📅 May 3, 2014

Re:

From: [REDACTED]

To: jeevacation@gmail.com

Ahh!! Jealous ;-) eat a Nutella crepe for me. When are you back? We will be in NY the 11-15 On May 3, 2014, at 5:24 PM, "jeffrey E." <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote: paris, lookking at the collage of you sleeping On Sat, May 3, 2014 at 11:53 PM, wrote: Hmmm..excellent question! Will think about it and get back to you. I still have your belated present in NY. Where are you? On May 3, 2014, at 5:10 AM, "Jeffrey E." leevacation®gmail.com> wrote: still birthday, suggestions? please note The in

Ahh!! Jealous ;-) eat a Nutella crepe for me. When are you back? We will be in NY the 11-15

On May 3, 2014, at 5:24 PM, "jeffrey E." <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote:

paris, lookking at the collage of you sleeping

On Sat, May 3, 2014 at 11:53 PM, wrote:

Hmmm..excellent question! Will think about it and get back to you. I still have your belated present in NY. Where are you?

On May 3, 2014, at 5:10 AM, "Jeffrey E." leevacation®gmail.com> wrote:

still birthday, suggestions?

please note

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please note

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Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by

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📅 May 2, 2014 REDACTED

May 2 update

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen <

<u>2 May, 2014</u> <table><tr><th><change><u>ArticleI.</u></change></th><th>The Weekly Standard <u>Getting Ready for a Bad Deal - Israel's security establishment steps up Elliott Abrams</u></th></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 2.</u></change></td><td>NYT <u>Why Abbas Reconciled With llamas Ali Jarbawi</u></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 3.</u></change></td><td>The Washington Post <change><u>On Syria, reality-check time</u> <u>David Ignatius</u></change></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 4.

