the Baltic and North Seas. The Israelis were interes=ed in ships that could navigate in similarly shallow waters, such as those=along the Lebanese coast, where they have to be able to lie at periscope depth, listen in on radio communi=ations and compare the sounds of ship's propellers with an onboard databas=. The Israelis obtained bids from the United States, Great Britain and the=Netherlands, but "the German boats were the best," says an Israeli who was involved in the decision.

A few weeks after t=e fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the German government, practically unno=iced by the general public, gave the green light for the construction of t=o "Dolphin"-class submarines, with an option for a third vessel.

But the strategic d=al of the century almost fell through. Although the Germans had agreed to =ay part of the costs, this explicitly excluded the weapons systems -- the =mericans were supposed to also pay a share. But in the meantime, the Israelis had voted a new government into=office that was bitterly divided over the investments.

'An Inconceivable S-enario'

In particular Moshe=Arens, who was appointed defense minister in 1990, fought to stop the agre=ment -- with success. On Nov. 30, 1990, the Israelis notified the shipyard=in Kiel that it wished to withdraw from the contract.

Was the dream of nu=lear second-strike capability lost? By no means.

In January 1991, th= US air force attacked Iraq, and then Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein reacte= by firing modified Scud missiles at Tel Aviv and Haifa. The bombardment l=sted almost six weeks. Gas masks, some of which came from Germany, were distributed to households. "It was a= inconceivable scenario," recalls Ehud Barak, the current Israeli def=nse minister. During those days, Jewish immigrants from Russia arrived, &q=ot;and we had to hand them gas masks at the airport to protect them against rockets that the Iraqis had built with the help of=the Russians and the Germans."

A few days after th= Scud missile bombardment began, a German military official requested a me=ting at the Chancellery, presented a secret report and emptied the content= of a bag onto a table. He spread out dozens of electronic parts, components of a control system and the percuss=on fuse of the modified Scud missiles. They had one thing in common: They =ere made in Germany. Without German technology there would have been no Sc=ds, and without Scuds no dead Israelis.

Once again, Germany=bore some of the responsibility, and that was also the message that Hanan =Ion, a senior Israeli Defense Ministry official, brought to Kohl during a =isit to Bonn shortly after the war began. "It would be unpleasant if it came out, through the media, tha= Germany helped Iraq to make poison gas, and then supplied us with the equ=pment against it, Mr. Chancellor," Alon said. According to Israeli of=icials, Alon also issued an open threat, saying: "You are certainly aware that the words gas and Germany don't=sound very good together."

The Shipyards of Ki=l

The Germans got the=message. "Israel-Germany-gas" would sound like a "horrible =riad" in the rest of the world, then Foreign Minister Genscher warned=in an internal memo.

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On Jan. 30, 1991, t=o weeks after the beginning of the Gulf War, the German government agreed =o supply Israel with armaments worth 1.2 billion deutsche marks. This incl=ded the complete financing of two submarines with 880 million deutsche marks. The budgetary miracle had come to pass. l=rael had found its benefactor.

According to milita=y wisdom, a country that buys one or two submarines will also buy a third =ne. One submarine is usually in dock, while the other two take turns being=deployed during operations. "After we had ordered the first two boats, it was clear that we had entered into = deal which would involve repeat orders," says an individual who was = member of the Israeli cabinet at the time.

On a winter's day i= 1994, at about 6 p.m., an Israeli Air Force plane landed in the military =rea of Cologne-Bonn Airport. Its passengers wanted to discuss the future o= Israel and the Middle East. On board were the then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, his national security adviser =nd then Mossad chief Shabtai Shavit. The small delegation was driven to th= chancellor's residence, where Kohl was waiting with his foreign policy adviser, Joachim Bitterlich, and his intelligence coordinator, Bernd Schmidbauer.

Wheat Beer for Isra=l

On that evening, Ko=I and Rabin discussed the path to peace in the Middle East. Rabin and Pale=tinian leader Yasser Arafat had been jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize=the year before, together with Peres. For the first time in a long time, conciliation seemed possible between th= Jews and the Palestinians, with Germany serving as a middleman.

In Bonn, Rabin spok= at length about the German-Israeli relationship, which was still difficul=. At dinner, Kohl surprised his visitors by serving wheat beer. The Israel=s were delighted. "The beer tastes great," Rabin said. The ice had been broken.

On that evening, th= Israeli premier asked the Germans for a third submarine, and Kohl spontan=ously agreed. At around midnight, Schmidbauer took Rabin back to airport. =ohl, who was virtually unsurpassed in the art of male bonding in politics, sent a case of wheat beer to Israe= for Christmas in 1994.

A few months after =he secret meeting in Bonn, in February 1995, the contract for the third su=marine, the Tekumah, was signed. The German share of the costs totaled 220=million deutsche marks.

