📅 Jan 9, 2013 REDACTED

Arda Beskardas

From: Lesley Groff

To: Epstein Jeffre

Arda will come see you on Wed. Jan. 16th at 2pm Wed. Jan. 16, 2012-NY 10:30 Appt w/David Mitchell (██████████) 2:00 Appt w/Arda (██████████)(██████████ <mailto:█████████████> ) 6:30 Haircut w/Patrick at house

Arda will come see you on Wed. Jan. 16th at 2pm

Wed. Jan. 16, 2012-NY

10:30 Appt w/David Mitchell (██████████)

2:00 Appt w/Arda (██████████)(██████████ <mailto:█████████████> )

6:30 Haircut w/Patrick at house

📅 May 16, 2013 REDACTED

(no subject)

From: Unknown

To: JE Jail

You started a fight when I asked questions about your odd behavior in Paris. Was that just a way redirect attention because you had no excuse? You said you were coming up with a fair deal, six weeks went by and you are back to ignoring everything.... I don't know what else to say...

You started a fight when I asked questions about your odd behavior in Paris. Was that just a way redirect attention because you had no excuse?

You said you were coming up with a fair deal, six weeks went by and you are back to ignoring everything.... I don't know what else to say...

📅 Feb 7, 2013 REDACTED

February 6 update

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen

Articl=2. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#b> Foreign Policy Saeb Erekat - <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/05/The_Peace_Proce=sor_Palestine_Saeb_Erekat> An interview by Aaron David Miller Articl= 4. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#d> NYT India vs. China vs. Egypt</=> Thomas L. Friedman <http://topics.nytimes.com/top=opinion/editorialsandoped/oped/columnists/thomasfriedman/index.html>

Articl=2. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#b>

Foreign Policy

Saeb Erekat - <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/05/The_Peace_Proce=sor_Palestine_Saeb_Erekat> An interview by Aaron David Miller

Articl= 4. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#d>

NYT

India vs. China vs. Egypt</=>

Thomas L. Friedman

<http://topics.nytimes.com/top=opinion/editorialsandoped/oped/columnists/thomasfriedman/index.html>

Articl= 6. <https://mail.google.com/mail/=/0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#f>

The Diplomat

Getting to the Endgame With Iran <http://thediplomat.com/=013/02/06/getting-to-the-endgame-with-iran/> =/u>
Robert Dreyfuss

Article 7.

The Wall Street Journal

A New U.S. International Economic =trategy

Robert B. Zoellick <http://online.wsj.com/search/=erm.html?KEYWORDS=ROBERT+B.+ZOELLICK&bylinesearch=true>

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Ar=icle 1.

Washington Post

Obama to make=first trip to Israel, part of a potential 'new beginning' with region<=span>

Scott Wilson <http://w=w.washingtonpost.com/scott-wilson/2011/03/02/ABt5vmP_page.html>

President Obama wil= travel to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories next month to make an early second-term push for peace negotiations between two divided governments and to assess the broader political developments remaking the Middle East.

It will be Obama'= first trip as president to Israel, where suspicions run high in the aftermath of his unsuccessful early efforts <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-searches-for-middle-east- peace/2012/07/14/gJQAQQIKIW_story.html> at Middle East peacemaking.

The choice of desti-ation-one that Obama avoided in his first term - suggests a revival of his ambitions abroad after a year of virtual dormancy on foreign affairs= The timing also points to a willingness on his part to quickly reengage a politically volatile foreign-policy issu= just months after winning his second term.

But the visit will =ighlight how much the region has changed <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/us-tries-to-define-relations-with-evolving-arab- world/2012/09/14/c3bff286-fe8=-11e1-b153-218509a954e1_story.html> since he last visited the Middle East i= his first year in office, with the rise of Islamist governments and the w=dening repercussions of civil revolt.

After Obama helped =a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/=R2011030905672.html" target="_blank"> topple Moammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011, many in the region wondered wh=n he would emerge again to help shape the course of the tumultuous Arab Sp=ing, which has replaced a pair of U.S.-allied dictatorships with elected I=lamist governments.

Within the Israeli--alestinian conflict, much has changed since the direct peace talks Obama inaugurated in September 2010 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/01/=R2010090106666.html> collapsed within weeks. Israel's recent-battle with the armed Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip left many predicting a wider fight in the future <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/some-in-israel-s-e-acquiescence-in-iron- dome-missile-defense-system/2012/12/08/5dc857f4-3d6=-11e2-bca3-aadc9b7e29c5_story.html>, as divisions deepened within the Palestinian and Israeli electorates over whether talks or war w=uld resolve the conflict.

"To make it a sub-tantive trip that is more than a positive photo-op would require setting u= a specific framework for an agreement and setting a tight deadline to ach=eve it," said Jeremy Ben-Ami, the executive director of J Street <http://jstreet.org/>= a nonprofit group that advocates the creation of a Palestinian state alon=side Israel.

White House officia-s would not provide a date for Obama's trip, which he will squeeze into =he tight schedule he is building around a busy domestic agenda that includ=s immigration, guns and the economy.

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But Israeli media reported that Obama is scheduled to arrive March 20 as part of a trip that will include a stop in Jordan, where the civil war in next-door Syria and it= growing refugee crisis is presenting a major challenge to King Abdullah II, a U.S. ally.

Obama began his fir=t term by making a strong push for peace talks between Israel and the Pale-tinians, believing the conflict fueled radicalism in the region in general-and toward the United States in particular, given its historical support for the Jewish state.

In contrast to pred=cessor George W. Bush, Obama wanted to demonstrate to Arab governments tha= the United States would make demands of Israel in pursuit of a regional p=ace agreement.

Israeli Prime Minis=er Benjamin Netanyahu made little secret of his preference for Republican Mitt Romney <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/mitt-romney-=alestinians-have-no-interest-whatsoever-in-establishing-peace/2012/09/18/5=185a12-0183-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story.html> in last year’s U.S. presidential campaign. Net=nyahu and Obama have at times disagreed bitterly over issues relating to t=e Palestinians, including Israel’s continued settlement construction in =he West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Israel's military=occupied those territories, along with Gaza, in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.=Palestinians view them as the key territorial elements of their future sta=e.

In a June 2009 address in Cairo, a speech that asked for a "new beginning=94 with the Islamic world, Obama said: "The United States does not accept= the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements." He also did not stop =n Israel on that trip, instead visiting Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Germany, where he emphasized the horror of the Holocaust <http://www.washingtonpos=.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/05/AR2009060500411.html> and the moral imperative of defending Israel. Romney, among others, made the omission <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-israel-romney-wows-cro=ds-but-puzzles-with-grasp-of-palestinian-relationship/2012/07/30/gJQAsBEJL=_story.html> a campaign issue.

But on regional sec=urity issues, Obama and Netanyahu have deepened cooperation amid rising U.S= military aid to Israel. Obama has agreed with Netanyahu that Iran must no= be allowed to use its uranium-enrichment program to develop a nuclear weapon, an issue that the two will discuss du=ing Obama’s visit.

Netanyahu's Likud=party emerged from elections last month as the largest bloc in Israel's =arliament, meaning that he will serve another term as prime minister. But = surprisingly strong showing by a new centrist party is likely to put more pressure on him to pursue talks.

"It was a mistake—for Obama not to go in the first term at a time when it could have affecte= Israeli public opinion of him, and now, it has hardened against him to a =oint that I don't believe it can," said Elliott Abrams, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who se=ved as a senior Middle East adviser to Bush.