<u>2 May, 2014</u>
<table><tr><th><change><u>ArticleI.</u></change></th><th>The Weekly Standard
<u>Getting Ready for a Bad Deal - Israel's security establishment steps up Elliott Abrams</u></th></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 2.</u></change></td><td>NYT 
<u>Why Abbas Reconciled With llamas Ali Jarbawi</u></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 3.</u></change></td><td>The Washington Post
<change><u>On Syria, reality-check time</u>
<u>David Ignatius</u></change></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 4.</u></change></td><td>The Washington Post
<change><u>Obama's foreign policy of denial</u>
<u>Charles Krauthammer</u></change></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 5.</u></change></td><td>The National Interest
<change><u>Thucydides Trap 2.0: Superpower Suicide?</u>
<u>Patrick Porter'</u></change></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 6.</u></change></td><td>The Washington Post
<change><u>Why the United States shouldn't support Egypt's ruling generals</u> 
<u>Robert Kagan</u></change></td></tr><tr><td>Article 7.</td><td>NYT 
<change><u>Why Economics Failed</u>
<u>Paul Krugman</u></change></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 8.</u></change></td><td>The Washington Post
<u>How U.S. billionaire Sheldon Adelson is buying</u> up <u>Israel's media</u> 
Ruth <u>Eglash</u></td></tr></table>
<change><u>Article 1.</u></change>
The Weekly Standard
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<u>Getting Ready for a Bad Deal - Israel's security establishment steps up</u>
Elliott Abrams
May 12, 2014 -- The world's attention was largely turned to Ukraine last week. To the extent that the Middle East was on the front pages, the focus was the new agreement between the PLO and Hamas, its implications for the "peace process," and John Kerry's comment about Israel as an "apartheid state."
But in Israel a different subject was getting a lot of attention: Iran's nuclear program. April 28 was Holocaust Remembrance Day, and that was the context in which Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke about Iran at the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial.
Netanyahu discussed the world's blind refusal to see what was coming in
the 1930s despite all the evident warnings: "How is it possible that so
many people failed to understand reality? The bitter, tragic truth is this: It
is not that they did not see. They did not want to see." He then asked, "Has
the world learned [from] the mistakes of the past? Today we again face
clear facts and a tangible threat. Iran calls for our destruction. It is
developing nuclear weapons."
Netanyahu turned then to the current negotiations with Iran and drew the analogy:
This time too, the truth is evident to all: Iran seeks an agreement that will lift the sanctions and leave it as a nuclear threshold state with the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons within several months at most. Iran wants a deal that will eliminate the sanctions and leave its capabilities intact. A deal which enables Iran to be a nuclear threshold state will bring the entire world to the threshold of an abyss. I hope that the lessons of the past have been learned, and that the desire to avoid confrontation at any cost will not lead to a deal that will exact a much heavier price in the future. I call on the leaders of the world powers to insist that Iran fully dismantle its capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons, and to persist until this goal is achieved. He then repeated a pledge he has made in the past that Israel will not tolerate Iran as a nuclear threshold power: "The people of Israel stand strong. Faced with an existential threat, our situation today is entirely
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different than it was during the Holocaust. . . . Today, we have a sovereign Jewish state. Unlike the Holocaust, when the Jewish people were like a wind-tossed leaf and utterly defenseless, we now have great power to defend ourselves, and it is ready for any mission."
Of course, Netanyahu has been saying these things for years, and listeners may wonder whether this is just more of the same: rhetoric, or at best a kind of "psy-op" meant to toughen the American position at those talks with Iran. After all, though Netanyahu is said to have come close to ordering a strike at Iran in the summer of 2012, it didn't happen. In addition to feeling great American pressure against acting, Netanyahu clearly did not have a consensus in the Israeli security establishment for such a grave decision.
Those who consider Netanyahu's words just more rhetoric should consider, then, two additional statements made last week—by two key figures in the security establishment, both viewed as balanced and sensible voices.
On April 23, five days before Netanyahu spoke, retired general Amos Yadlin, the former head of Israeli Military Intelligence and now director of the Institute for National Security Studies, wrote a piece for the Jerusalem Post. Like Netanyahu, he objected to a deal with Iran that would allow it to preserve its nuclear weapons program—and said that appears to be where the West is headed. The Iranian "concessions" are not real, he wrote: "Iran is trying to portray itself as a country prepared to make fundamental concessions, but at the same time it is preserving the core abilities in both routes it is developing for a nuclear weapon."
Yadlin rejected the view that inspections alone could prevent Iran from cheating: Inspections are "insufficient. The international inspection systems are not perfect and have always been known to fail. They already failed in the past to discover on time the efforts made by Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Iran to secretly develop a military nuclear program.
These systems can cease to exist in case of a unilateral Iranian decision— like what happened with North Korea."
So what should a deal with Iran contain?
The powers must demand that Iran will dissolve most of the centrifuges and leave a symbolic number of non-advanced centrifuges. They must demand that the uranium enrichment stockpile in Iran will be limited to a low level and symbolic amount (less than the amount required for one
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bomb). They must also demand the dismantlement of the enrichment site inside a mountain near Qom, which aims to guarantee a protected site immune to a quick breakthrough towards a bomb. They must demand that the Arak reactor will be altered so that it would not be used for military purposes and demand an answer to the open questions regarding the military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program.
Yadlin said the mark of an acceptable deal with Iran is that "the time it takes Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, if it decides to do so, will be measured in years rather than in months."
General Yaakov Amidror, the former Israeli national security adviser and before that head of research for Israeli Military Intelligence, wrote a piece for the Jerusalem Post one day later. Like Yadlin, he brushed aside assurances that inspections and intelligence will spot any Iranian moves toward making a bomb: "There is no such thing as a monitoring system that cannot be sidestepped. There is no way to guarantee that the world will spot Iran's efforts to cheat. American intelligence officials have publicly admitted that they cannot guarantee identification in real time of an Iranian breakout move to produce a nuclear weapon."
And what if Iranian cheating is discovered? "Anyone who thinks that a U.S. administration would respond immediately to an Iranian agreement violation, without negotiations, is deluding himself. . . . Israel cannot accept the existential threat caused by this delusion." The determination of the P5+1 to stop Iran will erode in future years, he argues, just as it has eroded in the past few years as the demands being made of Iran have steadily been reduced. Requirements considered essential a few years ago have already been dropped, including the demand that Iran simply stop enriching uranium.
Amidror also dismissed the idea that Iran won't cheat and try to build a bomb out of fear of the likely American reaction: "Does anyone believe that the use of force is a possible option for the United States? What are the chances that the United States would obtain the support of the Security Council for the use of force against Iran? What are the chances that Washington would act without U.N. support?" Amidror argued that optimistic assumptions about a deal with Iran cannot be sustained —"neither the assumption that a monitoring regime can guarantee identification, in real time, of Iranian violations; nor the assumption that
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the United States will act with alacrity if a breach is identified; nor the assumption that, in the real world, Iran will truly be deterred by U.S. threats."
Where does this argument lead? Amidror concluded: "With such a flimsy agreement, I wonder what will be left of Western commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And Israel will have to draw its own conclusions."
These three statements, from Israel's prime minister and two of its leading security figures, are of course meant to toughen the American position in the coming talks. Watching the P5+1 effort to conclude a deal with Iran by the July deadline, the three men are urging tougher terms than many in the West (not to mention Russia and China) seem willing to require. They are restating the point that a bad deal is, as American officials have agreed at least in principle, worse than no deal, because it would offer false assurances that we've stopped Iran while strengthening the Islamic Republic through the elimination of economic sanctions. And they are reminding us, yet again, that while the P5+1 may be willing to take a chance and let Iran progress a bit more slowly toward a bomb, Israel may make a different calculation and "draw its own conclusions." It may be difficult to think of Israel acting alone in the face of a widely celebrated nuclear deal with Iran or even in the face of continuing negotiations that function as a cover for Iran's progress toward a usable weapon. But watching Israel's prime minister deliver his warning from Yad Vashem, on Holocaust Remembrance Day, is a reminder that Jewish history has taught Israel's leaders powerful lessons about the past—and the dangers the future holds.
Elliott Abrams is a seniorfellowfor Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author, most recently, of Tested by Zion: The Bush Administration and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
Article 2.
NYT
Why Abbas Reconciled With Hamas
Ali Jarbawi
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May 1, 2014 -- Ramallah, West Bank — A week before the deadline expired on the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace talks sponsored by John Kerry, the Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas announced an end to their seven-year split. The announcement paved the way for the formation of a Palestinian unity government in the coming weeks, with elections following at least six months later.
The unity deal was greeted in Palestinian circles with a mixture of joyous relief and caution. The split has proved harmful to Palestinians, and has increased their collective suffering over the past seven years. It has also distracted them from major issues like ending the Israeli occupation and establishing an independent state. Indeed, for seven years, ordinary Palestinians have demanded that the two factions reconcile.
Despite the optimism, there is a pervasive fear that this latest deal will be reconciliation in name only. After all, the latest announcement doesn't contain anything new; it merely declares that earlier agreements will be upheld. This has led many to wonder: Why now? Is this latest agreement more serious than earlier ones? Does it signal a change in strategy on both sides? Or is it merely a necessary tactical step whose effects will soon fade away?
All the apprehensiveness has been exacerbated by Palestinian leaders' Kerry-sponsored political flailing talks, and a current bumbling. of opinion Since has the emerged breakdown demanding of the that the Palestinian leadership stop negotiating and approach the United Nations, which has led to Palestinian moves to join several international agreements and treaties. Meanwhile, there are ongoing attempts to save the negotiations and extend them.
To add to the tension, there is a discrepancy between growing hints that the Palestinian Authority will be dissolved and calls to hold Palestinian general elections.
After all, what would be the point in agreeing to form a national unity government and holding elections a few months from now if there's a plan to dissolve the Authority?
Many analysts believe that the unity agreement is a necessary way out of the dire straits that both the Authority's president, Mahmoud Abbas, and Hamas leaders currently find themselves in. The tightening of the siege on
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Gaza and the concomitant drying up of Hamas's international financial pipelines, as well as the closing of most of the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt, have forced Hamas to accept this deal. From its viewpoint, even if the agreement doesn't achieve much, the group doesn't stand to lose anything.
The situation is more complicated for Mr. Abbas. He had firmly believed that the negotiations were the only way to reach a settlement with Israel, and he stood against armed struggle, sticking to his position even during the armed intifada that broke out in 2000.
Mr. Abbas now finds himself in a sticky situation. The negotiations that he worked so hard for have reached a dead end, due to Israeli recalcitrance. Mr. Abbas would have been prepared to continue the negotiations process, as long as it achieved the barest sliver of acceptable gains for the Palestinians. But it has become clear that the current Israeli government is not prepared to cede even that bare minimum. As a result, Mr. Abbas has reached a conclusion he'd long refused to accept: that the negotiations process won't bear fruit. Of course, this is hugely disappointing on two levels. First, because the negotiations haven't achieved what he expected of them. Second, because internal dissent has mounted and he has been personally blamed for setting back the national cause, the legitimacy of his leadership has eroded.
This may explain why Mr. Abbas has endorsed Palestinian applications to join international treaties, as well as his recent recurrent statements that he wants to step down. He appears to have embarked upon two divergent paths simultaneously, despite the fact that they are contradictory. He has done so in the hope, perhaps, that one of them will stick. Reconciliation with Hamas means that the option of dissolving the Authority has been dropped. Furthermore, a general election after several months gives Mr. Abbas a final opportunity to find a way to resume negotiations — his preferred option — or finally quit. His tactics are rather obvious, but Israel and the United States are ignoring his signals. Instead, the unity deal has created a furor within the Israeli government. Because of the agreement, the bitterest vitriol has been poured on Mr. Abbas, who has been portrayed as someone who doesn't want peace with Israel and as a terrorist. Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the members of his government seem to have forgotten that Israel itself
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made a deal with Hamas (to free prisoners) not so long ago. They also seem to have forgotten that they once refused to recognize Mr. Abbas as an acceptable negotiating partner, claiming that, due to the schism with Hamas, he didn't represent all Palestinians. Now they consider him unacceptable for the opposite reason.
It's clear that the Israelis and Americans want to leave Palestinians with no choice but to acquiesce to Israeli demands. However, it's also clear that the Palestinian people will no longer accept the ongoing continuation of absurd, fruitless negotiations.
The reconciliation agreement with Hamas will ensure that the Palestinian Authority continues to exist after Mr. Abbas steps down. However, Israeli and American threats could lead to the Authority's eventual collapse. Is this what Israel and the United States really want?
Ali Jarbawi is a political scientist at Birzeit University and a former minister of the Palestinian Authority.
<change><u>Article 3.</u></change>
The Washington Post
<u>On Syria, reality-check time</u>
David Ignatius
2 May, 2014 -- Rabah Al-Sarhan, Jordan -- The Syrian border is just a few miles north of this processing station for <change><u>refugees.</u></change> Syrian rebel commanders had invited me to travel with them inside their country, entering through a crossing point near here, but the Jordanian government emphatically said no. So this account is based on interviews with Syrians I met in Jordan or who talked with me from inside Syria by phone. My Syrian contacts described a bitter stalemate: President Bashar al-Assad holds on to power, but he has lost control of major parts of the country. The rebels fight bravely, but they lack the organization and heavy weapons to protect the areas they have liberated. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda extremists fester in the shadows. The opposition remains so fragmented that some rebels frankly admit they aren't ready to govern, even if Assad should fall.
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"We still need to find a leader," conceded one rebel commander. "We are headless inside the country."
Rebel fighters spoke honestly about three key issues: First, their military wing remains diffuse and disorganized; the southern front has more than 55 brigades but lacks a unified command-and-control structure. Second,
Muslim extremists are gaining a foothold in the south, just as they did two years ago in northern Syria. <change><u>Jabhat al-Nusra,</u></change> linked with al-Qaeda, has set up checkpoints on some roads just north of the Jordanian border. Finally, Assad's forces have regained control of many Damascus suburbs, essentially by starving the residents into submission.
With <change><u>Ahmad al-Jarba</u></change> , the political leader of the Syrian opposition, to visit Washington next week for meetings with U.S. officials, it's reality-check slow-motion time. The death current of Syria. American What approach should be is changed? contributing There to the are grinding, two obvious possibilities, but each has problems:
• Strengthen the opposition. Saudi Arabia wants the United States to expand its covert training program to create a real rebel army, armed with anti-aircraft rebel-held areas. But missiles. the rebels Such would a force be could fighting hold for off a Assad draw and and an protect eventual political settlement. They are too fractured politically to triumph and rule.
• Negotiate with Assad to create a successor regime. Some in Jordan and Washington argue that, for the sake of stability, the friends of Syria should open back-channel contacts with Assad. "We might have to eat some hard crow," <change><u>Ryan Crocker,</u></change> the widely respected former U.S. ambassador to Syria and Iraq, said at a think-tank gathering in Washington on Thursday. "As bad as the regime is, there is something worse — which is extreme elements of the opposition."
But cutting a deal with Assad's regime strikes me as an unrealistic strategy, in addition to being an amoral one: Assad has so angered many Syrian citizens that he has probably lost any chance of rebuilding a unified country. As one U.S. official noted, "It's like asking Humpty Dumpty to put himself back together."
The United States needs a strategy for a long fight. If the goal is an eventual political balance in Syria, the opposition will need training and military assistance to stabilize the areas it controls. In return for help, the moderate opposition will have to break with al-Nusra, just as it has done
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with the even more extreme group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
A fighter from the <change><u>Daraa</u></change> region explained the simple reason his forces cooperate with al-Nusra: "They have a lot of support." This opportunistic alliance has to change; otherwise, the moderates are doomed.
In framing a sustainable strategy, the Obama administration should listen to Jordanians when they complain that they have a powder keg next door.
Jordan is nominally part of a covert plan to assist the rebels made by intelligence chiefs from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other key countries. But this pact masks a deep uneasiness.
Even some rebel leaders know Jordan's tight border is better than Turkey's porous frontier. "The smugglers and kidnappers can't operate along the Jordan border. The extremists can't enter. We feel safe at our backs," says a fighter with the Yarmouk Brigade in southern Syria.
The victims in this war are paying a terrible cost. A man shows you the wounds of torture — the stump of a finger chopped off and a red welt of stitch marks where his leg was broken. A delicately beautiful young woman walks with a severe limp because her leg was snapped by prison guards.
Syria policy should be made with a cool head, but it can't be heartless to such human suffering.
<change><u>Article 4.</u></change>
The Washington Post
<u>Obama's foreign policy of denial</u>
Charles Krauthammer
2 May, 2014 -- Barack Obama's 949-word response Monday to a question about foreign policy weakness showed the president at his worst: defensive, irritable, contradictory and at times detached from reality. <change><u>It began with a complaint</u></change> about negative coverage on Fox News, when, in fact, it was the <change><u>New York Times' front page</u></change> that featured Obama's foreign policy failures, most recently the inability to conclude a trade agreement with Japan and the collapse of Secretary of State John Kerry's Middle East negotiations.
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Add to this the collapse of not one but <change><u>two Geneva conferences</u></change> on Syria, American helplessness in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the Saudi king's humiliating dismissal of Obama within two hours of talks — no dinner — after Obama made a special 2,300-mile diversion from Europe to see him, and you have an impressive litany of serial embarrassments.
Obama's <change><u>first rhetorical defense,</u></change> as usual, was to attack a straw man: "Why is it that everybody is so eager to use military force?"
Everybody? Wasn't it you, Mr. President, who <change><u>decided to attack Libya</u></change> under the grand Obama doctrine of "responsibility to protect" helpless civilians — every syllable of which you totally contradicted as <change><u>150,000 were being slaughtered</u></change> in Syria?
chemical-weapons And wasn't "red attacking line" also Syria your for idea? having Before, crossed of course, your own <change><u>you retreated &jectly,</u></change> thereby marginalizing yourself and exposing the United States to general ridicule.
Everybody eager to use military force? Name a single Republican (or Democratic) leader who has called for sending troops into Ukraine.
The critique by John McCain and others is that when the Ukrainians last month came asking for weapons to defend themselves, Obama turned them down. The Pentagon offered instead MREs, ready-to-eat burgers to defend against 40,000 well-armed Russians. Obama even denied Ukraine such defensive gear as night-vision goggles and body armor.
Obama retorted testily: Does anyone think Ukrainian weaponry would deter Russia, as opposed to Obama's diplomatic and economic pressure?
Why, averred Obama, "in Ukraine, what we've done is mobilize the international community. ... Russia is having to engage in activities that have been rejected uniformly around the world."
That's a deterrent? Fear of criticism? Empty words?
To think this will stop Putin, liberator of Crimea, champion of "New Russia," is delusional. In fact, Putin's popularity at home has <change><u>spiked 10 points</u></change> since the start of his war on Ukraine. It's now <change><u>double Obama's.</u></change>
As for the allegedly mobilized international community, it has done nothing. Demonstrably nothing to deter Putin from swallowing Crimea.
Demonstrably nothing to deter his <change><u>systematic campaign</u></change> of destabilization, anonymous seizures and selective violence in the proxy-proclaimed
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People's Republic of Donetsk, where Putin's "maskirovka" (disguised warfare) has turned Eastern Ukraine into a no-man's land where Kiev hardly dares tread.
As for Obama's vaunted economic sanctions, when he finally got around to applying Round 2 on Monday, the <change><u>markets were so impressed</u></change> by their weakness that the ruble rose 1 percent and the Moscow stock exchange 2 percent.
Behind all this U.S. action, <change><u>explained the New York Times</u></change> in a recent leak calculated to counteract the impression of a foreign policy of clueless ad hocism, is a major strategic idea: containment.
A rather odd claim when a brazenly uncontained Russia swallows a major neighbor one piece at a time — as America stands by. After all, how did real containment begin? In March 1947, with Greece in danger of collapse from a Soviet-backed insurgency and Turkey under direct Russian pressure, <change><u>President Truman went to Congress</u></change> for major and immediate economic and military aid to both countries.