THE WELL-PROTECTED =ECRETS OF THE SHIPYARD IN KIEL

Since then, one of =he most secretive arms projects in the Western world has been underway in =iel, where a special form of bonding between the German and the Israeli pe=ple developed. Around half a dozen Israelis work at the shipyard today on a long-term basis. Friendships, som= of them close, have formed between HDW engineers and their families and t=e Israeli families, and special occasions are celebrated together. But des=ite these friendships, the Israelis always make sure that no outsiders are allowed near the submarines. Even m=nagers from Thyssen-Krupp, which bought HDW in 2005, are denied access. &q=ot;The main goal of everyone involved was to ensure that there would be no=public debate about the project, neither in Israel nor in Germany," says former Israeli navy chief Ayalon. Thi= explains why everything related to the equipment on the ships remains hid=en behind a veil of secrecy.

One of the special =eatures is the equipment used in the Dolphin class, which is named after t=e first ship. Unlike conventional submarines, the Dolphins don't just have=torpedo tubes with a 533-millimeter diameter in the steel bow. In response to a special Israeli request, the H=W engineers designed four additional tubes that are 650 millimeters in dia=eter -- a special design not found in any other submarine in the Western w=rld.

What is the purpose=of the large tubes? In a classified 2006 memo, the German government argue= that the tubes are an "option for the transfer of special forces and=the pressure-free stowage of their equipment" -- combat swimmers, for example --, who can be released through the narrow=shaft for secret operations. The same explanation is given by the Israelis=

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Keeping Options Ope=

In the United State=, however, it has long been speculated that the wider shafts could be inte=ded for ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. This suspicion was=fueled by an Israeli request for US Tomahawk cruise missiles in 2000. The missiles have a range of over 600 ki=ometers, while nuclear versions can even fly about 2,500 kilometers. But W=shington rejected the request twice. This is why the Israelis still rely o= ballistic missiles of their own design today, such as Popeye Turbo.

Their use as nuclea= carrier missiles is readily possible in the Dolphins. Contrary to officia= assumptions, HDW equipped the Israeli submarines with a newly developed h=draulic ejection system instead of a compressed air ejection system. In this process, water is compressed wit= the help of a hydraulic ram. The resulting pressure is then used to catap=lt the weapon out of the shaft.

The resulting momen=um is limited, however, and it isn't enough to eject a three to five-ton m=drange missile out of the ship, at least according to insiders. This is no= the case with lighter-weight missiles weighing up to 1.5 tons -- like the Popeye Turbo or the American Tomahawk,=which weighs just that, nuclear warhead included.

There are indicatio=s that, with the expanded tubes, the Israelis wanted to keep open the opti=n of future, more voluminous developments.

The Germans and the=Atomic Question: No Questions, No Problems

The Germans don't w=nt to know anything about that. "It was clear to each of us, without =nything being said, that the ships had been tailored to the needs of the I=raelis, and that that could also include nuclear capabilities," says a senior German official involved during =he Kohl era. "But in politics there are questions that it's better no= to ask, because the answer would be a problem."

To this day, former=German Foreign Minister Genscher and former Defense Minister Volker Ruhe s=y they do not believe that Israel has equipped the submarines with nuclear=weapons.

For their part, exp=rts with the German military, the Bundeswehr, do not doubt the nuclear cap=bility of the submarines, but they do doubt whether cruise missiles could =e developed on the basis of the Popeye Turbo that could fly 1,500 kilometers.

Some military exper=s suggest, therefore, that the Israeli government is bluffing, in a bid to=make Iran believe that the Jewish state already has a sea-based second-str=ke capability. That alone would be enough to force Tehran to commit considerable resources to defending itsel=.The first person to publicly voice suspicions that the German government =as supporting Israel in its nuclear weapons program was Norbert Gansel, an=SPD politician from Kiel. Speaking in the German parliament, the Bundestag, he stated that the SPD opposed th= shipment of "submarines suitable for nuclear missions" to Israe=.

Clearly Squirming <=span>

The German governme=t did make at least one stab at clearing up the nuclear issue. It was in 1=88, when Defense Ministry State Secretary Lother Ruhl, during a visit to=lsrael, asked then Deputy Chief of General Staff Ehud Barak what the "operational and strategic purpose of the s=ips" was. "We need them to clear maritime maneuvering areas,&quo=; Barak replied. The Israeli mentioned the Egyptian naval blockage of the =ulf of Aqaba ahead of the Six-Day War. The Israelis wanted to be armed against such a step, he said. It sounded plausible, but=RUhl didn't believe it.

Every German admini=tration has been keenly aware of how explosive the issue is. When the Germ=n Finance Ministry had to report the funds for the financing of submarines=4 and 5 in 2006, the ministry officials were clearly squirming.

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The planned weapons system is "not suitable f=r the use of missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. The submarines are t=erefore not being constructed and equipped for launching nuclear weapons,&=uot; reads a classified document from Finance Ministry State Secretary Karl Diller to the Bundestag budget committee dat=d Aug. 29, 2006.