Obama's visit wil= coincide with growing concern in the region that the two-state solution f=vored by him is in peril, as Israeli settlement construction continues and=as the Islamist Hamas gains clout within the once-secular Palestinian nationalist movement. Hamas The Peace Processor <http://=www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-gaza-surge-of-support-for-hama=-starts-to-fade/2012/11/29/adf3b9ac-3a2f-11e2-b01f-5f55b193f58f_story.html= target=>:

An interview by Aar=n David Miller

February 5, 2013 --Other than Mahmoud Abbas, Saeb Erekat could be the most recognizable Pales=inian on the planet. The chief Palestinian negotiator is certainly among t=e most passionate in promoting the cause. And nobody on the Palestinian side knows the substance of the issue= or the negotiating history better.

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I first met Erekat =n the late 1980s, while working on the Palestinian issue for then Secretar of State George Shultz. Back then, the U.S.-educated diplomat was already-showing the brashness and outspokenness that would make him one of the most memorable -- if exasperating -- of the=Palestinians with whom we dealt.

He annoyed then Sec-etary of State James Baker by wearing his kaffiyeh around his shoulders at the opening of the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991. And over the y-ars, he continued to annoy the Israelis too with his fiery performances on CNN -- though to this day, key Israeli =egotiators, such as Isaac Molho, continue to praise his pragmatism at the =argaining table.

It was Erekat's aca=emic bent, analytical chops, and capacity to write in English that would make him so indispensable to the only Palestinian who really counted in thos= days -- Yasir Arafat. Erekat was a unique figure -- neither a fighter (no nom de guerre for him), nor a PLO i-sider, nor an organization man from Tunis. Rather, he was a West Banker fr=m Jericho, and he succeeded in maintaining his relevance in a Palestinian =olitical scene dominated not by fellow academics, but by hard men defined by struggle and intrigue. During-the heady days of the peace process, he became a key point of contact for he Americans, the Israelis, the Arabs, and much of the rest of the internazional community.

I came to know Erek-t not only as a negotiator, but as a person. He sent his kids to Seeds of eace, a conflict resolution and coexistence organization that I ran briefl= after leaving the State Department, and my daughter befriended his and stayed with the Erekats in Jericho. Sae- and I have yelled at each other, defended our respective positions, laugh=d, and mourned opportunities that were never adequately explored. But through it all, what he said about himself was true: He wasn't as pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli as much as he was pr=-peace.

That peace has prov=n elusive to this day. But with all our differences -- and there are many =- I believe Erekat believes in its possibility. Who else would list as an =quot;objective" on his resume: "Solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on a two state negotiated solution through diplomatic offices"?

If, or perhaps when another effort to negotiate a deal is made, one thing is clear -- Erekat =ill be in the middle of it. Last week, he agreed to answer my questions on the past and future of the Israeli-Palestinian problem.

FP: What were your best and worst moments in the Israeli-Palestinia= negotiations, and what was the greatest missed opportunity?

Saeb Erekat: Though I was not the chief negotiator at that moment the connection between [then Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin and President =rafat made everyone around them, including myself, feel that peace was possible. There was significant progress in al=tracks until Rabin's assassination by an Israeli terrorist -- after he wa= killed, no Israeli leader had the vision to understand that the window of opportunity for a two-state solution would close as fast as they continued their colonization policies. =/p>

The missed opportunity has definitely b=en Israel throwing away the Arab Peace Initiative, which offers normalizat-on of relations of 57 countries with Israel in exchange for Israeli withdr=wal to the 1967 border. They threw it away by bombing Gaza, by intensifying collective punishments, and by in-reasing settlement construction all over the occupied West Bank, particula=ly in and around Occupied East Jerusalem.

FP: 2013 is the 20th anniversary of the Oslo negotiations. What was-Oslo's greatest success, and its greatest failure?

SE: The fact that, two decades after Oslo, we are still a nation un-er occupation shows that Israeli governments did derail it. The interim ac-ords were not supposed to last for 20 years but only five. After that, we were going to enjoy freedom and sovereignty.

But Israel increased its settlement expansion. In fact, within 20 years, the number of settlers almost tripled. Th= institution-building efforts led by the Palestinian government have been =ompletely undermined by the lack of freedom.

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This situation cannot continue. Oslo succeeded in bringing bac= 250,000 Palestinians from the diaspora and building the capacity for our =tate. The international community failed though, by granting Israel an unp=ecedented culture of impunity that allowed them to use negotiations as a means to continue rather than stop c=lonization.

FP: What is the most important thing Israelis don't understand about Palestinians?

SE: That we are not going anywhere. As simple as that. We are not g=ing to disappear just because their government builds an annexation wall a=ound us.

They should close their eyes and imagin= their state within 10 years time. What do they see? If they continue thei= policies, they are going to officially adopt the form of an apartheid reg=me, which I think is not what many Israelis want.

FP: What is the most important thing Palestinians have learned abou= Israelis?

SE: That Israelis will not take back the ships that brought them he=e to leave somewhere else. We got to understand that we have to live side =y side. The rules of engagement, though, cannot be those of apartheid, but those of freedom.

FP: What do you expect from the next Israeli government on the peac= process?

SE: I don't think there is room for optimism, but our position hasnt changed. We don't see any other solution than a two-state solution. Any =sraeli government that recognizes this fact and respects what previous governments have agreed upon should become a partner for peace.

FP: Is Hamas-Fatah unity possible, and what would the impact be on -he future of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations?

SE: We expect to have progress in the near future, with Hamas allow=ng the Central Elections Commission to register new voters in Gaza. I belive there is political agreement -- in fact, there is a signed agreement. We expect to have elections as soon as possible, which is the right way to solve our differences: Let our peopl= decide, those in Palestine as well as our people in the Diaspora.

Having said so, Hamas has recognized th= Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, including its mandate to negotiate a final status agreement with Israel. Once that is achieved, we expect to hold a national referendum.

FP: How would you describe Egypt's role in the peace process now? Wat do you expect from President Barack Obama's administration with regards to the peace process?

SE: Egypt has played a central role, and continues to do so. We trust that Egypt, under President Mohamed Morsy's leadership, will continue to play a strong role because Palestine and Egypt have a common interest in achieving peace.

President Obama had stated that he has = personal commitment to bring peace to the Middle East. We, the Egyptians, and the rest of the Arab world tell him that we are ready for peace. We have the Arab Peace Initiative. This goes in line with the stated U.S. national interest. Washington's failure o explicitly say that Israel is to blame for choosing settlements over pea-e has contributed to Israel's culture of impunity.

FP: Can America be an effective broker in negotiations?

SE: If the U.S. decides to be an honest broker, it could not only b= effective but in fact could bring real peace to the region, a just and la=ting one. The U.S. has a moral obligation toward the Palestinian people, who have been under occupation and living i= exile for decades.

FP: Is a two state solution still possible?

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SE: Yes, but only if there is a political will. So far, Israel's wi=l is about colonization, and the international community has failed to put=an end to decades of double standards by treating Israel as a state above the law. We don't see any other soluti=n than a two-state solution, though Israel is taking us to a one-state rea=ity.

Aaron David Miller is a distinguishe= scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Articl= 3.