That means weaponry, Mr. President. It was the beginning of the Truman Doctrine. No one is claiming that arming Ukraine would have definitively deterred Putin's current actions. But the possibility of a bloody and prolonged Ukrainian resistance to infiltration or invasion would surely alter Putin's calculus more than Obama's toothless sanctions or empty diplomatic gestures, like the preposterous Geneva agreement that wasn't worth the paper it was written on.
Or does Obama really believe that Putin's thinking would be altered less by antitank and antiaircraft weapons in Ukrainian hands than by the State Department's <change><u>comical #UnitedforUkraine Twitter campaign?</u></change>
Obama appears to think so. Which is the source of so much allied anxiety:
Obama really seems to believe that his foreign policy is succeeding.
Ukraine has already been written off. But Eastern Europe need not worry. Obama understands containment. He recently dispatched <change><u>150 American ground troops</u></change> to Poland and each of the Baltic states. You read correctly: 150. Each.
Article 5.
The National Interest
<u>Thucydides Trap</u> 2.0: <u>Superpower Suicide?</u>
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Patrick Porter
May 2, 2014 -- Though Russian troops gather on Ukraine's border, and civil war devastates Aleppo, the view from Washington still sees the 'big story' of this century as the rise of China and the mischief it entails. The big question is about the potential switch from an American to an Asian century and the bloody reckoning this could bring with it. Are America and China on collision course in the tradition of Athens and Sparta, or Imperial Germany and Edwardian Britain?
Some observers, such as Graham Allison and Joseph Nye of Harvard University, and recently strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski, sense that the problem is all Greek. They turn to the Athenian general and historian Thucydides, and his history of the Peloponnesian conflict that long ago tore apart the Hellenic world and wrecked Athenian power. As Thucydides wrote, Athens' growing power frightened Sparta, determined to hold the status quo. The power shift bred suspicion, and suspicion bred war.
Likewise, unless they strike a bargain, Washington and Beijing might walk into a 'Thucydides trap.'
Thucydides did portray a trap, and his account of an ancient war warrants attention. But the trap he spoke of was more insidious and closer to home. His prime theme wasn't with the external origins of superpower war. The real snare in his History was not the murder of great powers, but their suicide.
Sparta-Athens comparisons often come to the lips of American strategic thinkers. That Thucydides did not lay out a sustained explicit theory, and that his opinion is hard to extract from the arguments he recreated, does not stop people from ransacking his history for lessons. During the Cold War, some looked to Athens as America's surrogate, a democratic, dynamic naval power confronted by the Soviet land empire and garrison state. It is a discomforting analogy. When Henry Kissinger spoke of the Soviets as 'Sparta to our Athens,' a journalist asked 'Does that mean we're bound to lose?' During hot 'small' wars, debate turned to Athens' calamitous Sicilian expedition as a parallel to Vietnam or Iraq. But with an emerging power challenging the existing strategic order of the Far East, attention turns back to the Greek precedent of bipolar rivalry.
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Through the lens of 'China anxiety,' Thucydides' history stands as a perpetual reminder of the dangers of power transition. It is hard, pessimists fear, for one power to rise and the other to decline without clashing as they pass. The deeds of Beijing and Washington suggest an escalating rivalry that will get harder to keep within limits. For all the soothing rhetoric about pivots, rebalancing and the protection of norms, the hard reality is a tightening ring of American alliances and an ever-more-assertive Asian heavyweight pressing its territorial claims and pushing out its defense perimeter. And deny it all he likes, Obama isn't shifting over half of American naval assets to the Asia Pacific to contain pirates.
But contrary to fatalists, power transitions do not necessarily lead to wars. <change><u>As James Holmes argues</u></change> [3], Britain avoided clashes with imperial France, the United States and Japan before 1914. Thucydides made a different lamentation that should resonate for the United States: about the way Athens' foreign policy disaster was born in civil strife. Growing power led to a loosening of restraint and the corruption of language. The 'root cause' was not the hegemonic challenger's rise, but Athens' own growth, generating a lust for power and destructive politics with 'national security' as the totem. Foreign-policy debate suffered. In the debased rhetoric of the time, hardliners and opportunists treated the prudential regard for limits as unpatriotic cowardice.
In Book Three, Thucydides' description of wartime rhetoric bears resemblance to today's gridlocked politics. 'Words had to change their ordinary meaning....Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on any...The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected.' An aristocrat exiled by the people's vote, Thucydides portrayed a volatile Athenian population misled by demagogues that whipped it up. Even allowing for his disdain for unruly democracy, we can recognize in his History a useful warning. Power generates an obsession with status and the projection of strength, mutates into imperial swagger, and coarsens domestic politics. Domestic political spite in the imperial capital leads to moral and strategic failure, precisely because it makes sober debate difficult.
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So, in today's democratic superpower, restraint is labeled 'timidity.' A reluctance to risk more American casualties in peripheral wars is 'fecklessness.' Concern that a state with a multitrillion dollar debt should shift some burdens to rich allies, scale back some ambitions, and bring its commitments and power into balance is 'isolationism.' Despite sanctioning and negotiating with Iran, strengthening ties with East Asian states, attempting to broker peace in the West Bank and Syria, critics charge the Obama administration with 'turning inward' and a 'global retreat.' For Condoleezza Rice, reductions in the defense budget and failure to leave a residual presence in the Iraq she helped Pyrrhically to liberate add up to a forsaking of 'leadership.'
Such rhetorical poison runs in both directions. President Obama might break a wintry smile at Thucydides' description of intemperate rhetoric. But his own party has its share of opportunists more concerned to appear tough than get serious. The lack of serious opposition to the dogmatically conceived invasion of Iraq flowed in part from the reluctance of many congressional Democrats to ask difficult questions, or even read the intelligence reports. Only when the body count rose and intelligence failures emerged did they discover that the Neoconservatives made them do it. A climate of hysterical accusation prevents the formation of a party of caution, and impedes the measured consideration of hard choices, including one of the hardest choices of all—whether to pursue primacy or balance in Asia.
The mutual spiral of domestic disarray and strategic error loomed soon after the United States became a superpower. Journalist Walter Lippmann warned during the Korean War that the crisis of the escalation of the war into a dangerous clash with China rose from a fatal symbiosis between growing strength and bitter domestic politics. The unwise expansion of the war into northern Korea, the agitation for taking the war into China and the rise of McCarthyist politics fed off each other. Truman was judged harshly —but by the very standards his own over-reaching Doctrine raised, trapped in a set of crusading images of his own making. This 'Lippmann Gap', between means and ends, fed and was fed by the kind of partisan rancor that today resurfaces in American politics.
Since then, every major, prudent move of retrenchment and adjustment has drawn charges of appeasement and weakness, from President Richard
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Nixon's realignment with China, to Ronald Reagan's arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Both Thucydides and Lippmann were pessimistic about democracy, believing that it needed elite guardians to steady the ship. But one need not reject democracy to agree with their diagnosis. Effective statecraft, and its unraveling, begins at home. A glance at the history of major powers suggests that their fall originates more in self-inflicted wounds than in the challenge of rivals. As Steven Van Evera writes, since 1815, great powers have been conquered on eight occasions. On six of those occasions, the aggressors were fuelled by 'fantasy-driven defensive bellicosity.' A nuclear-armed, distant maritime-air heavyweight and liberal democracy like America may not go the way of Imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany or Napoleonic France. But by falling prey to its own fears, it could become its own worst enemy. Avoiding a clash will take compromise from both America and China, and a willingness to reconsider their security horizons and renegotiate their universe. This difficult adjustment will need the formation of coalitions at home. Rhetorical absolutes, and the hollow vocabulary of 'retreat' and 'leadership', are particularly unsuitable to the nature of the Asia-Pacific, because that region makes sheer dominance difficult. For China, as for the United States, a maritime military balance will make conquest by anyone difficult. While a rising China will be constrained by a neighborhood of wary adversaries, the United States with its debt-deficit problem will be lucky if its unipolarity lasts. This difficult equilibrium is the reality. A milder language, therefore, is needed for America to pick its way through the chaos, and dodge the trap.
Dr. Patrick Porter is Reader in Strategic Studies at the University of Reading. Dr. Porter is the author of Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (Columbia University Press and Hurst, 2009) and The Global Village Myth: Distance, Strategy and Modern War (Georgetown University Press, forthcoming).
<change><u>Article 6.</u></change>
The Washington Post
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<u>Why the United States shouldn't support Egypt's ruling generals</u> 
Robert Kagan
One wonders how much further the United States will allow itself to be dragged down into the deepening abyss that is today's Egypt. Those in the Obama administration and Congress who favor <change><u>continued U.S. military aid to the dictatorship in Cairo</u></change> insist that although such aid may run counter to American ideals, it does serve American interests. I would argue the contrary, that American interests are being harmed every day that support continues.
Far from aiding the United States in the struggle against terrorism, as the Egyptian military dictatorship and its supporters claim, the military's brutal crackdown on <change><u>Egypt's Islamists</u></change> is creating a new generation of terrorists.
Whatever one thought of the government of Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi, and there was much to criticize, it came to office by fair and legitimate electoral means, just as U.S. policy had demanded, and it was headed toward a second election that it probably would have lost.
Although <change><u>the Morsi government did use force against demonstrators,</u></change> that was nothing compared with the <change><u>military's killing of thousands</u></change> and <change><u>imprisonment of tens of thousands</u></change> since the military coup last summer. <change><u>Terrorism</u></change> since the coup has killed more than 10 times as many people as it did in the year Morsi was in office. And it's not surprising that terrorism has been on the upswing. The military's crackdown, in which <change><u>hundreds may be condemned to death</u></change> in an hour-long trial, will leave some Islamists believing that their only choice is to kill or be killed. For every jihadist the military may kill in the Sinai Peninsula, it creates many more future jihadists throughout the nation.
Certainly all political avenues have been closed. "One man, one vote, one time" used to be the charge leveled at Islamists. It turns out that was the Egyptian military's policy, and now the United States', too. A generation of Egyptian Islamists will turn to other means to seek power. And who will be the target of these future jihadists? Not only the Egyptian military dictatorship but also the superpower that is paying the Egyptian military to repress them.
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How is this in America's interest? If the United States wanted to tame Islamism and make it safe for the modern world, it has not merely squandered that opportunity; it has been complicit in crushing that opportunity and all but ensuring that there will never be another chance. Nor is it in the United States' interest to be acting so transparently contrary to its stated principles. While some hypocrisy is unavoidable in international affairs, the level of Orwellian doublespeak has been extraordinary in the past few months. As the military dictatorship of Egypt has rapidly and steadily expanded the scope and violence of its repression of all dissent, <change><u>persecuting journalists</u></change> and Egyptian liberals, <change><u>taking obstreperous comedians off the air</u></change> — not to mention ruthlessly cracking down on the Muslim Brotherhood and its followers — senior U.S. officials have nevertheless blithely referred to Egypt's <change><u>"democratic transition"</u></change> and have spoken sympathetically of the government's move toward elections, even though everyone knows that the military's leaders have no intention of creating a democracy in Egypt. No doubt officials feel compelled to use the strange language about "democratic transition" because Congress has required that the administration certify that Egypt is moving toward democracy in order to continue providing military assistance. Despite this, Congress has been complicit in supporting military dictatorship in Egypt. Anti-Islamist sentiment runs high in the United States. There is a feeling across much of America that the best policy in Egypt, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East is simply to let the Muslims kill each other. <change><u>"Let Allah sort it out</u></change> ," as Sarah Palin so pithily put it. There is sympathy for any Arab state attempting to crush the Brotherhood and little concern about the torture, persecution and killing that the government uses to accomplish this objective. Many members of Congress also believe that by backing the Egyptian
military they are helping Israel, which, through the <change><u>American Israel Public Affairs Committee,</u></change> has actively lobbied Congress for full restoration of military aid. Even though the Morsi government did not pull out of the Camp David Accords or take actions hostile to Israel, the mere presence of a Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt frightened the Israeli government.
To Israel, which has never supported democracy anywhere in the Middle East except Israel, the presence of a brutal military dictatorship bent on the
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extermination of Islamism is not only tolerable but desirable. Perhaps from the standpoint of a besieged state like Israel, this may be understandable. A friendly observer might point out that in the end Israel may get the worst of both worlds: a new Egyptian jihadist movement brought into existence by the military's crackdown and a military government in Cairo that, playing to public opinion, winds up turning against Israel anyway.
Israel has to be the judge of its own best interests. But so does the United States. In Egypt, U.S. interests and Israel's perceptions of its own interests sharply diverge. If one believes that any hope for moderation in the Arab world requires finding moderate voices not only among secularists but also among Islamists, America's current strategy in Egypt is producing the opposite result. If one believes, as President Obama once claimed to, that it is important to seek better understanding between the United States and the Muslim world and to avoid or at least temper any clash of civilizations, then again this policy is producing the opposite result.
And if one believes that just as the days of Hosni Mubarak's regime were numbered, and so the idea of a Mubarak 2.0 can never achieve stability in Egypt, no matter how ruthless its brand of authoritarianism, then our current policy is only drawing us closer to the day when a new revolution will rock Egypt. The next revolution will almost certainly be both more radical and more virulently anti-American than the last.
Robert Kagan is a seniorfellow at the Brookings Institution. He writes a monthlyforeign affairs columnfor The Post.
Article 7.
NYT
<u>Why Economics Failed</u>
<change><u>Paul Krugman</u></change>
May 1, 2014 -- On Wednesday, I wrapped up the class I've been teaching all semester: "The Great Recession: Causes and Consequences." And while teaching the course was fun, I found myself turning at the end to an agonizing question: Why, at the moment it was most needed and could have done the most good, did economics fail?
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I don't mean that economics was useless to policy makers. On the contrary, the discipline has had a lot to offer. While it's true that few economists saw the crisis coming — mainly, I'd argue, because few realized how fragile debt-burdened our deregulated families financial were to system a plunge had in become, housing and prices how — vulnerable the clean little secret of recent years is that, since the fall of Lehman Brothers, basic textbook macroeconomics has performed very well.
But policy makers and politicians have ignored both the textbooks and the lessons of history. And the result has been a vast economic and human catastrophe, with trillions of dollars of productive potential squandered and millions of families placed in dire straits for no good reason. In what sense did economics work well? Economists who took their own textbooks seriously quickly diagnosed the nature of our economic malaise:
We were suffering from inadequate demand. The financial crisis and the housing bust created an environment in which everyone was trying to spend less, but my spending is your income and your spending is my income, so when everyone tries to cut spending at the same time the result is an overall decline in incomes and a depressed economy. And we know (or should know) that depressed economies behave quite differently from economies that are at or near full employment.
For example, many seemingly knowledgeable people — bankers, business leaders, public officials — warned that budget deficits would lead to soaring interest rates and inflation. But economists knew that such warnings, which might have made sense under normal conditions, <change><u>were way off base under the conditions we actually faced.</u></change> Sure enough, interest and inflation rates stayed low.
And the diagnosis of our troubles as stemming from inadequate demand had clear policy implications: as long as lack of demand was the problem, we would be living in a world in which the usual rules didn't apply. In particular, this was no time to worry about budget deficits and cut spending, which would only deepen the depression. When John Boehner, then the House minority leader, <change><u>declared in early 2009</u></change> that since American families were having to tighten their belts, the government should tighten its belt, too, people like me cringed; his remarks betrayed his economic ignorance. We needed more government spending, not less, to fill the hole left by inadequate private demand.
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But a few months later <change><u>President Obama started saying exactly the same thing.</u></change> In fact, it became a standard line in his speeches. Nor was it just rhetoric. Since 2010, we've seen <change><u>a sharp decline in discretionarmpending</u></change> and <change><u>an unprecedented decline in budget deficits,</u></change> and the result has been anemic growth and long-term unemployment on a scale not seen since the 1930s.
So why didn't we use the economic knowledge we had?
One answer is that most people find the logic of policy in a depressed economy counterintuitive. Instead, what resonates with the public are misleading analogies with the finances of an individual family, which is why Mr. Obama began echoing Mr. Boehner.
And even supposedly well-informed people balk at the notion that simple lack of demand can wreak so much havoc. Surely, they insist, we must have deep structural problems, like a work force that lacks the right skills; that sounds serious and wise, even though <change><u>all the evidence says that it's completely untrue.</u></change>
Meanwhile, powerful political factions find that bad economic analysis serves their objectives. Most obviously, people whose real goal is dismantling the social safety net have found promoting deficit panic an effective way to push their agenda. And such people have been aided and abetted by what I've come to think of as the trahison des nerds — the willingness of some economists to come up with analyses that tell powerful people what they want to hear, whether it's that <change><u>slashing government  spending is actually expansionary,</u></change> because of confidence, or that <change><u>government debt somehow has dire effects on economic growth</u></change> even if interest rates stay low.
Whatever the reasons basic economics got tossed aside, the result has been tragic. Most of the waste and suffering that have afflicted Western economies these past five years was unnecessary. We have, all along, had the knowledge and the tools to restore full employment. But policy makers just keep finding reasons not to do the right thing.
<change><u>Article S.</u></change>
The Washington Post
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<u>How U.S. billionaire Sheldon Adelson is b_u_ying up Israel's media</u>
Ruth Eglash
May 1 -- Jerusalem — Las Vegas casino magnate and GOP super donor Sheldon Adelson is gambling on a new venture. On Wednesday, after the Israeli antitrust authority approved his purchase of two more news outlets, the Jewish American billionaire <change><u>upped his ante</u></change> in the country's media market.
Adelson already owns one of the four mainstream newspapers here, a <change><u>free</u></change>
<change><u>ily tabloid</u></change> called Israel Hayom (Israel Today). He started that newspaper
in 2007 and helped it grow to have <change><u>the largest circulation</u></change> in the country.
With his latest purchases, Adelson will now also control the main religious daily, Makor Rishon, which caters to Israel's Zionist religious right, and NRG, the news Web site of the Maariv newspaper, which has faced a multitude of financial woes in the past few years.
While the antitrust authority decided that Adelson's acquisitions are not crossing any competitive red lines, media watchdogs (and not a few political pundits) worry about Adelson's growing influence. Adelson is an avid supporter and long-time friend of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
"As a very strong backer of Prime Minister Netanyahu — not that there's anything wrong with it — Adelson owns a paper that is rarely, if ever, critical of the PM," <change><u>wrote Shmeul Rosner,</u></change> an Israeli commentator, in Jewish Journal. "He now owns two papers, and one might suspect that now two papers will never be critical of Netanyahu."
Israel's news media are lively, but venues are not infinite, with four main national newspapers, three television news broadcasters and a handful of radio and news Web sites vying to inform and sway public opinion in a country known for its rough-and-tumble politics.
An <change><u>investigative report</u></change> by Channel 10 aired last year claimed that Adelson's newspaper Israel Hayom was spinning the news to show Netanyahu in a more positive light. The newspaper's editor, Amos Regev, <change><u>dismissed the report,</u></change> saying, "This so-called evidence doesn't prove anything other than the routine workings of a news organization."
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Adelson's new ventures are seen as a good thing for Netanyahu. Israel's media is often very critical of Netanyahu — and loves engaging in what the Prime Minister calls "psychobabble" about his motives. Though he <change><u>on-the-record</u></change> makes plenty <change><u>interviews</u></change> of public or does pronouncements, not host regular Netanyahu news conferences. <change><u>rarely_grants</u></change> Adelson's purchase might also be a plus for Netanyahu's wife, Sara, who regularly faces media scrutiny for what critics call her <change><u>imperial lifestyle</u></change> (she recently came under fire for yelling at a staffer for buying bags of milk instead of a proper carton). Adelson has <change><u>played a big role</u></change> in GOP politics and is vocal about his support for Israel. In 2012, he spent millions backing the presidential candidacy of Mitt Romney, not only in a bid to beat President Obama but also to ensure strengthened support for Israel in domestic U.S. politics. And, more recently, New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie (R) apologized to Adelson after referring to the West Bank as "occupied territories" in <change><u>a speech</u></change> at the spring leadership meeting of the Republican Jewish Coalition, an event Adelson hosted at his Venetian Hotel in Las Vegas.
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📅 May 1, 2014