In other words, the=government was saying that Germany delivered a conventional submarine -- w=at the Israelis did with it afterwards was their own business. In 1999, th= then State Secretary Brigitte Schulte wrote that the German government could not "rule out any armament for=which the operating navy has capability, following the appropriate retrofi=ting."

THE WAR OVER THE BO=B: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IRAN

The conflict betwee= Israel and Iran has intensified steadily since 2006. War is a real danger= For months now, Israel has been preparing governments around the world, a= well as the international public, for a bombing of the nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordu and Isfahan using=cutting-edge conventional, bunker-busting weapons. Prime Minister Benjamin=Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Ehud Barak are convinced that the "=window" is closing in which such an attack would be effective, as Iran is in the process of moving most of its=nuclear enrichment activities deep below ground.

In his recent contr=versial poem "What Must Be Said," ainter Grass describes the s=bmarines, "whose speciality consists in (their) ability / to direct n=clear warheads toward / an area in which not a single atom bomb / has yet been proved to exist," as the potentially decisiv= step towards a nuclear disaster in the Iran conflict. The poem met with i=ternational protests. Comparing Israel and Iran was "not brilliant, b=t absurd," said German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. Netanyahu spoke of an "absolute scandal" and his in=erior minister banned Grass from entering Israel.

But some people agr=ed with the author. Gansel, the SPD politician, says that Grass has trigge=ed an important debate, because Netanyahu's "ranting about preventive=war" touches on a difficult aspect of international law. In reality, it is unlikely that Israel will use the submarines in a w=r with Iran as long as Tehran does not have nuclear missiles -- even thoug= the Israeli government has considered using the "Samson" option=on at least two occasions in the past.

The country's milit=ry situation following the Egyptian and Syrian surprise attack during the =973 Yom Kippur holiday was so desperate that Prime Minister Golda Meir =s intelligence service reports have now revealed -- ordered her Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to prepare severa= nuclear bombs for combat and deliver them to air force units. Then, just =efore the warheads were to be armed, the tide turned. Israel's forces gain=d the upper hand on the battlefield, and the bombs made their way back to their underground bunkers.

Unwillingness to Compromise

And in the first ho=rs of the 1991 Gulf War, an American satellite registered that Israel had =esponded to the bombardment by Iraqi Scud missiles by mobilizing its nucle=r force. Israeli analysts had mistakenly assumed that the Scuds would be armed with poison gas. It remains unclear =ow Israel would have acted if a Scud missile tipped with nerve gas had hit=a residential area.

Only Netanyahu and =ran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, probably know how close the =orld stands today to a new war. The Israeli prime minister and Khamenei ha=e "one thing in common," says Walther StUtzle, a former state secretary in Germany's Federal Defense Ministry:="They enjoy conflict. If Israel attacks, Iran slips out of the aggres=or role and into that of victim." The UN won't provide the mandate th=t would legitimize such an attack, which means Israel would be breaking the law, argues StUtzle, who is now at the Germ=n Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), a Berlin-based t=ink tank. "True friendship," he believes, "requires the Ger=an chancellor to stay Netanyahu's arm and prevent him from resorting to an armed attack. Germany's obligation to protect Isr=el includes protecting the country from embarking on suicidal adventures.&=uot;

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Helmut Schmidt went=even further, long before Grass. "Hardly anyone dares to criticize Is=ael here, out of fear of being accused of anti-Semitism," the former =hancellor told Jewish American historian Fritz Stern. Yet Israel is a country, Schmidt suggests, that "makes a peace=ul solution practically impossible, through its policies of settlement in =he West Bank and, for far longer, in the Gaza Strip." He also condemn= the current chancellor for, in his view, allowing herself to be essentially taken hostage by Israel. Schmidt says, =quot;I wonder whether it was a feeling of closeness with American policies= or nebulous moral motives, that led Chancellor Merkel to publicly state i= 2008 that Germany bears responsibility for the security of the State of Israel. From my point of view, this is a =erious exaggeration, one that sounds very nearly like the type of obligati=n that exists within an alliance."

Schmidt considers i= plain that Berlin has no business participating in adventurous policies, =nd he draws clear boundaries: "Germany has a particular responsibilit= to make sure that a crime such as the Holocaust never again occurs. Germany does not have a responsibility for Israel.&quo=;

From the start, Mer=el viewed the matter differently from her predecessor Schrader, who appr=ved the delivery of submarines number 4 and Son his last working day in o=fice in 2005. For Chancellor Merkel, on the other hand, there was never any doubt that she would do what Israel=asked, even at the cost of violating Germany's own arms export guidelines.=The rules, amended in 2000 by the SPD-Green coalition government, do allow=weapons to be supplied to countries that are not part of the EU or NATO in the case of "special foreign o= security policy interests." But there is a clear regulation for cris=s regions: The rules state that supplying weapons "is not authorized =n countries that are involved in armed conflicts or where there is a threat of one." There is no question that that ru=e would include Israel. But that did not stop the chancellor from making a=deal for the delivery of submarine number 6 -- just as she was not deterre= by Netanyahu's unwillingness to make compromises.