The Daily Beast

The Mixed Leg=cy Of Shimon Peres

Dan=el Gavron <http://w=w.thedailybeast.com/contributors/daniel-gavron.html>

Feb 4, 2013 -- Now that he has finished his consultations with the country's political parties and charged Benjamin Netanyahu with forming a new coalition, Is=ael's respected President, Shimon Peres, is once again very much in the =ews. In his speech inviting Netanyahu to form the next government, the President spoke forcefully about peace an= even seemed to influence Bibi to mention peace, a word he never used in h=s election campaign. Peres has rightly earned respect for this from many quarters, but now, as the coalition is being formed, it might be a good time to examine one aspect of Israel=92s political culture: the lack of respect for the task of a parliamentary-opposition. Peres is at least partly to blame for this, as he almost alway= preferred to join various administrations-even as a junior partner-rather than lead the opposition, ofen citing "our =rave situation" and "national responsibility." Now is surely a=better time to criticize Peres than in June, when the world (maybe even in-luding President Barack Obama) will be coming here to celebrate his 90th b=rthday. Then, surely, everyone will be paying deserved tribute to the wisdom of this elder statesman and prophet of peace, and it would be a shame to spoil the party. So let's clear t-e air right now, well before the festivities. Before we get to the matter of coalition politic=, which is very much on our minds right now as Netanyahu struggles to put =ogether a government, let us consider the other negative part of the Peres=legacy: his stint as Defense Minister under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin from 1974 to 1977. Today Peres is widel= respected as the architect of the Oslo Accord of 1993, achieved while he was Foreign Minister. It was the first political move toward a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, and Peres deserves huge credit for securing the agreement. However, two decades earlier, as Defense Minister, he supported the Jewish settlement project in the newly-conquered Palestinian territories, both overtly and coverty. Not for nothing did Rabin label Peres in his mem=irs as "an indefatigable intriguer." In 1975, while Rabin was doing hi= utmost to prevent the settlement of Elon Moreh, near Nablus, Peres contin=ously sabotaged his efforts. After no less than eight settlement attempts, which were ruled illegal by Israel'= Supreme Court, a "compromise" was reached, and Elon Moreh was establi=hed five kilometers to the east of the original site. Moreover, during the=furor over Elon Moreh, Defense Minister Peres quietly facilitated the creation of Ofra, near Ramallah. These two s=ttlements, which have become flagships of the settlement movement, were th= start of Jewish colonization in Samaria, the northern part of the West Ba=k. The previous year, as a young reporter, I interv=ewed Peres, after he and his political ally Moshe Dayan had refused "on =rinciple" to join the government of Golda Meir. "If a single child can learn that politics is not just intrigues," Peres told me, "I will be satisfied that we have done our bit." Just one week later, when he and Dayan had reversed their position for no discern-ble reason, and were seated snugly around the cabinet table, I asked Peres-what he had to say to the "single child." His aides sniggered, but Peres didn't bat an eyelid: "Just what my menor, David Ben-Gurion (Israel's first Prime Minister) told me: when the s=curity of Israel is laid on one side of the scales, and everything else on the other side, security tips the balance." Peres subsequently used that self-same argument =o join every government that would have him. The late Menachem Begin lost =ine elections before finally becoming Israel's Prime Minister in 1977. H= served as a pugnacious and

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dedicated leader of the opposition. Peres almost never headed the opposition, always preferring a ministerial appointment, once even designing a grotesque syst=m of “rotation" with Yitzhak Shamir, so that he could be in the government. He proposed the ideal of "national unity," and greatly devalued the democratic concept of parliamentary opposition. Former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni ruined her reputation when she refused to =oin Netanyahu in his last government. While it is quite true that Livni was an ineffective opposition leader, it is the very fact of her refusal to join the administration and "influenc= it from within" that has provoked most of the criticism by Israeli poli=ical commentators. Similar criticism is currently being leveled at =abor Party leader Shelly Yachimovich for stating clearly that she would no= join Netanyahu's next government, but would serve as leader of the opposition. There are certainly many reasons to criticize Yachimovich, but not her eminently democratic decision to lea= the parliamentary opposition. Very few of our political commentators have ever expressed respect or even understanding for the concept of opposition= The most popular political idea in Israel today is national unity-better still, a National Unity Governm=nt: "We should all rally round the flag and support our government in th=se critical times." This position, widely espoused, echoes what Peres ha= said repeatedly over the years.

So, although the Peres vision of peace is a positive legacy, he has also taught us less helpful lessons. The settlements are a supremely negat-ve inheritance, but I would argue that the anti-democratic rejection of the concept of a parliamentary opposition is an even more harmful bequest handed down to us by President Shimon Pere=.

Daniel Gavron, w=o lives in Israel, is a former journalist and the author of nine books, th= most recent of which is Holy Land Mosaic, stories of cooperation and=coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).

Articl= 4.
NYT
India vs. Chi=a vs. Egypt

Thomas L. Friedman

<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/opinion/edi=orialsandoped/oped/columnists/thomaslfriedman/index.html>

February 5, 2013 ---New Delhi -- It's hard to escape a visit to India without someone asking-you to compare it to China. This visit was no exception, but I think it'= more revealing to widen the aperture and compare India, China and Egypt. India has a weak central government but a =eally strong civil society, bubbling with elections and associations at ev=ry level. China has a muscular central government but a weak civil society= yet one that is clearly straining to express itself more. Egypt, alas, has a weak government and a very weak-civil society, one that was suppressed for 50 years, denied real elections and, therefore, is easy prey to have its revolution diverted by the one gr-up that could organize, the Muslim Brotherhood, in the one free space, the mosque. But there is one thing all-three have in common: gigantic youth bulges under the age of 30, increasin=ly connected by technology but very unevenly educated.

My view: Of these tree, the one that will thrive the most in the 21st century will be the one-that is most successful at converting its youth bulge into a "demographi= dividend" that keeps paying off every decade, as opposed to a "demographic bomb" that keeps going off every =ecade. That will be the society that provides more of its youth with the e=ucation, jobs and voice they seek to realize their full potential.

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This race is about =93who can enable and inspire more of its youth to help build broad societa= prosperity," argues Dov Seidman, the author of "How" and C.E.O. of =RN, which has an operating center in India. "And that's all about leaders, parents and teachers creating environme=ts where young people can be on a quest, not just for a job, but for a car-er - for a better life that doesn't just surpass but far surpasses the=r parents." Countries that fail to do that will have a youth bulge that is not only unemployed, but unemployable, he argued. "They will be disconnected in a connected world, despairing as they watch others build and realize their potential and curiosity."

If your country has either a strong government or a strong civil society, it has the ability to rise to this challenge. If it has neither, it will have real problems, wh-ch is why Egypt is struggling. China leads in providing its youth bulge with education, infrastructure and jobs- but lags in unleashing freedom and curiosity. India is the most intriguin= case - if it can get its governance and corruption under control. The quest for upward mobility here, especially among women and girls, is palpable. I took part in the graduation ceremony=for The Energy and Resources Institute last week. Of 12 awards for the top-students, 11 went to women.

"India today has =60 million young people under the age of 25 and 225 million between the ages of 10 and 19," explained Shashi Tharoor, India's minister of state f=r human resource development. "So for the next 40 years we should have a youthful working-age population" at a tim= when China and the broad industrialized world is aging. According to Thar=or, the average age in China today is around 38, whereas in India it's a-ound 28. In 20 years, that gap will be much larger. So this could be a huge demographic dividend - "provid=d that we can educate our youth - offering vocational training to some and university to others to equip them to take advantage of what the 21st-ce-tury global economy offers," said Tharoor. "If we get it right, India becomes the workhorse of the world. If we get-it wrong, there is nothing worse than unemployable, frustrated" youth.

Indeed, some of Ind=a's disaffected youth are turning to Maoism in rural areas. "We have M=oists among our tribal populations, who have not benefited from the opport=nities of modern India," Tharoor said. There have been violent Maoist incidents in 165 of India's 625 districts=in recent years, as Maoists tap into all those left out of the "Indian d=eam." So there is now a huge push here to lure poor kids into school. In=ia runs the world's biggest midday lunch program, serving 250 million free school lunches each day. It's also dou=led its number of Indian Institutes of Technology, from eight to 16, and i= planning 14 new universities for innovation and research.

But this will all b= for naught without better governance, argues Gurcharan Das, the former C.=.O. of Procter & Gamble India, whose latest book is “India Grows at =ight: A Liberal Case for a Strong State.” “The aspirational India has no one to vote for, because no one is talkin= the language of public goods. Why should it take us 15 years to get justi=e in the courts or 12 years to build a road? The gap between [youth] aspir=ations and government performance is huge. My thesis is that India has risen despite the state. It is a stor= of public failure and private success.”