Re: Call

From: Byron Hero

To: jeffrey E.

Hi Jeffrey, Hope you are well. If you can find a convenient time, perhaps we can have a call to discuss a deal I'm working on that may be of interest? I'm available on my cell most anytime; or, send me an email with a number and time and I'll call you back. Thanks, and all the best, Byron Byron Hero (cell) (Off) This communication (including any attachments) is intended for the use of the intendedrecipient(s) only and may contain information that is confidential, privileged or legally protec

Hi Jeffrey,

Hope you are well. If you can find a convenient time, perhaps we can have a call to discuss a deal I'm working on that may be of interest? I'm available on my cell most anytime; or, send me an email with a number and time and I'll call you back. Thanks, and all the best, Byron Byron Hero

(cell) 
(Off)

This communication (including any attachments) is intended for the use of the intendedrecipient(s) only and may contain information that is confidential, privileged or legally protected. Any unauthorized use or dissemination ofthis communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately notifi the sender by return e-mail message and delete all copies of the original communication. Thank youfor your cooperation.

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation®gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

📅 May 1, 2014

(no subject)

From: jeffrey E.

To: Byron Hero

number

number

📅 May 2, 2014

(no subject)

From: Jeffrey E.

To: Jermaine Ruan

buy the logitech and lets play, . please note The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by

buy the logitech and lets play, .

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein

Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation®gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

📅 May 2, 2014

RE:

From: Jermaine Ruan

To: jeevacation@gmail.com

Good morning boss, No problem) will do so. Regards fRuan

Good morning boss,

No problem) will do so.

Regards 
fRuan

📅 Apr 29, 2014

Re:

From: Brice Gordon <[REDACTED]>

To: Jeffrey Epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com>

trip was Ok, mum not well just sent boat info, will forward updates on everything else shortly regards Brice On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 7:24 PM, Jeffrey Epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote: how was your trip. did you see the boats? intemet, ? water. please note The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthori

trip was Ok, mum not well

just sent boat info, will forward updates on everything else shortly

regards Brice

On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 7:24 PM, Jeffrey Epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote: how was your trip. did you see the boats? intemet, ? water.

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein

Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation@gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

Brice Gordon
49 Zorro Ranch Rd
Stanley, NM 87056

Ph:

EFTA00718116

📅 May 1, 2014

Fwd:

From: Richard Kahn

To: jeevacation@gmail.com

just spoke with Neesha their offer was as follows: I) not being hired as employee rather a 1099 contractor 2) not being called a job but an assignment 3) salary 65,000 4) no medical benefits asked Neesha for references and for her to come in next week please advise Richard Kahn HBRK Associates Inc. 575 Lexington Avenue, 4th Floor, New York, New York 10022 Begin forwarded message: From: Richard Joslin Subject: Re: Date: May 1, 2014 4:07:39 PM EDT To: "jeffrey E." <jeevacation@gmail.com>

just spoke with Neesha

their offer was as follows:

I) not being hired as employee rather a 1099 contractor

2) not being called a job but an assignment

3) salary 65,000

4) no medical benefits

asked Neesha for references and for her to come in next week

please advise

Richard Kahn
HBRK Associates Inc.
575 Lexington Avenue, 4th Floor,
New York, New York 10022

Begin forwarded message:

From: Richard Joslin
Subject: Re:
Date: May 1, 2014 4:07:39 PM EDT
To: "jeffrey E." <jeevacation@gmail.com>
Cc: Eileen Alexanderson >, Richard Kahn

I spoke to her. she is sending references. I gave her comp # and labor status. she is amenable. plan is for her to come in next week; we will work out start date etc. (soon)

On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 1:38 PM, jeffrey E. <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote:
please contact neesha  and get her started

--

please note
The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein

EFTA00718117

Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation@gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

EFTA00718118

📅 May 2, 2014

(no subject)

From: Paula Fisher

To: jeevacation@gmail.com

K Sent from my iPhone On May 2, 2014, at 4:39 PM, "Jeffrey E." <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote: 7 This image is an email thread, not a chart. The key information is a conversation between Paula Fisher and Jeffrey E. (or Jeffrey Epstein) regarding meeting up. Here's a concise summary: * **Participants:** Paula Fisher, Jeffrey E. / Jeffrey Epstein * **Dates:** April 30, 2014 - May 2, 2014 * **Key Topics:** * Jeffrey Epstein's location in Paris until May 8. * Plans for meeting up ("come by toni

K

Sent from my iPhone On May 2, 2014, at 4:39 PM, "Jeffrey E." <jeevacation@gmail.com> wrote: 7

This image is an email thread, not a chart. The key information is a conversation between Paula Fisher and Jeffrey E. (or Jeffrey Epstein) regarding meeting up.

Here's a concise summary:

* **Participants:** Paula Fisher, Jeffrey E. / Jeffrey Epstein
* **Dates:** April 30, 2014 - May 2, 2014
* **Key Topics:**
 * Jeffrey Epstein's location in Paris until May 8.
 * Plans for meeting up ("come by tonite", "hang out or do something tomorrow").
 * Confirmation of availability and time ("around 6", "after 7").
 * Discussion about stopping by after the gym.
 * Inquiry about an address.

📅 Mar 23, 2014

Re:

From: S.M. Kosslyn

To: jeevacation@gmail.com

Rats! I wish I had known earlier.. Pm tied up tomorrow in SF. If you can make it up here for coffee/tea late in the day or dinner, just let me know.. Otherwise, I'll be in NYC from 3 - 6 April.. Be well! S. S.M. Kosslyn On 22 Mar 2014, at 3:33 PM, Jeffrey Epstein wrote: i am in palo alto. tomorw you? **************** ********* ********** **************** The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside informatio

Rats! I wish I had known earlier.. Pm tied up tomorrow in SF. If you can make it up here for coffee/tea late in the day or dinner, just let me know..

Otherwise, I'll be in NYC from 3 - 6 April..

Be well!

S.

S.M. Kosslyn

On 22 Mar 2014, at 3:33 PM, Jeffrey Epstein wrote:

i am in palo alto. tomorw you?

****************

*********

**********

****************

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein

Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation®gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

📅 Apr 22, 2014 REDACTED

(no subject)

From: Unknown

To: Jeffrey Epstein <jeevacation@gmail.com>

has confirmed she will come see you at 9:30am tomorrow. Wed. April 23, 2014 BOSTON-NY 9:30am Appt w/ (...) 2:45pm Appt w/Dr. Magnani (...) JOJO TO DRIVE YOU. MAKE SURE JE HAS MUSIC. EFTA00718127

has confirmed she will come see you at 9:30am tomorrow.

Wed. April 23, 2014 BOSTON-NY

9:30am Appt w/ (...)
2:45pm Appt w/Dr. Magnani (...)

JOJO TO DRIVE YOU. MAKE SURE JE HAS MUSIC.

EFTA00718127

📅 Apr 21, 2014 REDACTED

April 21 update

From: Office of Tetje Rod-Larsen

<table><tr><th><change><u>Article</u></change></th><th>NYT <u>Focusing America's Attention on Asia Carol Giacomo</u></th></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 2.</u></change></td><td>The Washington Post <u>Obama is on the right course with his reorientation toward Asia Tom Donilon</u></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 3.</u></change></td><td>Al Monitor <u>Hard choices for Erdogan as he mulls candidacy for president Scmih Idiz</u></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 4.</u></change></td><td>Al-Jazee

<table><tr><th><change><u>Article</u></change></th><th>NYT
<u>Focusing America's Attention on Asia Carol Giacomo</u></th></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 2.</u></change></td><td>The Washington Post
<u>Obama is on the right course with his reorientation toward Asia Tom Donilon</u></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 3.</u></change></td><td>Al Monitor
<u>Hard choices for Erdogan as he mulls candidacy for president Scmih Idiz</u></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 4.</u></change></td><td>Al-Jazeerah
<u>Israel Responsible for Death of Peace Process with Palestinians Because of Continuous Breaking of Agreements Uri Avnery</u></td></tr><tr><td><change><u>Article 5.</u></change></td><td>The American Interest
<change><u>BRIC Bust?</u>
<u>Michael Mandelbaum</u></change></td></tr></table>
<change><u>Article 1.</u></change>
NYT