Broken Promises and=the Deal for Submarine Number Six

In August 2009, Net=nyahu, who had recently been re-elected as prime minister as head of the c=nservative Likud party, came to Berlin. Netanyahu explained to Merkel how =mportant the submarines were for Israel; that wherever an Israeli looks, to the north, south, or east, there is no =trategic hinterland to work with, and only airspace and sea to serve as bu=fer zones. "We need this sixth boat," participants in the meetin= say Netanyahu told Merkel during his Berlin visit, coupling the statement with a request that Germany donate this subm=rine, as it had the previous ones.

Merkel's response i=cluded three specific requests in exchange. First, Israel should halt its =olicy of settlement expansion, and second, the government should release t=x assets it had frozen, which belong to the Palestinian National Authority. Third, Israel must allow constructi=n of a sewage treatment plant in the Gaza Strip, funded by Germany, to con=inue. The critical factor, the chancellor added, was absolute discretion. =f details leaked out, the deal would be off, because resistance from the Bundestag would be too much to o=ercome. The two leaders agreed that German diplomat Christoph Heusgen and =etanyahu's security advisor Uzi Arad would work out the details.

Arad is known as an=impulsive and hotheaded individual who has no problem with verbally attack=ng the Germans. When Merkel criticized Israel's settlement policy in a Jul= 2009 address to the Bundestag, Arad called the Chancellery and fired off a volley of angry complaints at Heusg=n. Arad ended the call with the demand that Merkel should not only apologi=e, but also retract her statements.

Asking for Help

The fact that Arad =as supposed to be leading the negotiations delayed the talks over the sixt= submarine once again. In the end, Netanyahu asked Yoram Ben-Zeev, Israels= ambassador to Germany, to help out.

Ben-Zeev returned t= Israel when his term as ambassador ended on November 28, 2011. He was sta=ding outside his house in Tzahala, a suburb of Tel Aviv, when his cell pho=e rang. It was Jaakov Amidror, Netanyahu's new security adviser.

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"Are you sitti=g down?" Amidror asked.

"I'm standing =n my neglected garden," Ben-Zeev replied.

"Netanyahu has=one more request," Amidror told him. "Germany is ready to sign t=e submarine deal. You need to get on the next flight to Berlin."

Ultimately, Ben-Zee= and Heusgen agreed on the final details over the phone, and the contract =as signed on March 20, 2012, at the Israeli ambassador's residence in Berl=n. Defense Minister Barak flew in especially for the meeting and RUcliger Wolf, a state secretary in the Federal Defen=e Ministry, signed on behalf of the German government. Since the Israeli g=vernment had financial problems once again, Germany made further concessio=s, agreeing to pay €135 million ($170 million), a third of the submarine's cost, and to allow Israel to defer pa=ment of its part until 2015. Netanyahu dutifully expressed his thanks with=a hand-written letter.

Still, disappointme=t within the Chancellery is running high, as Netanyahu has simply ignored =erkel's requests. Israel's policy of settlement continues unabated and no =urther progress has been made on the sewage treatment plant. The Israeli government only released the Palestini=n tax money. Merkel has apparently reached the conclusion that there's no =oint in saying anything further to Netanyahu, since he's sure not to liste= in any case.

Missed an Opportuni-y

But should the Germ=n government take this as cause to halt submarine production? That would s=nd Israel a signal that German support comes with certain stipulations -- =ut it would also amount to showing less solidarity, and that's something Merkel doesn't want.

The chancellor has =issed an opportunity to use one of the few sources of leverage the German =overnment has at its disposal to exercise influence on the Israeli governm=nt, which behaves like an occupying power on Palestinian territory. The fourth submarine, known as Tannin, was=first launched in early May and its delivery is set for early 2013. Submar=ne number five will follow in 2014 and number six by 2017.

These latest submar=nes are especially important for Israel, because they come equipped with a=technological revolution: fuel cell propulsion that allows the ships to wo=k even more quietly and for longer periods of time. Earlier Dolphin class submarines had to surface every cou=le days to start up the diesel engine and power their batteries for contin=ed underwater travel. The new propulsion system, which doesn't require the=e surface breaks, vastly improves the submarines' possible applications. They will be able to travel underwa=er at least four times as long as the previous Dolphins, their fuel cells =flowing them to stay below the surface at least 18 days at a time. The Per=ian Gulf off the coast of Iran is no longer out of the operating range of the Israeli fleet, all thanks t= quality engineering from Germany.

In the Haifa harbor= the Tekumah's diesel engines growl loudly enough that conversation is jus= barely possible. Out at sea, though, when the submarine is in true operat=on and all systems are functioning cleanly, "you can barely hear the motors at all," says the naval=officer in charge of the boat. The Tekumah can plow through the water at s=eeds of 20 knots and above, a sleek and powerful predator. But the real sk=ll, says the officer, comes in the low-speed operations carried out near enemy coasts, places where the Israeli Navy wo=ks covertly, where the Tekumah and the other submarines have to approach t=eir targets with great care, moving as if on tiptoe.