That is what Das me=ns by India grows at night, when government sleeps. "But India must lear= to grow during the day," he said. "If India fixes its governance befo=e China fixes its politics that is who will win. ... You need a strong state and a strong society, so the society can =old the state accountable. India will only get a strong state when the bes= of society join the government, and China will only get a strong society =hen the best Mandarins go into the private sector."

Articl= 5.

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Foreign Policy

Don't be too sure there won't be another U.S. war in the Middle East

Richard L. Russell<<=span>

February 5, 2013 ---Shortly before he left office in Feb. 2011, Defense Secretary Robert Gates-told West Point cadets that "in my opinion, any future defense secret=ry who advised the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa shoul= 'have his head examined,' as General MacArthur so delicately put it.&qu=t; The remark no doubt reflected Sec. Gates's fatigue and frustration from the enormous intellectual and emotional burdens associated with overseeing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One suspects, however, that in a more reflective moment, Gates would have acknowledged that &q=ot;never say never" is a wise rule of thumb in planning for military =ontingencies, especially in the region that makes up Central Command's area-of-responsibility. Few, for example, predicted t-e 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Gates himself -- who was a senior C=A official during the covert war supporting the Afghan resistance -- surel= did not anticipate then that the United States would have to return to Afghanistan two decades later to ous- a Taliban regime that was harboring terrorists. Before 1990, moreover, no-one predicted that Iraq, having just ended a bitter eight-year war with Ir=n, would swing its battered forces south to invade Kuwait.

So if it's conventional wisdom that the United States will not, or should not, intervene milit=rily in the Middle East or South Asia after it draws down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's also likely dead wrong. What is true, however, is that political and military trajectories =n the Middle East and South Asia are likely to increasingly challenge U.S.=contingency access in the coming decade. The ability for the United States-to surge large-scale forces into the region, as it did in the 1990 and 2003 wars against Iraq, will grow in=reasingly circumscribed. The United States will have to adapt to this new =trategic landscape by developing more nimble, highly-mobile, stealthy, and networked forces, and by abandoning the traditional practice of slowly and steadily building up conventional f=rces at regional logistic hubs prior to launching war.

***

Perhaps the most si-nificant factor that portends against further intervention in the Middle East and South Asia is increased political resistance -- and outright opposi-ion -- from the countries in the region. That resistance is likely to come from the new regimes emerging from the A-ab uprisings, as well as a number of Gulf monarchies.

Indeed, the political trends in the region are unlikely to conform to the rosy predictions of =emocratic peace theorists, whose musings have implicitly informed the secu=ity policies of both Republican and Democratic administrations for decades. Old authoritarian regimes seem to =e passing the way of the dodo bird, but the new regimes taking shape are heavily influenced by militant Islamic ideology that will make them less likely to engage in security or military cooperation with the United States.

Democracy optimists-argue that these ideological regimes, once entrenched in power, will have =o moderate their zeal in order to govern. Pragmatism will ultimately trump-ideology. That line of reasoning, however, is based on the assumption that the policy decisions of such regimes can b= explained by rational choice economic theory. In other words, if they wan= to attract international capital and participate in the world economy, they are going to have to break with their ideological affinities. But that reasoning ignores a hard fact of in-ernational politics: that time and again, political and ideological prerogatives trump economic rationality. It made little economic sense, for examp=e, for Pakistan to pursue a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, just as it makes little economic sense for I=an to do so today. Clearly, both Pakistan and Iran made major policy decis=ons based on political-military priorities rather than economic calculatio=s.

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As for the survivin= monarchies in the Middle East, they too will likely be less accommodating=to American military forces than they have been in the past. To be sure, m=ch of the Arab support for past American military operations -- like both Iraq wars -- was hidden from the public e.e. Arab states often loudly and publicly denounced "unilateral Americ=n" military action in the region at the same time as they supported i= in backroom dealings, quietly authorizing facilities support and air, land, and sea access.

But if Arab Gulf st=tes were quietly supportive in the past, their opposition to American mili=ary force is likely to grow in the future. They read the aftermath of the =rab uprisings much differently than did American and European policymakers. The Gulf monarchies were shocked t=at the United States "abandoned" Egyptian President Hosni Mubara= in his time of need in early 2011. Their leaders expected the United Stat=s to push for Mubarak and the Egyptian military to crack down on public protests in Cairo. After all, American policymaker= during the Carter administration had at least given this policy option co=sideration during the Iranian revolution in 1979.

Already, several Gu=f states have begun to translate their displeasure into policy independenc= from Washington. In 2011, for example, a coalition of Gulf states led by =audi Arabia intervened in Bahrain to quell domestic unrest in the island country. They did so under the banner =f the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which for years had been a feckless =ilitary force. Largely unnoticed in Western commentary was that the GCC, f=r the first time in its history, mounted a relatively effective military intervention.

Bahrain today is fo= all intents and purposes a province of Saudi Arabia, even if it is not po=ite to say so in diplomatic circles. Since the Iranian revolution, Bahrain=-- like the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar -- has pursued close ties with the United States, in signi=icant measure to counterbalance Iran and Saudi Arabia. With Washington at =heir back, they were able to stake out security policies that were at leas= nominally independent from Saudi Arabia. When Saudi Arabia wanted American forces removed from the kingdom=for example, Qatar was eager to compensate by hosting a more robust Americ=n command presence in the region.

The Arab uprisings =nd subsequent GCC intervention in Bahrain have turned the tables, making S=udi security backing a necessity for the smaller Gulf monarchies. From the=r perspective, American forces are clearly more capable than Saudi forces, but given the alignment of their i=terests, Riyadh is a more reliable security partner. Gulf leaders and mili=ary commanders in the coming decade will be focused on how to avoid follow=ng in Mubarak's footsteps. Part of minimizing that risk will involve decreasing security dependency on the=United States. Gulf leaders have to worry that if push comes to shove, the=Americans will throw them under a bus just like they did to Mubarak.

If the political dy=amics in the Middle East and South Asia do not favor further American mili=ary intervention in the future, neither do the emerging military trends. T=e proliferation of supersonic cruise missiles and mines in the region will make for nasty forced entries <http://be=fercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18409/closing_time.html> into narrow maritime confines like the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. =/span>

But the likely prol=feration of nuclear weapons -- and ballistic missile delivery systems -- w=ll pose even more formidable challenges to conventional military surges in=the region. In the future, the United States will not be able to take for granted unchallenged surges of naval, =ir, and ground forces into regional theaters via logistics hubs. These hub= -- like the American naval presence in Bahrain -- are large, readily iden=ifiable, and will be increasingly vulnerable to future targeting by nuclear weaponry.

Iran's nuclear weap=ns, assuming it gets them, will pose a direct threat to American military =urge capabilities. Although American policymakers and military commanders =ight feel confident that they could surge forces into the Gulf despite Iranian nuclear threats because of the =merican nuclear deterrent, Gulf security partners might be more nervous an= less willing to cooperate. As a result, they might not grant access to U.=. air, naval, and ground forces out of fear of angering Iran.

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American observers =ho doubt that Gulf states would make such calculations should recall how K=wait responded in the lead-up to Iraq's invasion in 1990. When faced with = build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the m=ve would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make si=ilar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an=inventory of nuclear weapons to match its growing ballistic missile capabilities.

The Gulf states, mo=eover, will likely reason that the U.S. capability to threaten or use fore= against a nuclear Iran will be significantly diminished. Even without nuc=ear weapons, Gulf states have seen, in their view, a long history of American reluctance to threaten or use fo=ce against Iran. For example, the United States took no direct military ac=ion against Iran after it aided and abetted Hezbollah bombings against Ame=icans in Lebanon in the 1980s, after Iran supported the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996,=or even after Iran supported the deadly campaign of improvised explosive d=vices (IEDs) against U.S. troops in Iraq. Gulf states will no doubt judge =hat if the United States was unable and unwilling to attack Tehran under these circumstances, then it is certa=nly not going to attack Iran in the future, when it will be able to retali=te with nuclear weapons.