<u>Focusing America's Attention on Asia</u>

Carol Giacomo
April 20, 2014 -- Sydney, Australia — Raise the subject of President Obama's Asia policy here and an American can expect to be bombarded with questions.
With the slowdown in Pentagon spending, and dysfunction in Congress, will the United States really put 60 percent of its defense assets in the Asia-
< EFTA00718128
Pacific region by 2020, as promised? Can Mr. Obama afford to invest more time in Asia when he is bogged down with crises in Ukraine and Syria? Can the United States be counted on to defend its allies if China becomes a real threat? What does Mr. Obama's idea to "rebalance" America's Asia policy, announced in 2011, really mean?
It's important that Mr. Obama's trip to Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Malaysia this week clarify his plans for greater engagement with Asia. The policy was initially oversold by the White House and, as a result, is often misunderstood in the region as a zero-sum shift rather than a more Asia-Pacific nuanced region, calibration. cannot The plausibly United abandon States, a its longstanding interests in power the Middle in the East, even after withdrawing troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. And America could never disengage from Europe even if Mr. Obama is sometimes accused of being neglectful of allies there.
Still, focusing more attention on Asia has long made sense, given the region's growing economic importance and the rise of a more assertive China, which has propelled many Asian nations to seek closer cooperation with America.
Mr. Obama's approach has been criticized by many experts, in Asia and at home, who see the rebalance as over-militarized. Examples include the base-sharing promised agreement shift of more with American the Philippines; defense rotating assets to deployments the region; of a new United States marines in Darwin, Australia; a reassertion of America's alliance with Japan in the context of Japan's maritime dispute with China; and expanding arms purchases by the United States' regional allies and partners.
Security among Asian nations is a top concern. The Ukraine crisis — and Mr. Obama's response to it — is being <change><u>watched closely</u></change> in Asia. The Japanese, particularly, are nervous that the United States is under congressional pressure to slow military spending, and have questioned whether America will deploy its forces should there be conflict with China. A challenge for Mr. Obama is managing the deepening relationships with Asian allies to enhance stability and freedom of the seas in their region without exacerbating tensions with China. For example, China's defense minister asserted <change><u>"indisputable sovereignty"</u></change> over disputed islands in the East China Sea, in an exchange with Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, who
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was in China earlier this month. Yet there were also signs of cooperation when Mr. Hagel was invited to tour the country's lone <change><u>aircraft carrier</u></change> and the two sides agreed to hold regular high-level talks on regional security and their armies.
But the rebalance has to be broader than defense, starting with a robust economic component. The one recurring theme was the importance of achieving the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact being negotiated among the United States, Japan and 10 other nations. The Japanese and Americans have been working to resolve differences on agricultural issues so a breakthrough could be announced when Mr. Obama is in Tokyo. Gaps are said to be narrowing, but the outcome is in doubt.
Beyond that are other steps that the administration is pursuing to bind countries in ways that are intended to make conflict less likely and improve economic growth. These include strengthening regional institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and the East Asian Summit meeting, which Mr. Obama will attend later this year; developing partnerships on energy, oceans and climate change with nations like India and Vietnam; and being the host of the first ever meeting of <change><u>Asean defense ministers</u></change> earlier this month in Hawaii to discuss humanitarian assistance and disaster relief procedures.
The administration has also been more active in nudging Japan and South Korea, the two nations that are integral to Mr. Obama's Asia policy, to ease their corrosive animosity, including over Japan's use of South Korean women as sex slaves for the Japanese Army during World War II.
Asia is a major engine of world economic growth, and rising tensions — between Japan and China, Japan and South Korea, China and some of the smaller maritime countries — could put that at risk. A volatile and chaotic world will continue to demand America's attention, but Asia is the future and warrants being a top priority.
Carol Giacomo, a former diplomatic correspondentfor Reuters in Washington, coveredforeign policyfor the international wire servicefor more than two decades before joining The Times editorial board in August 2007.
<change><u>Article 2.</u></change>
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The Washington Post
<u>Obama is on the right course with his reorientation toward Asia</u>
Tom Donilon
April 20, 2014 -- Questions have arisen in recent months about the sustainability of the United States' rebalance toward Asia. The costly <change><u>cancellation of President Obama's trip to the region</u></change> during the U.S. government shutdown last fall fueled that skepticism, which has only grown as urgent foreign policy challenges have required U.S. leadership in the Middle East and Europe.
Yet the rebalancing of U.S. priorities and resources toward Asia remains the right strategy. This reorientation does not imply a turn away from allies in other regions or an abandonment of our commitments elsewhere. It represents a shift away from the war efforts in the Middle East and South Asia that have dominated U.S. national security policy and resources for the past decade and a shift toward the region that presents the most significant opportunity for the United States.
Every U.S. administration must ensure that the inevitable cascade of crises does not crowd out the development of long-term strategies. So at the outset of his first term, Obama directed his national security team to assess the projection and focus of U.S. power around the world.
The administration concluded that the United States had become substantially underinvested in the Asia-Pacific region — diplomatically, militarily, commercially and in terms of policymaker attention. We began implementing the rebalance from the very start: <change><u>Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's first trip in office was to Asia, something no secretary of state had done since 1961.</u></change>
The decision to rebalance stemmed from a recognition of the United States' crucial role in supporting Asia's social and economic development. Were it not for 70 years of U.S. investment in the unimpeded flow of commerce and the preservation of peace, Asia would be less secure, less prosperous and less free. Today, territorial disputes, nationalism, changing power dynamics and the North Korean threat make the U.S. presence all the more essential.
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The administration also determined that the futures of the United States and Asia are increasingly linked. The Asia-Pacific region includes <change><u>more than half of the world's people, produces half of the world's economic output,</u></change> is the <change><u>top destination for U.S. exports</u></change> and is home to many of the world's fastest-growing economies.
The rebalance is a comprehensive effort incorporating all elements of U.S. national power. It entails strengthening alliances and partnerships, building an economic architecture that can sustain Asia's growing prosperity, supporting democratic reforms and maintaining productive relations with China. And the United States is making steady progress along each of these fronts.
The U.S. commitment to Asia's security is substantial and deepening. The United States is modernizing its alliances and strengthening the region's capacity to ensure the safety of navigation and respond to humanitarian disasters. Even amid uncertainty over its defense budget, the United States is set to expand the share of its <change><u>naval assets in the Pacific to 60 percent of at eglobal fleet by 2020.</u></change>
<change><u>The president's trip to the region this week</u></change> will reinforce the key elements of the rebalance. In Northeast Asia, it will reaffirm the importance of our core alliances with Japan and South Korea; in Malaysia and the Philippines, it will underscore the renewed U.S. focus on Southeast Asia, <change><u>an economically dynamic bloc of 600 million people.</u></change>
When in Japan and South Korea, the president should follow up on his recent efforts to mitigate long-standing tensions between the two countries.
Discord hampers our countries' abilities to address trilateral security challenges including the threat from North Korea.
But the rebalance is about more than military assets; it places an even greater emphasis on diplomacy and trade. The centerpiece of the economic rebalancing is the <change><u>Trans-Pacific Partnership_(TPP),</u></change> the most important trade deal under negotiation today.
By eliminating trade barriers and harmonizing regulations, the TPP would connect a dozen Asia-Pacific economies in a massive trade and investment framework covering 40 percent of global gross domestic product. It would directly provide the United States with some $78 billion in annual income.
The TPP's most important aims, however, are strategic. A deal would solidify U.S. leadership in Asia and, together with the negotiations over a
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free trade pact in Europe, put the United States at the center of a great project: writing the rules that will govern the global economy for the next century. An open platform that countries can sign onto provided they commit to its high standards, the TPP would incentivize the spread of free markets and liberal economic principles. Finally, the United States must continue to seek constructive relations with China. Some have caricatured the rebalance as a strategy to contain China. The United States has a good deal of experience with containment — and a <change><u>$500 billion annual economic relationship</u></change> does not resemble that strategy. In fact, the U.S. vision for Asia — an order rooted in stability, economic openness, the peaceful resolution of disputes and respect for human rights — presents the right environment for China's rise. Sustaining that environment requires the United States to maintain a strong presence and the necessary capabilities to meet its obligations to allies, constantly engage with Beijing and make clear that it rejects and will oppose the use of force, intimidation and coercion in territorial disputes. By upholding these principles, the United States can help ensure that the 21st century in Asia will be defined not by conflict but by security and prosperity.
Tom Donilon is a distinguishedfellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center. He was national security adviserfrom 2010 to 2013.
<change><u>Article 3.</u></change>
Al Monitor
<u>Hard choices for Erdogan as he mulls candidacy for president</u>
Semih Idiz
April 20, 2014 -- You have to hand it to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He is not one to mince his words whether he is hurling invective at his enemies or laying his future political intentions on the line. <change><u>He reportedly told deputies</u></change> from his Justice and Development Party (AKP) last week, during a meeting convened at the party's headquarters to discuss the upcoming presidential elections, that the future system of government
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in Turkey was, "de facto," a presidential one where the president enjoys executive powers.
He is said to have based his argument on the fact that the president will be elected by the public for the first time. Previously presidents in Turkey were elected by parliament. On Aug. 10, a president is to be elected to a five-year term as the result of a constitutional amendment accepted in 2007.
Erdogan, whose remarks were widely quoted in the media, reportedly added that he would use his constitutional powers to the limit if elected president, even though he has not decided yet whether to run for the presidency or not.
Erdogan's remarks were said to have been met with surprise by some AKP deputies in part because the 2007 amendment to the constitution did not alter the existing powers of the president, only the way he or she is elected. Aware that there would be questions as to what Erdogan based his contention about a "de facto presidential system" on, Nurettin Canikli, the deputy head of the AKP's parliamentary group reportedly stepped in to clarify the matter for AKP deputies. Addressing them immediately after Erdogan, <change><u>Canikli maintained</u></change> that the existing 1982 constitution would permit a popularly elected president to exercise executive powers.
That constitution was drawn up under the military junta led by Kenan Evren, the chief of the general staff who toppled the democratically elected government of the day in 1980 and later became president. Despite his advanced years, Evren is currently facing legal proceedings over the coup he headed.
Many articles of the 1982 constitution remain in force today and continue to be criticized as undemocratic, despite amendments introduced under the AKP after it came to power in 2002, and by the coalition government that was in power before that.
Pointing out that the 1982 constitution gave Evren wide-ranging authority to use as president, Canikli reportedly said this authority could also be used by a president elected by the people. The risk in saying this at a time when Erdogan is already being accused of being authoritarian apparently did not bother Canikli.
Not surprisingly, the opposition was quick to react to Erdogan's and Canikli's reported remarks, which have not been officially denied. Kemal
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Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the main opposition Republican Peoples' Party (CHP), was curt when responding to a question by reporters on the topic, merely saying, <change><u>"We do not need a new Kenan Evren."</u></change>
Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), for his part said Erdogan was dreaming of becoming president and added, "He is already keen on using illegal authority <change><u>should he become president."</u></change>
Erdogan's remarks were generally taken as a further indication that he wants to become a strong president. His declaration of war on the <change><u>Al-Monitor,</u></change> Constitutional for overturning Court, as <change><u>Cengiz</u></change> government <change><u>Candar</u></change> legislation <change><u>explains</u></change> that in his limits Apr. the 16 post authority for the judiciary is being pointed to as a clear sign that he wants to be a president unencumbered by any checks or balances.
It is of course still an open question as to whether Erdogan will run for president, even though all signs indicate this is where his heart lies. Twenty of the 24 deputies who delivered an address during last week's AKP meeting, convened to discuss this matter, are said to have insisted that Erdogan be a candidate in August.
An unofficial sounding out of AKP deputies present during the meeting is said to have also revealed a majority in favor of Erdogan's becoming president.
Those who opposed this, <change><u>on the other hand,</u></change> reportedly did so not out of any opposition to Erdogan, but because they are concerned about the fate of the AKP should Erdogan, as its charismatic leader, leave the helm.
Aware of these concerns, Erdogan reportedly told his deputies during last week's meeting that the future of the party would not be in danger should someone else take its leadership.
"The party is an institutional structure. To say it will be finished if this person goes, or that person comes is wrong. What is important here is not this or that individual but the institution. There will be no flood with me or without me," <change><u>Erdogan reportedly said,</u></change> throwing in for good measure that he has not decided yet about his candidacy for president.
The general formula bandied around AKP circles to date has been that President Abdullah Gul, who is a co-founder of the AKP, would take over the party leadership after Erdogan in order to maintain its cohesion and lead it to success in the 2015 general elections. Gul, however, threw a
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wrench into the works as far as this expectation is concerned when he suggested on April 18 that he has no political plans for the future. "I see a lot of debate and speculation. I have served the state at every level with great honor, and there can be no greater source of pride than this. <change><u>I would like to share with you</u></change> here that under conditions that are prevailing today I have no political plans concerning the future," Gul said in response to questions from reporters during a visit to Kutahya in western Turkey. If Gul's remarks mean that he will withdraw from active politics after his term as president ends, this will be a disappointment to different quarters for fundamentally different reasons.
First, there are those within the AKP who want to see Erdogan as president and believe Gul must head the AKP to keep it together. Then there are those in the AKP who want to see Gul re-elected as president to keep Erdogan at the head of the party. Finally, there are those outside the AKP who either want Gul to run in order to spoil Erdogan's presidential ambitions, or who want Gul to become prime minister in order to check Erdogan should he start exceeding his powers as president. There is speculation that Gul arrived at a decision not to run for president or become prime minister in order not to obstruct Erdogan's presidential path and also not to end up in a position of having to check Erdogan's once he becomes president, now that Erdogan has indicated his intention to be a strong president.
Cemil Cicek, who is the speaker of parliament and a prominent AKP figure, <change><u>pointed recently to the clash</u></change> of authority that will emerge in the event that Turkey has an elected president with executive ambitions, and an elected prime minister who is constitutionally vested with executive powers. Turning Erdogan's "de facto" presidential system into a "de jure" one in order to overcome the kinds of difficulties that Cicek is warning about will, however, require a change to the constitution. But the AKP cannot do this on its own without support from other parties in parliament, and that is a highly unlikely prospect given the tense political atmosphere in Turkey. This, however, is not the only difficulty facing Erdogan should he make a bid for the presidency. The general assumption based on the AKP's recent success in the municipal elections is that Erdogan will win. But presidential elections based on the popular vote remain uncharted territory for Turkey. If the opposition can get together to produce a
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credible and popular candidate, this could upset Erdogan's plan to become "the president of the people," as he puts it, whose power is based on a strong public mandate. Otherwise it will be difficult for him to allay heated arguments about his legitimacy as he uses the executive powers he is promising to use if elected president. A credible opponent could eat away at his voter base and weaken his position even if he ends up winning the presidency in a second round of voting. There are also those, of course, who argue that Erdogan may not win the elections, given his abrasive manners, which many people do not want to see in a head of state. Those who argue this also point to the fact that the majority did not vote for the AKP in the municipal elections on March 30, even if it came out with nearly 45% of the vote. AKP circles, of course, argue that that vote will translate into a 60% vote for Erdogan in August. But this is not certain. Erdogan clearly has a lot on his mind as the day nears when he will have to take the risk and decide for sure whether he will run for president or not.