'Everything Possibl='

The naval officer s=es his submarine as "one of the places where Israel is being defended=quot; and his determined tone leaves no doubt he will take whatever action=necessary if he considers his homeland to be under attack. "The Israeli Navy needed this boat," he says.

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He also says he fol=owed the controversy over Giinter Grass' poem and was surprised by the in=ensity of the debate. His own family originally came from Germany -- his g=andparents managed to escape before the Holocaust, fleeing their Munich suburb in 1934 and later becoming part of =srael's founding generation. "We can never forget the past," he =ays, "but we can do everything possible to prevent a new Holocaust.&q=ot;

This naval officer =ill likely be needed to serve onboard submarines for some time to come. In=lsrael, Berlin and Kiel, they are already talking about the fact that the =sraelis will soon want to order their 7th, 8th and 9th submarines.

URL:

http://www.=piegel.de/international/world/israel-deploys-nuclear-weapons-on-german-bui-t-submarines-a-
836784.html <http://w=w.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-deploys-nuclear-weapons-on-german--uilt-submarines-
a-836784.html>

Related SPIEGEL ONL=NE links:

Photo Gallery: Germany Supplies Israel with Nuclear-Capable Subs <http://w=w.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/germany-
supplies-israel-with-subs-for-its-nuclear-arsenal-fotostrecke-83178.html>
http:=/www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-83178.html <http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/germany-supplies-
israel-with-s=bs-for-its-nuclear-arsenal-fotostrecke-83178.html>

=hoto Gallery:: Weapons 'Made in Germany' <http://w=w.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/german-weapons-exports-booming-
fotostrecke-83191.=tml>
http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-83191.html=/a> <http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/german-weapons-
exports-booming-fotostrecke-83191.html>

Controversial Poem about Israel: Günter Grass's Lyrical First Strike (04/04/2012)
<http://w=w.spiegel.de/international/germany/editorial-on-guenter-grass-poem-about-i-rael-a-825818.html> <=>
http://www.=piegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,825818,00.html
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/editorial-on-guenter-grass-poem-about-israel-a-825818.html>

In the Eye of the Storm: Israel Wary of Changes in the Arab World (04/06/2012=
<http://w=w.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-skeptical-of-the-regime-changes-in-the-arab-world-a-825510.html>
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,825510,00.html <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-
skeptical-of-th=-regime-changes-in-the-arab-world-a-825510.html>

Tehran's Last Chance: Israel, Iran and the Battle for the Bomb (03/05/2012)
<http://w=w.spiegel.de/international/world/tehran-s-last-chance-israel-iran-and-the--attle-for-the-bomb-a-
819312.html>
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,819312,00.html
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/tehran-s-last-chance-i-rael-iran-and-the-battle-for-the-bomb-a-
819312.html>

What Iranian Elites Think: An Inside Look at Views of the West (02/22/2012)
<http://w=w.spiegel.de/international/world/what-iranian-elites-think-an-inside-look--t-views-of-the-west-a-
816867.html> <br> http=//www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,816867,00.html
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/what-iranian-elites-th=nk-an-inside-look-at-views-of-the-west-a-
816867.html>

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US Disarmament Expert: 'The Risk that Nuclear Weapons Will Be Used Is Growing= (02/10/2012) <http://w=w.spiegel.de/international/world/us-disarmament-expert-the-risk-that-nucle-r-weapons-will-be-used-is- growing-a-814370.html>

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518-814370,00.html <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/us-
disarmament-expert--he-risk-that-nuclear-weapons-will-be-used-is-growing-a-814370.html>

The Merkel Doctrine: Tank Exports to Saudi Arabian Signal German Policy Shift =10/14/2011) <http://w=w.spiegel.de/international/world/the-merkel-doctrine-tank-exports-to-saudi-arabian-signal-german-policy- shift-a-791380.html>

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,-91380,00.html <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-
merkel-doctrine-ta-k-exports-to-saudi-arabian-signal-german-policy-shift-a-791380.html>

Articl= 2.

Los Angeles Times <http://w=w.latimes.com/>

Toppling Syri='s Assad

Max Boot

June 5, 2012 -- Aft=r the Holocaust and the genocide in Rwanda, the world said: Never again. A=d there have been interventions to stop the killing — in Bosnia, Kos=vo and Libya. But these have been the exception, not the norm. Even now, as horrifying violence unfolds in Syria, the U.S. =nd its allies find reasons to limit their response to economic sanctions a=companied by strongly worded, but ineffectual, statements of condemnation.=/span>

This, despite the f=ct that the stakes in Syria are higher, from a strategic standpoint, than =n Libya. By the time NATO acted against Moammar Kadafi, he was an isolated=despot who had given up sponsoring terrorism and building weapons of mass destruction. Not so with Bashar Ass=d: His regime sponsors Hezbollah and llamas. It has a large stockpile of ch=mical weapons and would be on its way to developing nuclear weapons had no= Israel bombed its nuclear reactor in 2007. And it has close links to the Iranian regime, which is the No. 1 =nemy of the U.S. and its allies in the region.