American policymake=s may counter that Iran would never be foolish enough to threaten or use n=clear weapons against the United States, given its robust nuclear deterren=e posture. But the threat or use of nuclear weapons might not look so foolish from Iran's perspective. One of =he great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the =iddle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hu=sein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up =orces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam did both in the run-up to t=e 1991 re-conquest of Kuwait and in 2003, before the drive to topple the r=gime in Baghdad.

Drawing upon these =essons, Iran will likely do everything in its power to deny the United Sta=es the ability to surge conventional forces into the region -- and that mi=ht include threatening to target U.S. forces with nuclear weapons. Iran might accept the risk that preemptive us= of nuclear weapons could bring on American nuclear retaliation, because f=ilure to do so would mean certain destruction for the regime. The United S=ates would be able to build-up conventional forces in the region and oust Iran's leaders just as it did i= Baghdad.

This line of strate=ic reasoning runs counter to conventional wisdom in the West, but we actua=ly know little or nothing about what Iranian decision-makers think about n=clear weapons or deterrence theory. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, opportunities for the exchange of pr=fessional views between Western and Iranian scholars, policymakers, and mi=itary leaders on these critically important issues have been extremely lim=ted. Therefore, it's not unreasonable to assume that the Iranians, like American policymakers in the early stage= of developing their nuclear triad doctrine, will think of nuclear weapons=as merely "big artillery." Unfortunately, the United States and =ts security partners lack formal and informal exchanges with the Iranians akin to the Cold War discussions and arms cont=ol negotiations between the Americans and Soviets, which allowed both part=es to develop mutual understandings of the other's perception of nuclear w=apons. These understandings were essential for crisis management in the Cold War strategic relationship aft=r the Cuban missile crisis.

Meanwhile, the Gulf=states, led by Saudi Arabia, are likely to look for their own nuclear dete=rents. Much like France wanted its own nuclear force de frappe during the =old War, the Gulf states will want their own nuclear weapons to deter Iran. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf=states will worry that the United States would be deterred from coming to =heir defense in future regional crises by Iran's nuclear weapons.

Saudi Arabia and ot=er Arab states are likely to see nuclear weapons as a quick fix for all of=their security woes. Although they have been on a shopping spree in the pa=t decade, buying expensive and sophisticated Western military technology, they have had a tough time absorbing the new =echnology and fully utilizing and integrating weapons systems. To be sure=in a rough net assessment <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-55/6.pdf> , Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf=have significantly greater conventional capabilities than Iran. But if Iran goes nuclear, they will want to follow=suit.

***

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Americans may be we=ry of conflict in the Middle East and South Asia, but strategic prudence d=mands that we contemplate future military interventions in the Central Com=and theater. A scan of the horizon reveals that both political and military trends in the region pose formida=le obstacles to conventional force surges into the region.

But there is anothe= wrinkle in this story that U.S. policymakers must contend with as they pl=n for the future. As Gulf monarchies seek to reduce their dependence on Am=rican military power, they will increasingly look to China for security assurances. China does not have a political age=da devoted to promoting democratization, and it maintains political and di=lomatic ties with both Arab states and Iran. China's military activity in =he region is modest but increasing, as evidenced by its recent peacekeeping dispatches to the region and naval=port visits in the Gulf. Beijing is likely to send more naval forces to th= Gulf to increase its presence there and enhance its ability to protect th= sea lanes which bring oil to China's thirsty economy. China is keenly aware that the United States has naval su=remacy in the Gulf, but will be working to erode that strategic edge in th= future.

Faced with these re=lities, there is a need for new thinking and innovative conceptualizations=of surges into Centcom's area of responsibility. Theater campaign planners=will have to think about contingencies in which the United States cannot slowly and methodically build up forces =n the region and then kick off campaigns after most troops, arms, and equi=ment are in place. Future U.S. force build-ups in the region will be far t=o vulnerable to preemptive nuclear strikes. As a result, planners will have to devise campaign plans in which=the insertion of U.S. military forces begins with an immediate rolling and=flowing start. The United States will have to work from smaller troop foot=rints and be prepared to start fighting even as follow-on-forces are on the way. Ideally, these forces wo=Id flow from multiple staging positions to reduce vulnerability to nuclear=attack. The politics of the region, however, will work against securing a =ultitude of staging areas from which to deploy.

The region under th= purview of Centcom has always been riddled with political violence that h=s posed formidable challenges to military operations. But in plotting a co=rse over the horizon, the political and military obstacles for American military surges into the region are po=sed to grow even larger. As a result, theater contingency planners will ha=e fewer good options for projecting American military power into the regio= -- and they'll have to do more with the bad and the ugly.

Richard L. Russe=l is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Near East and South Asi= Center for Strategic Studies.

Articl= 6.

The Diplomat

Getting to the Endgame Wish Iran <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/06/getting-to-the-endgame-with-iran/>

Robert Dreyfuss

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February 6, 2013 --=Why did it take so long to secure a date for talks between Iran and the P5=#43;1?

After all, in the w=eks before the presidential election in November, it was reported that the=United States and Iran had already tactically agreed to convene private, o=e-on-one talks. And since then the United States, the European powers, Russia, and China, all sought to arran=e another round of negotiations, first in December and then in January. It=now appears that Iran, which is about to enter its presidential election s=ason, has finally agreed to what will be the first round of negotiations with the P5+1 since the last r=und in Moscow seven months ago. On Tuesday, Tehran announced chttp://old.irna.ir/News/Politic/Next-round-of-lran-G5-1-t=lks-to-be-held-late-February/80530492>

The negotiations wi=l be a serious test for the Obama administration and for John Kerry, the n=w secretary of state. Previous rounds have all faltered because neither si=e was willing to make concessions to the other, and so far there is little sign that the United States and the =5+1 have improved their offer to Iran very much. As the talks were ann=unced, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ira=-agrees-to-new-nuclear-talks-with-us-other-world-powers/2013/02/05/d1587d2=-6fa4-11e2-aa58-243de81040ba_story.html> the powe=s Washington have made Post only reported mild revisions to a proposal that Iran flatly rejected la=t June." Until now, the United : "The P5+1 States has been unwilling to acknowledge =ran's right to enrich uranium on its own soil and to suggest that some economic sanctions might be lifted as part o= a deal, and Iran has refused to agree even to a limited deal called "st=p, ship, and shut" — involving the suspension of its enrichment to 20 =ercent purity, shipping its existing stockpiles of 20% uranium to a third country for processing, and shutting =own its underground facility at Fordo, near Qom — without an agreement t= lift sanctions.

After the reelectio= of Barack Obama in November, there were great hopes that the president wo=ld have greater political freedom of offer concessions to Iran. Yet, publ i=ly at least, the White House isn't signaling that it is ready to make a more generous offer to Iran, and in f=ct Obama in January signed into law yet another round of draconian economi= sanctions.

Perhaps as a result= Iran allegedly dragged its feet on setting a date for talks. Despite prod=ing from the P5+1 — <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/17/us-nuclear-iran=russia-idUSBRE90G0P420130117> including urgent efforts by Russia =— i= January Iran reportedly went silent about talks chttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/pro=pects-for-nuclear-talks-with-iran-dim/2013/01/16/7f1113f4-5f42-11e2-a389-e=565c81c565_story.html> of Tehr=n and the West to negotiate seriously, vented its frustration. "Some . Russia, of =ur increasingly partners in frustrated the six powers by the and inability the Iranian side cannot come to an agreement about where to meet," Russia= Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told a news con=erence <http://www.ynetnews.com/artides/0,7340,L-4337898,00.html= target=> . "We are ready to =eet at any location as soon as possible. We believe the essence of our talks is far more important (than the site), an= we hope that common sense will prevail and we will stop behaving like lit=le children."