<change><u>Semih Idiz</u></change> is a journalist who has been covering diplomacy and foreign policy issuesfor major Turkish newspapers for 30 years.
<change><u>Article 4.</u></change>
Al-Jazeerah
<u>Israel Responsible for Death of Peace Process with Palestinians Because of Continuous Breaking of Agreements</u>
Uri Avnery
April 21, 2014
An Oslo Criminal
THE DEATH of Ron Pundak, one of the original Israeli architects of the 1993 Oslo agreement, brought that historic event back into the public eye. Gideon Levy reminded us that the Rightist rabble-rousers, in their furious onslaught on the agreement, called the initiators "Oslo criminals" — a
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conscious echo of one of Adolf Hitler's main slogans on his way to power. Nazi propaganda applied the term "November criminals" to the German statesmen who signed the 1918 armistice agreement that put an end to World War I — by the way, at the request of the army General Staff who had lost the war.
In his book, Mein Kampf (which is about to lose its copyright, so that anyone can print it again) Hitler also revealed another insight: that a lie will be believed if it is big enough, and if it is repeated often enough. That, too, applies to the Oslo agreement. For more than 20 years now the Israel right-wing has relentlessly repeated the lie that the Oslo agreement was not only an act of treason, but also a total failure.
Oslo is dead, we are told. It actually died at birth. And by extension, this will be the lot of every peace agreement in the future. A large part of the Israeli public has come to believe this.
THE MAIN achievement of the Oslo agreement, an act of history-changing dimensions, bears the date of September 13, 1993 — which happened to be (three days after) my 70th birthday.
On that day, the Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Prime Minister of the State of Israel exchanged letters of mutual recognition. Yasser Arafat recognized Israel, Yitzhak Rabin recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.
Today's younger generation (on both sides) cannot realize the huge significance of these twin acts.
From its inception almost a hundred years earlier, the Zionist movement had denied the very existence of a Palestinian people. I myself have spent many hundreds of hours of my life in trying to convince Israeli audiences that a Palestinian nation really exists. Golda Meir famously declared:
"There is no such thing as a Palestinian people." I am rather proud of my reply to her, in a Knesset debate: "Mrs. Prime Minister, perhaps you are right. Perhaps a Palestinian people really does not exist. But if millions of people mistakenly believe that they are a people and act like a people, they are a people!"
The Zionist denial was not an arbitrary quirk. The basic Zionist aim was to take hold of Palestine, all of it. This necessitated the displacement of the inhabitants of the country. But Zionism was an idealistic movement. Many
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of its East European activists were deeply imbued with the ideas of Lev Tolstoy and other utopian moralists. They could not face the fact that their utopia could only be realized on the ruins of another people. Therefore the denial was an absolute moral necessity.
Recognizing the existence of the Palestinian people was, therefore, a revolutionary act.
ON THE other side, recognition was even harder.
From the first day of the conflict, practically all Palestinians, and indeed almost all Arabs, looked upon the Zionists as an invading tribe that was out to rob them of their homeland, drive them out and build a robber-state on their ruins. The aim of the Palestinian national movement was therefore to demolish the Zionist state and throw the Jews into the sea, as their forefathers had thrown the last of the Crusaders quite literally from the quay of Acre.
And here came their revered leader, Yasser Arafat, and recognized the legality of Israel, reversing the ideology of a hundred years of struggle, in which the Palestinian people had lost most of their country and most of their homesteads.
In the Oslo agreement, signed three days later on the White House lawn, Arafat did something else, which has been completely ignored in Israel: he gave up 78% of historical Palestine. The man who actually signed the agreement was Mahmoud Abbas. I wonder if his hand shook when he signed this momentous concession, minutes before Rabin and Arafat shook hands.
Oslo did not die. In spite of the glaring faults of the agreement ("the best possible agreement in the worst possible situation," as Arafat put it), it changed the nature of the conflict, though it did not change the conflict State-in-the-Making, itself. The Palestinian is a reality. Authority, Palestine the basic is recognized structure by of most the Palestinian countries and, at least partly, by the UN. The Two-State Solution, once the idea of a crazy fringe group, is today a world consensus. A quiet but real cooperation between Israel and Palestine is going on in many fields. But, of course, all this is far from the reality of peace which many of us, including Ron Pundak, envisioned on that happily optimistic day, September 13, 1993. Just over twenty years later, the flames of conflict are
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blazing, and most people don't dare to even utter the word "peace", as if it were a pornographic abomination.
WHAT WENT wrong? Many Palestinians believe that Arafat's historic concessions were premature, that he should not have made them before Israel had recognized the State of Palestine as the final aim.
Rabin changed his whole world-view at the age of 71 and took a historic decision, but he was not the man to follow through. He hesitated, wavered, and famously declared "there are no sacred dates".
This slogan became the umbrella for breaking our obligations. The final agreement should have been signed in 1999. Long before that, four "safe passages" should have been opened between the West Bank and Gaza. By violating this obligation, Israel laid the foundation for the break-away of Gaza.
Israel also violated the obligation to implement the "third stage" of the withdrawal from the West Bank. "Area C" has now become practically a right-wing part of parties. Israel, waiting for official annexation, which is demanded by
There was no obligation under Oslo to release prisoners. But wisdom dictated it. The return of ten thousand prisoners home would have electrified the atmosphere. Instead, successive Israeli governments, both left and right, built settlements on Arab land at a frantic pace and took more prisoners.
The initial violations of the agreement and the dysfunctionality of the entire process encouraged the extremists on both sides. The Israeli extremists assassinated Rabin, and the Palestinian extremists started a campaign of murderous attacks.
LAST WEEK I already commented on our government's habit of abstaining from fulfilling signed obligations, whenever it thought that the national interest demanded it.
As a soldier in the 1948 war, I took part in the great offensive to open the way to the Negev, which had been cut off by the Egyptian army. This was done in violation of the cease-fire arranged by the UN. We used a simple ruse for putting the blame on the enemy.
The same technique was later used by Ariel Sharon to break the armistice on the Syrian front and provoke incidents there, in order to annex the so-
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called "demilitarized zones". Still later, the memory of these incidents was used to annex the Golan Heights.
The start of Lebanon War I was a direct violation of the cease-fire arranged a year earlier by American diplomats. The pretext was flimsy as usual: an anti-PLO terrorist outfit had tried to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in London. When Prime Minister Menachem Begin was told by his Mossad chief that the assassins were enemies of the PLO, Begin famously answered: "For me, they are all PLO!"
As a matter of fact, Arafat had kept the cease-fire meticulously. Since he wanted to avoid an Israeli invasion, he had imposed his authority even on the opposition elements. For 11 months, not a single bullet was fired on that border. Yet when I spoke a few days ago with a former senior security official, he assured me seriously that "they shot at us every day. It was intolerable."
After six days of war, a cease-fire was agreed. However, at that time our troops had not yet succeeded in surrounding Beirut. So Sharon broke the cease-fire to cut the vital Beirut-Damascus highway.
The present crisis in the "peace process" was caused by the Israeli government's breaking its agreement to release Palestinian prisoners on a certain day. This violation was so blatant that it could not be hidden or explained away. It caused the famous "poof' of John Kerry.
In fact, Binyamin Netanyahu just did not dare to fulfill his obligation after he and his acolytes in the media had for weeks incited the public against so-called the release "center-left", of "murderers" voices with were "blood mute. on their hands". Even on the
Now another mendacious narrative is taking shape before our eyes. The large majority in Israel is already totally convinced that the Palestinians had brought about the crisis by joining 15 international conventions. After this flagrant violation of the agreement, the Israeli government was right in its refusal to release the prisoners. The media have repeated this falsification of the course of events so often, that it has by now acquired the status of fact.
BACK TO the Oslo Criminals. I did not belong to them, though I visited Arafat in Tunis while the talks in Oslo were going on (unbeknownst to me), and talked with him about the whole range of possible compromises.
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May Ron Pundak rest in peace — even though the peace he was working for still seems far away. But it will come.
Uri Avnery - peace activist, journalist, writer Founding member, Gush Shalom (peace bloc), independent peace movement (1993). Former publisher and editor-in-chief Haolam Hazeh news magazine (1950-1990). Former member of the Knesset (three terms: 1965-1969, 1969-1973, 1979- 1981)
<change><u>Article 5.</u></change>
The American Interest
<u>BRIC Bust?</u>
<change><u>Michael Mandelbaum</u></change>
April 20, 2014 -- Once the darlings of the global economy and the brightest hope for economic growth robust enough to lift most if not all boats around the world, the four major emerging-market countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—have lately fallen from grace. They withstood the global financial meltdown of 2008 far better than the rich countries of Europe and North America, but growth rates in all four countries have declined in the past several years. Goldman Sachs, the company that first coined the term "BRICs" in 2001, issued an analysis at the end of last year whose title summed up its conclusion: "Emerging Markets: As the Tide Goes Out." Tides also come in, of course, so the important question about the BRICs is whether their poor performance of the past few years stems from cyclical, transient causes or is due to longer-term, more deeply rooted forces that presage stagnation or even decline. This matters for political as well as economic reasons. The rise of the BRICs, and of other emerging-market countries, has been thought in some quarters likely to lead to a shift in their favor in the global balance of power, with profound consequences for all countries, including the United States.
Whether or not the BRICs realize their potential for economic growth, that potential exceeds that of the world's wealthiest countries because of what some economists call convergence. Rich countries already have in
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abundance what produces growth: the most advanced technology and techniques of production. For them, further growth requires inventing new techniques and technologies, a slow, unpredictable process. The BRICs, by contrast, can expand their economies simply by incorporating the technologies and techniques the rich have already invented. Incorporation is a much easier and faster way than invention to mobilize existing but underutilized economic resources—hence the buoyant optimism of recent years. All things being equal, the BRICs should lead the world in growth until they, too, reach the technological frontier.
All other things are not, however, equal. That is the reason for the outgoing tide and the uncertainty over the BRICs' long-term economic prospects, and the political consequences of their growth rates. While certainty about their economic future is not possible, the range of uncertainty can be narrowed with a single observation: The extent to which the BRICs fulfill their considerable economic potential in the years ahead will depend, as do all economic matters, on politics.
Specifically, the economic growth rate for the four BRICs will depend on how well each copes with a feature of its politics that once served to spur economic advance but now hinders it. For Brazil that feature is the political tradition known as populism. For Russia it is the distorting impact of its large reserves of energy. For India and China it is their political systems: democratic and authoritarian, respectively.
Brazil: The Perils of Populism
In Brazil, as elsewhere in Latin America, populism has involved a large economic role for the government, which sought to enhance public welfare by providing financial benefits to many Brazilians, including direct transfers and well-paying jobs in state-managed firms. Brazilian populism's economic record in the years after World War II was eminently respectable. From 1950 to 1975 the country grew at 7 percent per year. Over the next 25 years, however, per capita income hardly grew at all. A major reason was Brazil's continuing and sometimes ruinously high inflation, the result of its populist economic policies. Loans and subsidies to state-owned enterprises, the growing payrolls of government workers, and generous programs of government-provided benefits were expensive. They produced large deficits, which the government funded either by
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borrowing, thereby creating steep levels of debt, or by printing money— and sometimes both. As a result, the price level rose sharply. then-Minister With the of economy Finance teetering Fernando on Henrique the brink Cardoso of hyperinflation introduced in a 1993, plan that succeeded in breaking the inflationary spiral by the summer of 1994. Cardoso was subsequently twice elected Brazil's President, in 1994 and 1998, and he used his tenure to dismantle part of the structure of economic populism. His two-term successor, Luis Inaeio Lula da Silva, continued much of Cardoso's economic strategy despite the ideological differences between the two men. Even with low inflation, Brazil has grown more slowly than the other BRICs. The main reason, which stands as the chief obstacle to its high growth in the future, is the significant residue of populism that has remained. The country has retained many of the commitments to public expenditure that accumulated over the course of the 20th century, the fulfillment of which made inflation a chronic problem. The government is still obligated to pay generous social welfare benefits; pensions, for example, account for an unusually high 13 percent of GDP. It continues to be responsible for the wages of the many employees of its own bureaucracies and the workers in enterprises that public authorities still own and operate. These wages tend to rise rapidly. Because of these demands on the public treasury, budget deficits have persisted. The Brazilian government has funded the deficits more extensively through taxation than it did in the past. This has helped to curb inflation, but high taxes and high public spending crowd out private investment, which is a major source of economic growth. Moreover, Brazil's public spending does less than it might to foster growth because populism channels government money to uses that fail to promote growth. The pension benefits, pork-barrel projects, generous public-sector wages, and income-supplement programs mostly support private spending. For growth, however, Brazil also needs public investment—in roads, ports, power plants, and, above all, in education. The shortcomings of its educational system, in particular, cloud the country's long-term economic future.
That future depends on the outcome of the country's ongoing political struggle over economic policy. On one side of this struggle, pressing for
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ever-greater public expenditure, stand the forces of populism, with their deep historical roots, their powerful constituencies, and in some cases— efforts to reduce Brazil's poverty, for example—their strong moral claims. Opposing them are those favoring fiscal prudence and productive public investment. They have global economic history, including the past two decades of Brazilian economic history, on their side, but much less political support throughout the country.
Added to these conflicting forces, a new development is bound to play a large role in determining Brazil's economic destiny: large, offshore long-term reserves economic of oil. Oil growth. revenues, But such if used revenues wisely, are can not augment always the used rate wisely, of as the experience of Brazil's fellow BRIC, Russia, vividly demonstrates.
Russia's Resource Curse
In 2012 energy (natural gas as well as oil) accounted for around 30 percent of Russia's GDP and approximately two-thirds of its exports. The total value of energy exports, just $29 billion in 1990, climbed to $76 billion in 1999 and $350 billion in 2007. Half the country's economic growth came not from anything Russians made or did but simply from the rise in the international price of oil. By one estimate a $10-per-barrel rise in the price of oil boosted Russia's GDP by about 2 percent.1
Yet energy reserves have economic drawbacks as well. They can do for economies what steroids do for athletes, enhancing performance in the short term but having deleterious effects in the long run. Energy riches can produce pathologies common enough that a term for those that suffer from them has come into common usage: petro-states. Studies have shown that petro-states have sometimes actually grown more slowly than countries without energy resources. The presence of large energy reserves can retard long-term economic growth in four ways, all of them pertinent to Russia.
Demand for its energy has pushed up the value of the Russian currency, injuring import-competing and exporting industries—a syndrome known as the "Dutch disease." Energy wealth has also increased the size of the Russian government, which diverts money from more productive purposes.
Oil revenues support a bloated bureaucracy and a variety of often unproductive government programs. Perhaps most damagingly, because the energy sector alone supplies the revenues that the government needs, oil wealth relieves pressure to devise and implement policies that promote the
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development of a robust and broad-based economy. Like other petro-states, Russia has lagged in building the infrastructure and the institutions—legal and financial systems, for example—needed to stimulate productive employment. These countries can get rich without working, and so do not learn to work.
Energy wealth inhibits economic growth in yet another indirect but important way: It discourages the development of democracy. The windfall from oil creates a formidable temptation for rulers to hold on to power indefinitely in order to keep a large share of the wealth for themselves. That is what has happened in Russia. Vladimir Putin has made Russia less democratic, restricting liberties and limiting the Russian public's control over its government. Oil wealth gives Putin not only the incentive but also the means to retain power: He, and others in his position, can bribe the populace with generous welfare benefits in exchange for political passivity. Where they cannot purchase acquiescence, they can fund effective instruments of repression. Putin has done both.