Moreover, the longe= Assad stays in power without being able to stop the uprising against his =overnment — which is now more than a year old — the greater th= odds that regional powers will be drawn into the fray and that extremist groups such as Al Qaeda, already responsible for s=veral grisly bombings in Syria, will be able to establish safe havens on S=rian soil.

There are risks in = post-Assad Syria, to be sure, but toppling him as swiftly as possible :=12; something sanctions have shown no sign of achieving — holds out =he promise of meeting significant strategic as well as humanitarian objectives.

Those in favor of a=go-slow approach will admit much of this but then argue that there are no =ood options for intervention. It is true that action to topple a regime al=ays carries risks. It is never an operation to be undertaken lightly, as we learned in Afghanistan and Iraq. But no on= is proposing sending U.S. ground troops into Syria; the riskiest option o= all isn't on the table, nor should it be.

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Even less risky opt=ons, such as airstrikes, would be harder in Syria than in Libya because th= Syrian opposition is less unified than in Libya, and it does not control =ny cities or discrete territory. Thus it would be harder to strike regime assets without injuring civilians.

But is this an argu=ent for simply sitting by and letting the killing continue? That isn't a &=uot;good option" either.

Luckily, as the Syr=a expert Andrew Tabler, among others, has argued, there are other choices.=/span>

First, we should be=ome more closely involved in organizing the Syrian resistance by providing=it with communications gear, intelligence and other nonlethal assistance. =s CIA and special operations officers develop closer ties with the rebels, they will develop the contacts necess=ry to funnel weapons into the right hands and to avoid arming jihadist ext=emists.

U.S. diplomats and =ntelligence operatives can also work with the opposition to draft plans fo= a democratic, inclusive, post-Assad government. This would ease qualms am=ng Kurds, Christians and other Syrian minorities — along with businessmen and other stakeholders in the As=ad regime — who have so far hesitated to embrace the rebellion.

It would also help =f safe zones were established along Syria's borders with Jordan and Turkey= where refugees could escape Assad's oppression. Turkey and Jordan have th= military capability to defend such zones from the Syrian army, and there are indications that Turkey, which a=ready hosts the Free Syrian Army, might be willing to do more if it receiv=d American support — which hasn't been forthcoming so far.

In addition, the U.=. and our NATO allies could strengthen sanctions on Syria by mounting a na=al blockade of the Syrian coastline. This would make it more difficult for=Syria's principal supporters, Russia and Iran, to provide arms to the regime.

Airstrikes to prote=t safe zones or take out key regime targets are a more aggressive option t=at needs to be considered. The Air Force and Navy have shown the ability t= accomplish such goals with few if any losses and relatively little collateral damage.

With Russia blockin= action at the United Nations, the most difficult part of any such operati=n might well be winning international approval. That did not stop Presiden= Clinton from intervening in Kosovo, and it need not stop it in Syria, particularly if we can win the backing o= NATO and the Arab League.

Max Boot is a co=tributing editor to Opinion, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Rel=tions and the author of the forthcoming "Invisible Armies: An Epic Hi=tory of Guerrilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present."

Articl= 3.

Foreign Policy

The Real Reas=n to Intervene in Syria

James P. Rubin

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JUNE 4, 2012 - We'r= not done with the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran. Given that th= current round of negotiations with the world's major powers will not fund=mentally change Iran's nuclear program, the question of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities is likely t= return to center stage later this year. In addition to hard-headed diplom=cy and economic sanctions, there is an important step the United States ca= take to change Israel's calculations - - helping the people of Syria in their battle against President Bashar al=Assad's regime. Iran's nuclear program and Syria's civil war may seem unco=nected, but in fact they are inextricably linked. Israel's real fear -- lo=ing its nuclear monopoly and therefore the ability to use its conventional forces at will throughout the Middle E=st -- is the unacknowledged factor driving its decision-making toward the =slamic Republic. For Israeli leaders, the real threat from a nuclear-armed=lran is not the prospect of an insane Iranian leader launching an unprovoked nuclear attack on Israel tha= would lead to the annihilation of both countries. It's the fact that Iran=doesn't even need to test a nuclear weapon to undermine Israeli military l=verage in Lebanon and Syria. Just reaching the nuclear threshold could embolden Iranian leaders to call on t=eir proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, to attack Israel, knowing that their adve=sary would have to think hard before striking back.