According to analys=s in Washington, reinforced by comments from Iran itself, a big reason for=Tehran's recalcitrance is that Iran wants to prove to the United States =hat its vaunted sanctions regime will not force Iran to make unilateral concessions at the bargaining table. In =ddition, Iran is concerned that it won't get much in return in talks wit= the West, and that it will be asked to make unilateral concessions on ura=ium enrichment without getting sanctions relief in <http://www.nytimes.com/2=13/02/05/world/middleeast/high-level-feud-bares-tensions-in-iran.html?ref=3Dtodayspaper> return. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/201401/iran-p51-nuclear-negotiations-presidential-election.html> could mean Combined that for with the Iranian next six =nternal months divisions or so Ayatollah , as Ali its Khamenei own presidential =imply won't election be ready season to gets talk un=erway seriously, despite , that scheduling the Kazakhsta= round.

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Others suspect that=lran is waiting to see how President Obama's new national security team =96 with Kerry as secretary of state, Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense, =nd John Brennan at the Central Intelligence Agency — will shape Obama's stance at any talks.

In Washington, some=would argue there's a growing consensus, at the level of think tanks, Ir=n experts, and other analysts, that a preliminary, first-round deal, inclu=ing "shop, ship, and shut," might work, if in response the P5+1could lift some of the economic sanctions on l=an and agree to limited Iranian enrichment.

Perhaps the best-ca=e scenario is the possibility that there are ongoing, secret and back-chan=el talks between Washington and Tehran. Nothing along those lines has leak=d and there is no indication of this, yet. But in advance of behind-the-sc=nes the first diplomacy. round of Iran-P5+1 talks in Vienna in=2009, the United States and Iran did indeed engage in quiet,

In fact, of course,=any sanctions relief for Iran will occur slowly and step-by-step, not all =t once, in parallel with steps taken by Iran and openness to more intrusiv= inspections and oversight by the IAEA.

But it's certainl= not helpful that in early January yet another round of unilateral sanctio=s was passed by Congress <http://www.scribd.com/doc/114936491/Iran-NDAA-as-Filed-PD=> and signed into law by President =bama. The complex set of new measures targets key industrial sectors, including shipping and imports of products such as=aluminum, steel and coal, and seeks to block Iran from using barter commod=ties such as oil and gold to pay for imports. =span style="font-size:18.0pt">The <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new=iran-sanctions-target-industry-in-bid-for-deal-curbing-nuclear-program/201=/01/06/e6a8735e-56b4-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc_story.html> Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security=new-iran-sanctions-target-industry-in-bid-for-deal-curbing-nuclear-program=2013/01/06/e6a8735e-56b4-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc_story.html> paraphrased U.S. official= as saying that, "the new policies are closer to a true trade embargo, d=signed to systematically attack and undercut Iran's major financial pill=rs and threaten the country with economic collapse." Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) th=t contained the sanctions provisions despite having hinted earlier that he might veto the <http://www.jta.org/news/article/2013/01/06/3116081/obama-=nacts-new-iran-sanctions> NDAA over a h=st of measures contained in the bill.

If the Obama admini=tration believes that ever-tougher sanctions will cause Iran to cave in at=the talks, it's likely that they are badly misreading Iranian politics.<=span>

For many observers,=however, and for Iran, too, the nomination of Hagel for secretary of defen=e may be a sign that the White House is beginning to realize that sanction=, and threats of military action, won't force Iran's hand.

As has been widely =eported, hawks, neoconservatives, and members of the pro-Israel lobby in W=shington have slammed Hagel for his past comments and positions on Iran. 1= conjunction with Israel-friendly members of Congress, they've warned Obama to rein Hagel in so as not to send a d=vish signal to Tehran. Robert Satloff, executive direction of the Washingt=n Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), a pro-Israel think tank, warned =luntly <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hagels-nomination-=ows-doubts-about-obama-on-iran/2013/01/17/dlcb9756-Sda6-11e2-9940-6fc488f3=ecd_story.html> make sure that Hagel backs away=from his previous views on Iran and at that least the toes White the administration's House should act t=ugher quickly to line. "If the White House does not take steps soon to correct that=impression, the chances for a negotiated resolution of the Iran nuclear crisis will fall nearly to zero and the lik=lihood of Israeli military action will rise dramatically," he wrote.

Indeed, within days=of his nomination as secretary of defense, Hagel was already backing=away from his earlier views <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/09/chuck-hagel-iran=n_2443090.html> , m=eting with senior Pentagon officials and influential senators who'll vote on his confirmation to clarify his view= on Iran, asserting that he supports broad international sanctions against=lran and that he believes that the military option ought to be "on the t=ble." Several Democratic senators who met with Hagel announced with satisfaction that the former senator from Ne=raska

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had sufficiently backtracked or "clarified" <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congress/kerry-def-nds-hagel-in- face-of-gop-criticism-over-nuclear-weapons-stand/2013/01/24/7-733bb8-6644-11e2-889b-f23c246aa446_story.html> his views on l-an. Consequently, they announced that he had earned their support - and -heir vote.

Then, during his co=firmation hearings on January 31, Hagel — under hostile questioning from=several Republican senators — backed away from earlier-held positions on=lran, including the role of sanctions. And, though he previously been a sharp critic of a military attack on Iran= in his opening statement <http://foxnewsinsider.com/2013/01/31/transcript-defense-s=c-y-nominee-chuck-hagels-opening-statement-at-senate-confirmation-hearing/> Hagel said: "I am fully committed to the President's goal of preventing Iran=from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and—as I've said in the past—all op=ions must be on the table to achieve that goal. My policy is one of preven=ion, and not one of containment—and the President has made clear that is the policy of our government. As Secretary of Defen=e, I will make sure the Department is prepared for any contingency."

Satloff's views w=re echoed by another tough-talking official at WINEP, former Ambassador Denis Ross, a pro-Israel hawk who served as Obama's top adviser on Iran du=ing much of the president's first term. "I think 2013 is going to be For <http://=ww.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-iran-nuclear-crisis-20130114,=,3842481.story> <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-=ran-nuclear-crisis-20130114,0,3842481.story> decisive," the diplomacy result. Ross We to still told have have th= a a =hance challenge Los of Angeles , success, expressing to convince Times the=lranians about need that Hagel's to understand we're previous quite that serious comments. if diplomacy about "Time the fails,=force use really of force," is going he said. out. to be "In the first term, the administrati=n didn't always speak with one voice on this issue. So what Hagel says c=n make a

difference." difference." Despite his =a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/31/chuck-=agel-was-bad-and-it-doesnt-matter/" target="_blank">poorly receieved performance at his confirmation hearings <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/20=3/01/31/chuck-hagel-was-bad-and-it-doesnt-matter/> , <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/20=3/01/31/chuck-hagel-was-bad-and-it-doesnt-matter/> , it's widely believed in Washington that Hagel will be confirmed as secretary of defense and tha= his private advice to Obama will more closely hew to his long-held belief= about the futility of sanctions and the grave downside to a military stri=e. Partly for that reason, it remains very unlikely that the Obama administration will resort to force to resolv= the dispute with Iran. In fact, in remarks that Iranian officials cited a= promising, Vice President Joe Biden expressed the administration's will=ngness to hold bilateral talks with the Iranians. In response to a question at the Munich Security <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/02/remarks-vi=e-president-joe-biden-munich-security-conference-hotel-bayeri> Conference meet bilaterally =/span> with Biden the Ira=ian said leadership" when , "We Iran's have Supreme made Leader it clear Ayatollah at the outset Ali Khamenei that...we would is s=rious be prepared about to negotiations. Iran's Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi resp=nded favorably and said <http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=3D302076> , "I am optimistic, I feel this ne= administration is really seeking this time to at least divert from its previous traditional approach vis-a-vis my count!..."