The absence of democracy in energy-rich countries, including Russia, inhibits genuine and broad-based growth because rulers have little incentive to take steps, or spend money, to promote it. They get rich from the proceeds of the country's energy sales, and besides, economic growth might foster political activity that would threaten their monopoly of power. Those outside the ruling circle do have such an incentive, but without channels of political participation they lack the power to press the rulers to undertake growth-promoting policies.
What could lift Russia's oil curse? It could happen through a decline in the global price of energy, because of new discoveries of fossil fuel, new and different sources of energy, and the widespread diffusion of the techniques of conservation combined with a reduction in Russia's energy production. Some of these developments are already taking place.
Falling energy income might put Russia on a more promising economic course by removing the basis for the political support the Putin regime has enjoyed. It might ultimately lead to the replacement of the current regime with growth-promoting one more policies. democratically Still, democracy oriented by and itself more does committed not guarantee to optimal economic performance, as the experience of another BRIC country, India, demonstrates.
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India's Dilemma
India has maintained democratic government, with one brief exception, since its independence from Great Britain in 1947. Democracy is one of the country's proudest and most important achievements, and has in fact made a major contribution to the economic progress that it has achieved. Like populism for Brazil and energy for Russia, however, democracy, as practiced in India today, blocks economic progress.
With its various ethnic groups, religions, rigid social categories known as castes, and 17 major languages, India has the diversity of the entire European Union—but with twice as many people. Given this diversity and the conflicts to which it has inevitably given rise, without democracy, with its emphasis on compromise, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the rights of minorities, a united India within its 21st-century borders would not exist. India qualifies as an economic under-achiever, however. Two features of the Indian economy in particular have kept it from reaching its potential. Both features have roots in India's version of democratic government.
The first of these is the economy's unusual, lopsided configuration. Every modern economy has three sectors: agriculture, industry, and services. As countries become richer, workers move from one sector to another, and almost always in a particular order: from the farm to the factory to the office. India is different. Despite economic growth and the decline of agriculture's share in its total output due to expansion in other sectors, its agricultural workforce has declined only modestly. Its industrial sector has grown relatively slowly, contributing only 27 percent of the country's GDP in 2008, with 17 percent coming from manufacturing. Services in India, especially the country's thriving high-tech sector, have, by contrast, expanded rapidly, but because this sector provides relatively few jobs, its growth has done relatively little to reduce poverty. Only a robust industrial sector with growing manufacturing industries can do that, but Indian manufacturing suffers from a shortage of the industries, and therefore the jobs, that require unskilled labor.
The second feature of India's economy that keeps it from its full potential is the shortage of economically critical assets government ordinarily provides: roads, bridges, ports, and adequate schools, as well as reliable supplies of electricity and clean water. Poor infrastructure constrains the
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Indian industrial sector. The shortcomings of Indian education also hold back the country's economy, including its manufacturing sector. Even many unskilled factory jobs require rudimentary literacy, and as jobs become more complex, higher levels of education are needed to perform them. Many villages have only part-time teachers for their young children; some have none at all.
These obstacles to growth have their roots in India's democracy. In India, as in other democratic countries, people are free to organize themselves not only on the basis of a common identity—race, religion, ethnicity—but also according to common economic interests. Such groups work politically to bring benefits to their members, but the benefits can come at the expense of the general welfare. India, like other democracies, is susceptible to the formation of these "distributional coalitions", which tend over time to grow well-being.2 in power Powerful and number, minorities to the have detriment helped of to a country's create India's economic two major economic problems—a stymied manufacturing sector and inadequate infrastructure and education—by imposing some policies and blocking others, in both cases harming the interests of the country as a whole.
Regulations and laws governing employment make it all but impossible to fire workers. This discourages hiring them in the first place and keeps firms from entering industries that require large workforces. The largest and most efficient Indian companies tend to avoid such industries, which are precisely the ones that could, if established on a large scale, lift millions of Indians out of poverty. Similarly, laws restricting the use of land make it difficult in many places to build facilities such as factories and hotels that could employ large numbers of people.
Unions and other interest groups promote and defend the laws, regulations and restrictions that block employment-generating initiatives. Minorities also inhibit the building of the infrastructure and the development of the educational system that India needs by using the political process to divert resources to themselves, thus making them unavailable for building roads or paying teachers. Subsidies of various kinds, all of them the legislative achievements of interest groups, account for 2.4 percent of the country's GDP. The Indian bureaucracy is itself a large, powerful, and voracious interest group. Its salaries consume resources that would be better devoted to more productive uses. Spending according to the whims of special
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interests leads to budget deficits; borrowing to finance these deficits drains yet more money from infrastructure and education.
India has two methods, both consistent with democracy, of dealing with politically imposed obstacles to economic growth: removing them and bypassing them. The country's political system badly needs reform, and the impetus for political reform around the world often comes from the middle class: propertied, salaried people who see government as an impersonal enforcer of the law and a neutral arbiter of disputes rather than as a source of funds and favors. Such a social stratum is growing in India, though it is still a minority of the total population. The victory of the new reformist political party Aam Aadmi ("common man") in the December 2013 elections in the national capital region signaled its rising strength. Even without serious political reform, Indians have found a way to bypass the government's chronic failure to provide adequate infrastructure and education: privatization. This has involved not only returning to private enterprise tasks that they usually perform in other countries—the production of steel and cement and the management of hotels, for example —but also opening to private participation activities customarily undertaken by the government. Rather than reforming the government, such privatization circumvents it.
India's greatest success with privatization involves communications. The government monopoly in charge of telephone landlines performed poorly. Few Indians were connected to the national system. Once private cellphone companies were permitted to operate, however, access to telephone service mushroomed. In 1991 the country had only 5.1 million phones in aggregate; by November 2006, an average of 5.2 million new telephones were going into service each month. At that point India had 153.3 million of them. By May 2012 there were 960 million telephone subscribers, 929 million of whom used mobile phones, in a population of 1.2 billion. How far and how quickly reform and privatization proceed will do much to set the rate of Indian economic growth. That, in turn, will determine how rapidly, if at all, India catches up with the country against which it often fastest-growing, measures and itself—the economically final member most important of the BRICs one: China. and the As largest, with the other BRICs, a particular feature of Chinese public life that has enhanced its
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economic performance in the past threatens to constrain it in the future. As in the case of India, China's asset-turned-liability is its political system. The Limitations of Autocracy
Descriptions of China's economic performance invariably feature superlatives, and rightly so. The country has sustained the highest annual economic growth rate of any major country— almost 10 percent—for three decades, which is the best performance in recorded history. In so doing it has lifted more than 500 million people out of poverty. It has become the world's largest exporter, the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the world's largest market for automobiles and the country with the largest store second-largest of economy hard-currency and is reserves. on course It to has replace also become the United the world's States as the global leader in total annual output. Every country's economy will be affected by how well China's performs in future.
China's autocratic government has not only presided over the country's three-decade run of resounding economic success; it has contributed to that success. It has excelled in installing infrastructure. It has managed to give virtually all its citizens a basic education. It has conducted, on the whole, prudent macroeconomic policies. It coped well with the economic crisis of 2008-09. When the recession struck, the regime responded quickly, implementing in November 2008 a stimulus package equal to 14 percent of GDP. This cushioned the impact of the massive global downturn on China. growth-friendly Its autocratic policies. character The fact probably that Chinese helped authorities the regime do to not carry have out to its respect the civil liberties or the political opinions of those they govern made it easier to devote resources to building roads, schools, and power plants, and to respond quickly to economic shocks.
Whatever the economic advantages China has derived from its autocratic political system, however, it has become a wasting asset. Autocracy will retard efforts to do the four key things China must do to succeed: achieve high productivity; add more value to the products that are made in the country; rely less on exports and more on domestic consumption; and maintain a stable political framework. Only a political system that is more democratic—as democracy is properly understood—can deliver these outcomes.
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Democracy is a hybrid political form, the product of the merger of two distinct political traditions. One is popular sovereignty—rule by the people through freely elected representatives—which makes the government accountable to the governed. The other is liberty, more commonly called freedom, which includes economic liberty in the form of private property as well as religious liberty and the political liberties embodied in the American Bill of Rights. Whatever they may be called in different democratic political cultures, these liberties are protected in all functioning democracies by the rule of law.
Each of these two traditions is relevant to China's economic agenda. Higher productivity, adding more value to what the country produces, and shifting from selling to foreigners to selling to Chinese will require more liberty. Higher domestic consumption will also require wider popular participation in the governance of the country, as will the more purely political task of keeping the country stable enough for productive economic activity to take place.
The greatest potential for enhancing productivity lies in the financial sector. China allocates resources inefficiently because the government directs investment through its control of the country's major banks. It would do better to entrust this task to private, profit-seeking organizations and individuals—private banks and investors—who would do it more effectively. For this purpose China needs more economic liberty—that is, better-defined and more secure property rights, which are crucial for many of a market economy's functions, including the allocation of capital. To maintain a high rate of economic growth, China will also have to rely less on the kind of unskilled manufacturing that has played a major role in its economy for three decades. It will have to move to more lucrative stages in the production process, such as inventing, designing, financing, packaging, and marketing rather than simply assembling products. This involves participating in the cutting-edge industries of the 21st century— biotechnology, for example—which rely on scientific discovery and technological innovation.
Here, too, economic liberty matters. As important as secure property rights are for improving the financial system, they are also a prerequisite for innovation. Inventors and entrepreneurs spend time and risk their money in search of new processes and devices, and to found new companies, when
EFTA00718151
they are confident of reaping the financial rewards if they succeed. They cannot have such confidence in China, where businesses must have government approval and give government officials a share of their profits in order to operate.
The Chinese government will have to permit greater liberty in other ways in order to ensure economic growth. The more ingenuity and creativity a job requires, the greater the freedom there must be to do it well.The more ingenuity and creativity a job requires, the greater the freedom there must be to do it well. Factory workers assembling computers need nimble hands and a basic level of literacy, but not broad latitude to experiment and to meet and discuss their work with colleagues. Designers and inventors do. Scientific advances require institutions (in the West, most of them are universities) in which freedom of inquiry is taken for granted. Along with increasing productivity and contributing more to the overall value of what it makes, China must reduce its reliance on exports to continue its rate of economic growth. Growth will then require greater domestic consumption, and to raise it the country can usefully make two changes, each involving one of democracy's component parts. One change is to establish rural property rights—to extend, that is, this form of liberty to those living outside China's cities. Farmers usually cannot get unrestricted title to the land they work, which means they cannot use it as much-discussed collateral for official borrowing, document as do issued most in farmers November all over 2013 the promised world. A steps in that direction. The other change is the expansion of the social safety net. The more generous social welfare programs become, the greater China's domestic consumption will be and the less the Chinese people will feel they must save. In Western countries, public pressure, the result of democracy's other defining feature, popular sovereignty, led to the programs of social protection that all now enjoy. To be sure, Chinese authorities are already committed to spending more on health care. But if the Chinese people do gain a measure of political power they are likely to use it to press for increased government spending on social welfare programs.
For China to shift its economic policies and modify its institutions to sustain a high rate of growth assumes the maintenance of the stable political framework that all markets—global, national, and local—require.
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In the Chinese case, stability cannot be assumed. Economic growth, with its particular Chinese characteristics, has created discontent, public expressions of which have become larger and increasingly frequent, with some demonstrations involving as many as 10,000 people. A more accountable government is needed to contain and ultimately reduce the rising level of publicly expressed discontent, which, if not checked, has the potential to shake the political foundations of China's economic growth. Accountability comes about through transparency in the conduct of public business, for which a free press is crucial. Accountability also comes about through the power of the people to replace their rulers peacefully through free elections: that is, through the popular sovereignty that is one of democracy's two constituent elements. Accountable government is particularly relevant to dealing with the two problems that have given rise to China's popular protests: pollution and corruption.
China's environmental problems stem ultimately from the country's lack of political accountability. The national government has promulgated laws and regulations to prevent environmental abuse, but local authorities frequently disregard them. These officials allow factories to continue to discharge toxic material into the air and water because to stop them would in many cases forfeit economic growth and thus jobs, tax revenues, and bribes. The absence of accountability in government lies at the heart of corruption as well, and anger at officials who abuse their positions for personal gain has inspired many of China's protests. As with pollution, China's rulers have sought to combat corruption with Communist-style, party-led campaigns, which consist of slogans, exhortations, and a few token punishments to give the impression of seriousness. This approach has done little to solve the problem, even in its recently stepped-up mode. As with pollution, reducing corruption requires generating public pressure on officials who abuse their power. A free press that can bring abuses to light is one source of pressure. Another is vesting the public with the power to remove corrupt officials through free elections.
Will the Chinese political system become more democratic? Most Communist Party officials will oppose both features of democracy—liberty and popular sovereignty—because the more there is of each, the less they will have of what they value most: power. On the other hand, for three decades the party has been willing to do whatever seemed necessary to
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secure growth, including relinquishing some of its own prerogatives. If it concludes that only more democratic governance can deliver the growth that will preserve its leadership, then China is likely to become more democratic, with wider liberties available, especially in economic matters, and a greater measure of public participation in public life. Because other countries have come to depend so heavily on Chinese economic growth, the whole world, not only the people of China, has a stake in Chinese democracy. And because the potential contribution of the other three BRICs to global growth is so large, the whole world has a stake as well in the containment of Brazilian populism, the lifting of Russia's energy curse, and the reform of Indian democracy.
Michael Mandelbaum is the Christian A. Herter Professor ofAmerican Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins University's School ofAdvanced International Studies. This essay is adapted from his new book The Road to Global Prosperity, published by Simon & Schuster.
I. See Philip Hanson, "The Sustainability of Russia's Energy Power: Implications for the Russian Economy", UCL Center for the Study of Economic and Social Change in Europe, Economics Working Paper No. 84 (December 2007).
2. "Distributional coalitions" is Mancur Olson's concept, described in The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (Yale University Press, 1982).
EFTA00718154

📅 Apr 18, 2014

(no subject)

From: COLOM, Olivier

To: jeevacation@gmail.com

When are you in Paris? Happy to catch up

When are you in Paris? Happy to catch up

📅 Apr 18, 2014

Re:

From: COLOM, Olivier

To: jeevacation@gmail.com

Ok De: Jeffrey Epstein [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com] Envoyé Friday, April 18, 2014 12:53 PM À COLOM, Olivier Objet: Re: 27 2014-04-18 6:06 GMT-04:00 COLOM, Olivier <>: When are you in Paris? Happy to catch up De Jeffrey Epstein [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com] Envoyé Friday, April 18, 2014 12:01 PM À COLOM, Olivier Objet : news? please note The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended

Ok

De: Jeffrey Epstein [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com]
Envoyé Friday, April 18, 2014 12:53 PM
À COLOM, Olivier
Objet: Re:

27

2014-04-18 6:06 GMT-04:00 COLOM, Olivier <>: When are you in Paris? Happy to catch up

De Jeffrey Epstein [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com]
Envoyé Friday, April 18, 2014 12:01 PM
À COLOM, Olivier
Objet :

news?

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation®gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

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EFTA00718155

message, nous vous remercions de le détruire immédiatement et d'en avertir l'expéditeur. Toute utilisation ou diffusion non autorisée de ce message et de ses annexes est interdite. Tout message électronique est susceptible d'altération et son intégrité ne peut être assurée.

Le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild ne pourra être tenu pour responsable des erreurs ou omissions contenues dans ce message. Ce message ne constitue en aucun cas un engagement du Groupe Edmond de Rothschild, sous réserve de tout accord par écrit entre vous et le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild. Conformément à la Loi Informatique et Libertés, n°78-17 du 6 juillet 1978, modifiée par la loi n°2004-801 du 6 août 2004, toute personne a le droit d'interroger le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild en vue de savoir si les traitements automatisés dont il dispose contiennent des informations nominatives la concernant, les faire rectifier ou les faire supprimer.

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein

Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation@gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

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Le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild ne pourra être tenu pour responsable des erreurs ou omissions contenues dans ce message. Ce message ne constitue en aucun cas un engagement du Groupe Edmond de Rothschild, sous réserve de tout accord par écrit entre vous et le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild. Conformément à la Loi Informatique et Libertés, n°78-17 du 6 juillet 1978, modifiée par la loi n°2004-801 du 6 août 2004, toute personne a le droit d'interroger le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild en vue de savoir si les traitements automatisés dont il dispose contiennent des informations nominatives la concernant, les faire rectifier ou les faire supprimer.

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EFTA00718156

📅 Apr 18, 2014 FROM EPSTEIN

(no subject)

From: jeevacation@gmail.com

To: COLOM, Olivier

news? please note The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation®gmail.

news?

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation®gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

Ensemble adoptons des gestes responsables : N'imprimez ce mail que si nécessaire.

Ce message et ses annexes sont strictement confidentiels et établis à l'attention exclusive des destinataires prévus par l'expéditeur. Si vous n'êtes pas le destinataire de ce

EFTA00718155

message, nous vous remercions de le détruire immédiatement et d'en avertir l'expéditeur. Toute utilisation ou diffusion non autorisée de ce message et de ses annexes est interdite. Tout message électronique est susceptible d'altération et son intégrité ne peut être assurée.

Le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild ne pourra être tenu pour responsable des erreurs ou omissions contenues dans ce message. Ce message ne constitue en aucun cas un engagement du Groupe Edmond de Rothschild, sous réserve de tout accord par écrit entre vous et le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild. Conformément à la Loi Informatique et Libertés, n°78-17 du 6 juillet 1978, modifiée par la loi n°2004-801 du 6 août 2004, toute personne a le droit d'interroger le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild en vue de savoir si les traitements automatisés dont il dispose contiennent des informations nominatives la concernant, les faire rectifier ou les faire supprimer.

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein

Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation@gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

Ensemble adoptons des gestes responsables : N'imprimez ce mail que si nécessaire.

Ce message et ses annexes sont strictement confidentiels et établis à l'attention exclusive des destinataires prévus par l'expéditeur. Si vous n'êtes pas le destinataire de ce message, nous vous remercions de le détruire immédiatement et d'en avertir l'expéditeur. Toute utilisation ou diffusion non autorisée de ce message et de ses annexes est interdite. Tout message électronique est susceptible d'altération et son intégrité ne peut être assurée.

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Français I English I Italiano I Deutsch I Espaffol I Chinese e2004- La Compagnie Financière Edmond de Rothschild Banque - tous droits réservés

EFTA00718156

📅 Apr 18, 2014 FROM EPSTEIN

Re:

From: jeevacation@gmail.com

To: COLOM, Olivier

27 2014-04-18 6:06 GMT-04:00 COLOM, Olivier <>: When are you in Paris? Happy to catch up De Jeffrey Epstein [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com] Envoyé Friday, April 18, 2014 12:01 PM À COLOM, Olivier Objet : news? please note The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this co

27

2014-04-18 6:06 GMT-04:00 COLOM, Olivier <>: When are you in Paris? Happy to catch up

De Jeffrey Epstein [mailto:jeevacation@gmail.com]
Envoyé Friday, April 18, 2014 12:01 PM
À COLOM, Olivier
Objet :

news?

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation®gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

Ensemble adoptons des gestes responsables : N'imprimez ce mail que si nécessaire.

Ce message et ses annexes sont strictement confidentiels et établis à l'attention exclusive des destinataires prévus par l'expéditeur. Si vous n'êtes pas le destinataire de ce

EFTA00718155

message, nous vous remercions de le détruire immédiatement et d'en avertir l'expéditeur. Toute utilisation ou diffusion non autorisée de ce message et de ses annexes est interdite. Tout message électronique est susceptible d'altération et son intégrité ne peut être assurée.

Le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild ne pourra être tenu pour responsable des erreurs ou omissions contenues dans ce message. Ce message ne constitue en aucun cas un engagement du Groupe Edmond de Rothschild, sous réserve de tout accord par écrit entre vous et le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild. Conformément à la Loi Informatique et Libertés, n°78-17 du 6 juillet 1978, modifiée par la loi n°2004-801 du 6 août 2004, toute personne a le droit d'interroger le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild en vue de savoir si les traitements automatisés dont il dispose contiennent des informations nominatives la concernant, les faire rectifier ou les faire supprimer.

please note

The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of Jeffrey Epstein

Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to jeevacation@gmail.com, and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved

Ensemble adoptons des gestes responsables : N'imprimez ce mail que si nécessaire.

Ce message et ses annexes sont strictement confidentiels et établis à l'attention exclusive des destinataires prévus par l'expéditeur. Si vous n'êtes pas le destinataire de ce message, nous vous remercions de le détruire immédiatement et d'en avertir l'expéditeur. Toute utilisation ou diffusion non autorisée de ce message et de ses annexes est interdite. Tout message électronique est susceptible d'altération et son intégrité ne peut être assurée.

Le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild ne pourra être tenu pour responsable des erreurs ou omissions contenues dans ce message. Ce message ne constitue en aucun cas un engagement du Groupe Edmond de Rothschild, sous réserve de tout accord par écrit entre vous et le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild. Conformément à la Loi Informatique et Libertés, n°78-17 du 6 juillet 1978, modifiée par la loi n°2004-801 du 6 août 2004, toute personne a le droit d'interroger le Groupe Edmond de Rothschild en vue de savoir si les traitements automatisés dont il dispose contiennent des informations nominatives la concernant, les faire rectifier ou les faire supprimer.

Français I English I Italiano I Deutsch I Espaffol I Chinese e2004- La Compagnie Financière Edmond de Rothschild Banque - tous droits réservés

EFTA00718156

📅 Apr 15, 2014 REDACTED

(no subject)

From: Boris Nikolic

Please let me time that works for you. Boris

Please let me time that works for you.

Boris

📅 Apr 17, 2014 REDACTED

(no subject)

From: Boris Nikolic

Will need your advice re this. B

Will need your advice re this.

B

📅 Apr 17, 2014

Re: Can we please talk?

From: Yuri Milner

To: Boris Nikolic

Boris, of course. Anna (cc'd) will help to coordinate the call on Friday or Saturday. Yuri Sent from my iPad

Boris, of course. Anna (cc'd) will help to coordinate the call on Friday or Saturday.

Yuri

Sent from my iPad

📅 Apr 18, 2014 FROM EPSTEIN

Re: FW: Can we please talk?

From: jeevacation@gmail.com

To: Boris Nikolic

I bill and I accepted your word as a commitment . 2 you changed your Ming 7 months after agreeing. It's awkward . 3. I need your help as a result 4 back office, 1ps , flow . I will start withour you. . Ppm only satb27 editions . I relied on your word.

I bill and I accepted your word as a commitment . 2 you changed your Ming 7 months after agreeing. It's awkward . 3. I need your help as a result 4 back office, 1ps , flow . I will start withour you. . Ppm only satb27 editions . I relied on your word.