That is where Syria=comes in. It is the strategic relationship between the Islamic Republic an= the Assad regime that makes it possible for Iran to undermine Israel's se=urity. Over the three decades of hostility between Iran and Israel, a direct military confrontation has never occurre= -- but through Hezbollah, which is sustained and trained by Iran via Syri=, the Islamic Republic has proven able to threaten Israeli security intere=ts.

The collapse of the=Assad regime would sunder this dangerous alliance. Defense Minister Ehud B=rak, arguably the most important Israeli decision-maker on this question, =ecently told CNN's Christiane Amanpour that the Assad regime's fall "will be a major blow to the radical axi=, major blow to Iran.... It's the only kind of outpost of the Iranian infl=ence in the Arab world ... and it will weaken dramatically both Hezbollah =n Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza."

The rebellion in Sy=ia has now lasted more than a year. The opposition is not going away, and =t is abundantly clear that neither diplomatic pressure nor economic sancti=ns will force Assad to accept a negotiated solution to the crisis. With his life, his family, and his clan's future a= stake, only the threat or use of force will change the Syrian dictator's =tance. Absent foreign intervention, then, the civil war in Syria will only=get worse as radicals rush in to exploit the chaos there and the spillover into Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey=intensifies.

U.S. President Bara=k Obama's administration has been understandably wary of engaging in an ai= operation in Syria similar to the campaign in Libya, for three main reaso=s. Unlike the Libyan opposition forces, the Syrian rebels are not unified and do not hold territory. The Arab=League has not called for outside military intervention as it did in Libya= And the Russians, the longtime patron of the Assad regime, are staunchly =pposed.

Libya was an easier=case. But other than the laudable result of saving many thousands of Libya= civilians from Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime, it had no long-lasting conseq=ences for the region. Syria is harder -- but success there would be a transformative event for the Middle East. =ot only would another ruthless dictator succumb to mass popular opposition= but Iran would no longer have a Mediterranean foothold from which to thre=ten Israel and destabilize the region.

A successful interv=ntion in Syria would require substantial diplomatic and military leadershi= from the United States. Washington should start by declaring its willingn=ss to work with regional allies like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to organize, train, and arm Syrian rebel f=rces. The announcement of such a decision would, by itself, likely cause s=bstantial defections from the Syrian military. Then, using territory in Tu=key and possibly Jordan, U.S. diplomats and Pentagon officials could start strengthening and unifying the oppositi=n. Once the opposition knows real outside help is on the way, it should be=possible over time to build a coherent political leadership based on the S=rian National Council as well as a manageable command and control structure for the Free Syrian Army, both =f which are now weak and divided. This will be difficult and time-consumin=, but we should remember that the Syrian civil war is now destined to go o= for years, whether the outside world intervenes or not.

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James P. Rubin w=s assistant secretary of state during the Bill Clinton administration.

Articl= 4.

Asia Times</=>

An unwelcome turn in the Arab Spring? Brian M Downing

Jun 5, 2012 -- The remarkable uprisings across the Arab world in the past 1= months have ousted or imperiled leaders in several countries, including E=ypt, Yemen, and Syria. None of these movements, however, has been successf=l in its goal of creating a new political system let alone a democratic one. Old rulers are gone in many c=ses but their regimes have persisted, either through adroit maneuvering or=vicious repression.

The leaders of the old regimes believe they can wait out or repress the pop=lar upheavals, much as European monarchies did when youthful revolutions s=ept the continent in 1848. Young people then and now are not patient. Frus=ration leads to despair, emigration, and violence. Young people in the Arab world today have options against in=ransigent authority - guerrilla warfare and terrorism among them - which o=d regimes should bear in mind. Outside powers hoping for stability in the ;region should do the same.

Uprisings and regime response

Middle East observers had long noted the immense youth population in most A=ab countries, with 50% or more of the public under the age of 22. Such a d=mographic bulge would be problematic in any country, but in countries with=stagnant economies and stale political systems, it was an impending disaster and all that was needed was a trigge= of some sort.

That came with demonstrations against food prices and bold acts of violence= In a matter of weeks, public outrage was focused on corruption, oppressio=, lack of opportunity, and demands for a voice in their future. In less time than anyone would have expected only a year earlier, Egyptian =resident Hosni Mubarak was forced to step down. The business, military, an= political networks that made up his regime, however, are positioned to re=ain their privileges and suppress popular aspirations, leaving democratic forces with perhaps a decade-long =ask of incremental change. They are counting on civil disorder to bring mi=dle classes to their side and on delaying tactics to disillusion the rest.=The absence of unity in the opposition is on the regime's side. Democratic forces are divided over tactics,=factions, and fears of Islamism and Salafism.

Similar uprisings took place in Yemen, though with the complications of reg=onal and sectarian antagonisms. After months of demonstrations and skirmis=es, president Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to pressure from his countrymen an= regional powers and left the country he ruled for over 20 years. As with Egypt, his associates retained control=over the military, state, and key businesses. Popular protest is on hold a= people wait to see if meaningful reform will begin. Regional, tribal, and=sectarian conflict remains. Hydrocarbon production is tapping out and water supplies cannot match population growl=.