But if Washington r=mains committed to ever-tougher sanctions — and without promising Iran t=at sanctions will be lifted as part of a deal — then negotiations are un=ikely to succeed. Vali Nasr, another former Obama administration official with expertise on Iran, suggested recently t=at there's not much more the world can do to sanction Iran, and that such =enalties could drive Tehran to take radical action. The regime of sanction= against Iran over its nuclear activity <http://=bcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/expert-iran-sanctions-end-effectiven=ss-18294468> "really Un=versity, has reached said during its end," the , dean World Nasr of Economic the Paul H. Forum Nitze in School Davos. of And Advanced he warned International that=unless Studies there at is Johns a diplomatic Hopkins breakthrough — or, alternatively, an attack=on Iran — "you really are looking at a scenario where Iran is going to rush very quickly towards nuclear pow=r, because they also think, like North Korea, that (then) you have much mo=e leverage to get rid of these sanctions."

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Robert Dreyfuss =s an independent, investigative journalist in the Washington, D.C, area, w=o writes frequently for The Nation, Rolling Stone, and other publications.=His blog, The Dreyfuss Report, appears at TheNation.com. He is the author of 'Devil's Game: How the United St=tes Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam'.

Articl= 7.

The Wall Street Jou=nal

A New U.S. In=ernational Economic Strategy

Robert B. Zoellick <http://o-line.wsj.com/search/term.html?KEYWORDS=ROBERT+B.+ZOELLICK&by=inesearch=true>

February 5, 2013 --=Five years into the global economic storm, America's traditional allies, t=eEuropean Union and Japan, are struggling. Developing economies are reshap=ng the global dynamic but also face big challenges. The United States is the one country that could lead the m=dernization of the international system so as to supply security, economic=opportunity, and prospects for liberty. America's own strategy for economi= revival cannot be limited to the nation's borders. And its future foreign policy—its projection of power =nd principle—must be grounded in the emerging economic order.

President Obama has=said he admires Ronald Reagan's transformative thinking. If so, he should =sk for an assessment of Reagan's second-term innovations on currency and m=netary affairs, trade, debt and development. Reagan advanced a new international system to match the revival of capital=sm after the oil shocks and stagflation of the 1970s. America's success in=the 198Os contributed both to the end of the Cold War, by persuading the S=viet Union it could not keep up, and to two decades of exceptional global growth.

The new U.S. intern=tional economic strategy should have five parts. First, this country shout= strengthen its continental base by building on the North American Free Tr=de Agreement with Canada and Mexico. Together, the three partners could boost energy security, improve producti=ity, and give North Americans an edge in manufacturing and other industrie= that are already experiencing rising wages in East Asia. A politically ac=eptable immigration policy, and a push for educational innovation using new technologies and competition, =ould lead to a more prosperous, populous, integrated and democratic future=for the hemisphere.

Second, the extraor=inary monetary policies of late, led by the Federal Reserve's continued ne=r-zero interest-rate policy, are taking us into uncharted territory. Centr=l banks have tried most every tool to stimulate growth; if Japan is any warning, the next tactic is competiti=e devaluation, which risks a new protectionism. "Currency manipulatio=" could become a danger that reaches far beyond the debate about Chin=se policies. The world economy will need at some point to withdraw the drug of cheap money and negative real intere=t rates. The U.S. should anticipate these dangers.

The International M=netary Fund also could help set standards about exchange-rate policies and=serve as a referee that blows a whistle, even if it cannot penalize. The I=F and the World Trade Organization should anticipate this risk and give effect to the existing WTO agreement =hat economies must "avoid manipulating exchange rates . . . to gain a= unfair competitive advantage."

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Third, the U.S. nee=s to break the logjam on opening markets. As the leading world economy, Am=rica should initially try to strengthen and increase international trade t=rough the WTO. As my colleagues at the Peterson Institute have pointed out, there are gains from the stymied =oha Round of trade negotiations that should be harvested now: ending agric=ltural export subsidies; limiting food export controls; eliminating tariff= and quotas for almost all exports of the poorest countries; facilitating customs and clearance procedures; a=d improving the transparency and speed of the system for settling disputes=

Next, the U.S. need= to keep the WTO current with a vastly changed world economy. The past WTO=agreements are valuable for all 158 WTO members. But some economies want t= go further by reducing barriers in important sectors such as the services trade, environmental goods and serv=ces, government procurement, and the digital economy.

The services trade,=for example, is vital for boosting innovation, productivity and jobs in de=eloping and developed countries alike—but regulatory, licensing, zoning =nd other barriers to services are often equivalent to a 30% tariff or higher. Because liberalization in the WTO ha= been stuck, countries have turned increasingly to bilateral and multilate=al free-trade agreements, some of which have addressed these newer topics.=The U.S. should foster the WTO principle of world-wide liberalization by adopting standards in various in=ustries and sectors that would be open to all economies that reciprocate. =he WTO also needs new rules for fair trading by state-owned enterprises.

Yet the U.S. also s=ould use free-trade agreements to open markets. Trade competition advances=structural reforms and growth without bigger government and more spending.=The Obama administration has talked about trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic accords. Yet it has failed to close=even one new free-trade agreement. Ron Kirk, the president's trade represe=tative, said in 2009 that the administration did not have "deal fever=" In fact, it has been "deal delinquent."

Fourth, gender equa=ity is not only fair and right—it is smart economics. No economy can rea=h its potential if it overlooks the talents of half its people. The U.S. s=ould lead in identifying structural barriers in countries that hold back girls' and women's health, education, credit, =obs and entrepreneurship.

Finally, the U.S. needs to match growth priorities of developi=g economies. President Obama should expand the global food-security initia=ive he announced in 2009 to boost agricultural productivity and production across the value chain, including through the =rivate sector, in sub-Saharan Africa and other poor regions. Infrastructur= investment could increase global demand today while building productivity=for tomorrow.

The U.S. can lead a=push with middle-income economies to develop public-private infrastructure=models that move from "one-offs" to a deal flow. The zero return= for savers from U.S. monetary policy can make infrastructure investments attractive.

In addition to offering financing, the private sector can impr=ve the design, operation and maintenance of infrastructure. As the state o= Indiana has shown, the federal government could profitably use public-private partnerships for its infrastructure, t=o.

The administration =as talked about some of these topics. But it is oddly passive, as if it we=e hesitant to lead. State Department speeches are not enough. To carve out=an international economic strategy, the new secretary of the Treasury needs to choreograph policies across all=U.S. departments and with multilateral economic institutions. The U.S. had=better wake up: International economic strategy is the new foreign policy.=/span>

Mr. Zoelli=k <http:=/topics.wsj.com/person/Z/Robert-Zoellick/556> has served as president of the World Bank Group, U.S. trade represen=ative and deputy secretary of state. He is now a fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard and the Peterson Institute=for International Economics.

17

<u>EFTA_R1_00133059</u>
EFTA01796857

📅 Jun 12, 2012

FW: The Newsroom NY Evite

From: Allison Reddington

To: JEEVACATION@GMAIL.COM

Thank you.

Thank you.

📅 Jun 18, 2012 REDACTED

Fwd: The Newsroom NY Evite

From: Unknown

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Begin forwarded message: From: Allison Reddington Date: June 12, 2012 3:49:36 PM EDT To: "JEEVACATION@GMAIL.COM" <JEEVACATION@GMAIL.COM> Cc: "Lesley Groff Subject: FW: The Newsroom NY Evite Thank you.

Begin forwarded message:

From: Allison Reddington

Date: June 12, 2012 3:49:36 PM EDT

To: "JEEVACATION@GMAIL.COM" <JEEVACATION@GMAIL.COM>

Cc: "Lesley Groff

Subject: FW: The Newsroom NY Evite

Thank you.

📅 Jan 23, 2011 REDACTED

Dock lights pneumo mohel Jonathan

From: jeffrey epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com>

Dock lights pneumo mohel Jonathan Tule full-time Scott cables sultan un gym two jack paul steve gogger krishna ver Jerry larrypetergeorgeandrews date-last-viewed 0 date-received 1295789941 flags 8590195713 gmail-label-ids 29 remote-id 130203 1 EFTA_R1_00133064 EFTA01796859

Dock lights pneumo mohel Jonathan

Tule full-time Scott cables sultan un gym two jack paul steve gogger krishna ver Jerry larrypetergeorgeandrews date-last-viewed 0 date-received 1295789941 flags 8590195713 gmail-label-ids 29 remote-id 130203

1

EFTA_R1_00133064
EFTA01796859

📅 Apr 4, 2011

Re:

From: David Stern

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Thank you! On 4 Apr 2011, at 11:42, Jeffrey Epstein wrote: call me paris ******** The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify

Thank you!

On 4 Apr 2011, at 11:42, Jeffrey Epstein wrote:

call me paris

********

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation@gmail.com <mailtoleevacation@gmail.com> , and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

📅 Mar 31, 2011 REDACTED

(no subject)

From: Unknown

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Eva's office called. Celina has friends flying to PB to have dinner with her tonight for her birthday, but they are staying in Boca. They are wondering if we know of any drivers who could drive her friends to Boca after their dinner. Janusz would be the only option I know of. Would you like him to drive her friends to Bocca?

Eva's office called. Celina has friends flying to PB to have dinner with her tonight for her birthday, but they are staying in Boca.

They are wondering if we know of any drivers who could drive her friends to Boca after their dinner. Janusz would be the only option I know of. Would you like him to drive her friends to Bocca?

📅 Jan 23, 2016

Fwd: Back to Singapore ...maybe?

From: Larry Visoski

To: Je vacation, Rich Kahn

Jeffrey See Bill's email below: Bill Hammond is asking for your approval, he has the opportunity for additional 90 Days in Singapore flying the BBJ, if this doesn't affect your 8727 flying? I have Chris Higgins qualified at Flight engineer at this time. Do you approve of Bill flying BBJ until end April? Thank you, Larry Sent from my iPhone Begin forwarded message: From: Bill Hammond Date: January 23, 2016 at 7:24:01 AM EST To: Larry Visoski Subject: Back to Singapore ...maybe ???? Larry,

Jeffrey
See Bill's email below:

Bill Hammond is asking for your approval, he has the opportunity for additional 90 Days in Singapore flying the BBJ, if this doesn't affect your 8727 flying? I have Chris Higgins qualified at Flight engineer at this time.

Do you approve of Bill flying BBJ until end April?

Thank you,

Larry

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: Bill Hammond
Date: January 23, 2016 at 7:24:01 AM EST
To: Larry Visoski
Subject: Back to Singapore ...maybe ????

Larry, I need to talk to you today when you have a few minutes. I just received an email from Edan, he has asked me to come back at the end of next week for up to 90 days. I could take all or part of it. Here is what is happening with them. They were in the process of buying a Global 5000 for a second aircraft and the director and the engineer were with the airplane for pre-buy and all of that stuff, that is why they needed me, well I came home a week early because the deal fell through so Edan came back to work. Now the deal is back on and he needs support again.

This is truly a one-time deal once they get their airplane, so once they get the plane in service I'll be cut loose and probably not to return. They are hiring 4 global pilots for the aircraft but they have to be based in Singapore, in case you might know any that are looking for work.

As I mentioned before my first allegiance is to you and Mr. Epstein, so if this would cause you pain then I will turn it down. If you think that you could muster through it, I would like to go, it's a lot of money, I worked for 18 days and made 29K and the next deal will be if I stayed the entire time would be:

Day rate 1300 x 90
Per diem + 135 x 90

117000 + 12,125 = $129,125

Again, I could do part of it as well or do it all and that would be it. Please advise.

Feel free to call me today to discuss.

This is what Edan wrote to me this morning.....

Hi Bill,

Any chance you can come back end of next week if it happens? This would be a long tour for sure if you want it.

Thanks,

Edan

I will need coverage for several months if not more but I understand you may not be available for too long. I'm short two pilots through April from what I see now.

E

📅 Feb 11, 2011

Re:

From: jeffrey epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com>

To: Gary Kemey

High Sorry for all the typos. Sent from my iPhone On Feb 11, 2011, at 11:33 AM, "Gary Kerney" Confirming. Satin finish on master not high gloss > Sent from my iPhone

High

Sorry for all the typos. Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 11, 2011, at 11:33 AM, "Gary Kerney"

Confirming. Satin finish on master not high gloss

> Sent from my iPhone

📅 Dec 6, 2011

(no subject)

From: Jeffrey Epstein

To: M

news?

news?

📅 Dec 7, 2011

(no subject)

From: M

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Now I also understand the connection between respect and talking= it shows being the one that controls the situation. Thank you. I will watch more Sasha Grey.

Now I also understand the connection between respect and talking= it shows being the one that controls the situation.

Thank you. I will watch more Sasha Grey.

📅 Dec 7, 2011

Re:

From: M

To: Jeffrey Epstein

ok, I'll try. I think I understand what you mean. sure men like that? most watched were girls virgin style, guy having the control and=amateur stuff.

ok, I'll try. I think I understand what you mean. sure men like that? most watched were girls virgin style, guy having the control and=amateur stuff.

📅 Dec 7, 2011

Re:

From: Jeffrey Epstein

To: M

but I want you to talk as nasty, vulgar, imaginative as you can.. = it will free your mind. its like a mental sneeze

but I want you to talk as nasty, vulgar, imaginative as you can.. = it will free your mind. its like a mental sneeze

📅 Dec 7, 2011

Re:

From: Jeffrey Epstein

To: M

this is for you „ not for them. „ =

this is for you „ not for them. „ =

📅 Dec 11, 2011 REDACTED

Re:

From: Unknown

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Do you have time to talk now=/VAR>?

Do you have time to talk now=/VAR>?

📅 Oct 29, 2010 REDACTED

Re: Re:

From: Jeevacation <jeevacation@gmail.com>

Sunday with daughters? Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone On Oct 29, 2010, at 9:48 AM, "Sarah" > When? Which day? > -----Original Message------ > From: Jeffrey Epstein > To: Sarah > Subject: > Sent: Oct 29, 2010 6:44 AM > > Are we on for breaky > > Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone > > > This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and > intended=solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. 1= you have received t

Sunday with daughters?

Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone

On Oct 29, 2010, at 9:48 AM, "Sarah"

> When? Which day?

> -----Original Message------

> From: Jeffrey Epstein

> To: Sarah

> Subject:

> Sent: Oct 29, 2010 6:44 AM

>

> Are we on for breaky

>

> Sorry for all the typos .Sent from my iPhone

>

>

> This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and

> intended=solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. 1= you have received this email in error please notify the sender immediately.

📅 Dec 29, 2010

Connectomes

From: Melanie

To: Jeffrey Epstein

http://mobi-e.nytimes.com/article?a=720515&f=24 = 1 EFTA_R1_00133074 EFTA01796869

http://mobi-e.nytimes.com/article?a=720515&f=24

=

1

EFTA_R1_00133074
EFTA01796869

📅 Mar 5, 2016

Re:

From: ader@aderfam.ch

To: Jeffrey E.

Yes On 05 Mar 2016, at 21:54, jeffrey E. <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote: 1hr? On Saturday, 5 March 2016, ader@aderfam.ch wrote= Hi Jeff, we can speak when u re free. please note The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of JEE Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited

Yes

On 05 Mar 2016, at 21:54, jeffrey E. <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote:

1hr?

On Saturday, 5 March 2016, ader@aderfam.ch wrote=

Hi Jeff, we can speak when u re free.

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of JEE

Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation@gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

📅 Dec 22, 2010

(no subject)

From: Jeffrey Epstein

To: Emad Hanna

did we get the info I asked for from dennis boone?

did we get the info I asked for from dennis boone?