Yemen is becoming a ward of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (=CC), which may augur well for economic aid but not for political reform. T=ese Sunni powers see the Arab Spring as a dangerous threat to the principl= of autocracy upon, which they have governed since independence, and as an international conspiracy direc=ed by the Shilites of Iran. They are using their diplomatic and financial =ssets to oppose democracy throughout the region.

small-unit The uprising level of regular in Syria a=my is in its formations second year. ensure The that military defections remains and intact, even l=yal, critical and discussions murderous. are Security lim=ted. officers Russia, at Iran, the and China remain supportive. Saudi Arabia and other GCC states tried last year to detach Ba=har al-Assad from his ties to Iran, but without success. In this effort, t=ey tipped their hand in supporting autocracy over democracy in the region.

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After months of repression, peaceful demonstrations gave way to armed oppos=tion. But it has failed to mount effective defenses of rebel neighborhoods=or inflict casualties on the army and security forces. In recent months re=ression has become increasingly murderous, with artillery raining down on cities and militias slaughtering=villagers.

Options

Intransigent regimes historically have caused despair, withdrawal from poli=ics, retreat into private life, and emigration. This would of course be we=come by the old regimes today, taking away a good deal of the pressure to =eform. The lower turnout in successive Egyptian elections may be encouraging to rulers.

These options are unlikely today as Arab youth has insufficient opportunity=to work and have families. Emigration will seem attractive to many, especi=lly to Europe and the US. However, those countries are not as open as they=once were to immigrants, and young men from the Middle East may be among the least welcome.

The activists in the Arab world today have thus far exhibited remarkable te=acity in the face of oppression and intransigence from rulers. There is st=ll the conviction that their moment is at hand and failure will bring on d=cades of continued misrule. Unlike many rulers of the past, those in power today have the capacity to come do=n on activists and their families both cruelly and relentlessly.

A change in tactics will come and in places take the form of using violence=and terrorism, initially sporadic and unorganized but with potential for b=coming well organized, whether from new organizations or grafting on to ex=sting ones. They will target personnel in the security forces, military, and state. Student groups and activist n=tworks that coalesced early last year may turn their organizational skills=to these acts, just as some in the US antiwar movement formed the Weather =nderground after the 1968 police crackdown in Chicago, and launched a bombing campaign.

A more historically significant parallel is the People's Will, a Russ=an group that emerged following the failure of populism and which assassin=ted Tsar Alexander III in 1894. It set the groundwork for later secret pol=tical movements that were dedicated to overthrowing the Romanov dynasty and directed by fearsome, single-minded f=gures.

Existing structures may serve the same purpose. The Muslim Brotherhood or s=linter groups of it, in both Egypt and Syria, have been known to use viole=ce. In Egypt, a splinter group assassinated president Anwar Sadat in 1981.=ln Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood began a wave of bombings that led to the regime's ruthless attack on=the city of Hama in 1982.

Salafist networks have long inculcated not only an austere form of Islam bu= also militancy and a zeal to transform the world and establish a just (Is=amist) state. Salafis have an at least semi-secret organization with unsee= but munificent benefactors, probably in Saudi Arabia. They have long acted as recruitment networks for causes i= Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan during the Soviet war (1979-89). Today =hey have ties to the Sunni insurgents in Iraq, who in turn have ties to Ir=qi refugees in Syria.

Salafi networks, however, are thought to be tied to Wahhabi clerics and Sau=i intelligence, both of which recoil from democracy and support the cause =f autocracy in the region. Salafism enjoys an intermediary position betwee= the conservative House of Saud and the revolutionary al•Qaeda movement.

Part of al-Qaeda's appeal over the years has been its argument that s=cular dictatorships are unreformable and can only be brought down through =rmed struggle, which in turn will bring social justice. The Arab Spring wa= thought to signal the end of al-Qaeda's appeal by showing that secular dictatorships could indeed be brought down =ithout the cataclysms Osama bin Laden and the like called for.

The persistence of secular dictatorships will bring new appreciation of al-=aeda as intransigent regimes are ratifying a central part of its thought. =gents of al-Qaeda are doubtless making this point in the region and only a=few thousand converts could be problematic if not disastrous. Western powers supportive of democracy and =ulf powers supportive of autocracy might well bear this in mind, though of=course the old regimes will not.

Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and author of The Milita=y Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social C=ange in America from the Great War to Vietnam.

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📅 Jun 11, 2012

(no subject)

From: Jeffrey

To: Boris Nikolic

lan is NOT family. go slow Sorry for all the typos.Sent from my iPhone

lan is NOT family. go slow

Sorry for all the typos.Sent from my iPhone

📅 Jun 11, 2012

Re: RE:

From: Jeffrey

To: Boris Nikolic

He is a gossipy gay, unlike mark lloyd who is a safe deposit Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone

He is a gossipy gay, unlike mark lloyd who is a safe deposit

Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone